The security environment in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region is witnessing numerous emerging threats. These are connected, on one hand, to the repercussions of the war in Gaza, the Houthi involvement in the escalation path in the region, and the subsequent “militarization” of alliances and interactions in the Red Sea area. On the other hand, they are tied to the increasing activities of non-state armed actors and the initiation of cooperative relationships among them, based on shared interests. A prominent example of this is the growing relationship between the Houthi movement in Yemen and both Al-Qaeda in Yemen, known as “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” and the Somali Al-Shabaab movement. U.S. intelligence estimates have pointed to growing cooperation between these parties, prompting an examination of the directions and limits of this cooperation, the nature of the relationships linking these militias, and the implications of this for regional security.
Growing Relations Between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
When discussing the dimensions of the relationship between the Somali Al-Shabaab movement and the Houthis, it is essential to consider the general framework of the Houthis’ relationship with Al-Qaeda, and the Iranian role in fostering rapprochement between the two sides in recent years. In this context, it should not be overlooked that Al-Qaeda in Yemen, known as “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” has become the strongest branch of Al-Qaeda in the Middle East. This has increased the attractiveness and opportunities for rapprochement between the two sides, based on what can be termed “mutual dependency” and the achievement of shared interests, transcending the traditional ideological considerations that have governed their relations for years. In this regard, several aspects and dimensions of the rapprochement between the Houthis on one side and “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” on the other can be observed, considering the following factors:
1. Iranian Mediation in Houthi-Al-Qaeda Rapprochement:
Iran has been the most significant actor in recent years in bringing together the Houthis and the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda. Iran began this process in 2015 when it held secret talks with Al-Qaeda to release some of its prisoners, including an Iranian diplomat, in exchange for Iran freeing five prominent Al-Qaeda members it had imprisoned. In 2016, Tehran mediated between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda to conduct a large number of prisoner exchange deals in Al-Bayda Governorate, southeast of Sanaa, and in the city of Mukalla in Hadramout Governorate. This Iranian mediation between the two sides has continued to this day.
It can be said that the Iranian mediation between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in Yemen has relied on several key considerations. The first is Iran’s significant control over the current Al-Qaeda leader, “Mohammad Salah Zidan,” known as Saif al-Adl, who is reportedly in Iran. The second is that Al-Qaeda’s central leadership practically moved to Iran after the killing of “Ayman al-Zawahiri” in a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan in August 2022. The third is that the ideological and operational orientations of the current Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, Khalid Batarfi, show a tendency to overcome ideological differences with factions aligned with Iran and to draw closer to them on the basis of “waging a war of attrition against Western presence and interests.” This suggests that there are operational and ideological shifts that have brought Al-Qaeda in Yemen closer to what is known as the Axis of Resistance. The fourth consideration is that since Iran began establishing relations with Al-Qaeda in the late 1990s, it has aimed to neutralize the threat of the most dangerous Sunni terrorist organization and direct it against Western interests and presence.
2. “Unity of Objectives” Between the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in Yemen:
Several factors and variables in recent years in Yemen have led to the growth of shared goals between Al-Qaeda on one side and the Houthis on the other. The first is that the structural composition of the Yemeni Presidential Council, formed in 2022, is primarily based on the most engaged Yemeni politicians in counterterrorism efforts, namely President “Rashad al-Alimi” and his deputy “Aidarus al-Zoubaidi.” The second factor is that the liberated areas under the legitimate government and the areas controlled by the Southern Transitional Council represent common targets for both sides. The third factor is that confronting Western presence and interests in Yemen and the region is a principal common objective for both sides. For Al-Qaeda, the Western axis has historically been its primary enemy, and for Iranian-aligned factions, particularly the Houthis, this axis is currently the main enemy. This represents a significant point of convergence between the two sides.
3. The Revival of Al-Qaeda’s Operational Activity in Yemen:
Al-Qaeda’s attacks in Yemen have numbered nearly 150 from late 2022 to the present, with the latest being a violent attack on a Southern Transitional Council military position in Abyan Governorate on August 17th. Al-Qaeda’s attacks have primarily targeted the legitimate government forces and Southern Transitional Council forces. During this period, there has been an almost complete halt in the organization’s attacks against the Houthis. Some reports indicated that “Khalid Batarfi” met with a group of Al-Qaeda military leaders in Yemen in January 2023, focusing on “intensifying operations in Shabwa, Abyan, Hadramout, and Aden against the Southern Transitional Council while instructing leaders not to operate in Houthi-controlled areas.” Additionally, it has been noted that the organization was equipped with advanced military and armament capabilities, including the introduction of drones into its operations and military arsenal.
These indicators suggest several important implications. The first is that one of the consequences of the Houthi-Al-Qaeda rapprochement has been the enhancement of Al-Qaeda’s military and armament capabilities, as evidenced by reports of the organization using Iranian-made drones in its recent operations. The second is that the organization has launched extensive recruitment campaigns for new fighters, particularly from Arab tribes in southern Yemen, and has even invited the Islah Party (the Muslim Brotherhood) on several occasions to ally with it and leave the legitimacy camp. The third is that Al-Qaeda, facing significant internal crises, particularly after losing all its top leaders, declining financial support, and the overall weakening of the parent organization, turned to a pragmatic alliance with the Houthis. This alliance was practically translated into acquiring explosive technologies, as well as drones and other weapons. The fourth implication is that the organization has, within this new strategy, rebuilt and reorganized its ranks. Some Yemeni circles report that the leader “Osama al-Diyani” was appointed as the official responsible for communication and coordination with the Houthis, obtaining drones, alongside “Ibn al-Madani,” a nickname for Saif al-Adl’s son, who was chosen as the head of the organization’s external operations, whether against Western interests or the Arab coalition. The fifth is that the organization’s focus on attacking southern areas is due to their strategic importance as regions overlooking the sea.
4. Changing Al-Qaeda’s Rhetoric Towards the Houthis:
There has been a notable shift in the media rhetoric of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is broadcast through the “Al-Malahim” Foundation, the organization’s media arm. This rhetoric has seen significant and fundamental changes in its approach to dealing with the Houthis, on several levels. The first is a decline in the assessment of the Houthi threat to Al-Qaeda, with a rise in anti-imperialist and anti-Western rhetoric. The second is a retreat from the traditional excommunication of the Houthis, such as labeling them “Rafidah” (a derogatory term for Shia Muslims). The third is the absence of any mention of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and even occasional praise for them, which is a stark departure from the traditional media approach of Al-Qaeda towards the Houthis.
Critical Timing
In the context of the ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since last November and the resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast, U.S. intelligence reported on June 11, 2024, that the Houthis are interested in cooperating with the Somali al-Shabaab group, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda. This cooperation aims to provide advanced weapon systems to al-Shabaab in exchange for expanding the group’s influence over shipping operations in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The specific types of weapons to be exchanged are unclear, but it is likely that the Houthis will provide al-Shabaab with offensive drones or surface-to-air missiles.
U.S. intelligence is investigating whether Iran is involved in this potential agreement. Despite Tehran’s participation in anti-piracy operations since 2008, it has not prevented Iran from using pirates to smuggle weapons to its regional proxies. Iranian arms have reached the Houthis through the Horn of Africa, with al-Shabaab playing a role in facilitating this.
There are two main assumptions regarding Iran’s role in this potential rapprochement. The first assumption suggests that Iran has a direct role and interest in fostering relations between itself and al-Shabaab, and consequently between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. This assumption is based on several key points. Firstly, some Somali reports have indicated flows of weapons from Yemen to Somalia. According to the “Global Organized Crime Index 2023,” Somalia remains a critical hub for illicit arms trafficking, with increased illegal arms flows from Yemen to Somalia during the reporting period. Additionally, anti-aircraft weapons were detected on some hijacked vessels near Somali shores. Secondly, a 2018 UN report revealed Iran’s involvement in funding and arming al-Shabaab, violating sanctions imposed on the group. Thirdly, in 2017, Iran procured uranium from mines controlled by al-Shabaab to advance its nuclear activities, with the Houthis potentially playing a central role through the port of Hodeidah, possibly turning the port into a transit point for exchanging weapons and energy supplies.
The second assumption is that there are no existing ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. This assumption is based on several considerations. First, the United States has not found any evidence of such ties. Second, there is a sectarian difference between the groups: the Houthis are Zaydi Shia, while al-Shabaab is known for its opposition to Shia Islam. Furthermore, there has been no prior cooperation between them, and the local al-Qaeda branch in Yemen, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has built its reputation in recent years on fighting the Houthis.
Motivations for the Rapprochement
Iranian Motivations: Over the years, Tehran has shown interest in establishing a presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. With the outbreak of the Gaza war, Iran has exploited it to advance its interests and those of its proxies by supplying the Houthis with explosive-laden boats and naval mines. Some sources also indicate that Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders and advisors provide intelligence to help the Houthis target ships in the Red Sea. In March, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior military advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, stated that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s naval and air forces should focus on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, describing the two seas as part of Iran’s strategic depth, and suggesting that Tehran should extend its strategic depth by 5,000 kilometers.
From this perspective, Tehran views a foothold in key international chokepoints as a threat to global trade routes, which could serve as leverage in negotiations with international powers, particularly regarding the Iranian nuclear deal. Iranian-backed cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab would allow Tehran to control both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and provide necessary training to Somali pirates, equipping them with information to conduct attacks beyond the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, alongside Houthi attacks.
Houthi Motivations: It is unclear if the Houthis would cease their attacks on ships in the Red Sea without a ceasefire in Gaza. Therefore, the group might seek to engage with al-Shabaab due to its affiliation with al-Qaeda, known for its combat experience and ability to carry out suicide operations, which the Houthis lack.
Furthermore, if the Gaza conflict ends, the Houthi group aims to maintain the momentum gained from its anti-Zionist rhetoric, following a decline in its popularity within Yemeni circles. Thus, they might seek to build relationships with al-Shabaab, despite ideological differences, to reposition themselves from a local actor to a regional one capable of threatening Western interests, particularly those of the United States, Israel’s main strategic ally.
Additionally, a deal with al-Shabaab could provide the Houthis with capital to fund their military activities, especially as the U.S. and its allies track financial flows to the Houthi group. Al-Shabaab has the financial assets needed, as it reportedly receives over $100 million annually through various funding sources, including extortion, taxes, road fees, and illicit trade, along with numerous affiliated businesses and limited governmental oversight in Somalia’s financial sector.
Al-Shabaab Motivations: If a deal is struck between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, the latter would benefit from access to a new source of weapons, including drones. Currently, al-Shabaab only has access to missiles, mortars, and homemade explosive devices used against the Somali government, while Iran provides the Houthis with drones and short-range ballistic missiles.
Al-Shabaab is also looking to regain momentum amidst the current turmoil in the Horn of Africa, marked by tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The group views this unstable environment as a fertile ground to expand its activities and terrorist operations, thereby enhancing its role as a regional actor capable of destabilizing the area and bolstering its global terrorist standing.
Potential Consequences
The region extending from the southern Red Sea to the eastern Gulf of Aden is one of the most dangerous areas, and a potential rapprochement between the Houthis and both al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somali al-Shabaab could lead to increased chaos and instability in the Red Sea region. This may also impede efforts to resolve crises in Yemen and Somalia, as outlined below:
Militarization of the Region: Houthi involvement in the ongoing escalation in the Middle East through the Red Sea has increased the group’s strategic importance to Iran’s maritime policy. This likely explains Iran’s desire to strengthen ties between the Houthis and both al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabaab, aiming to establish a presence in critical maritime chokepoints and expand its influence in the region. If Houthi attacks in the Red Sea result in a ceasefire agreement, Western powers might use this situation to extend their dominance in the region under the guise of protecting maritime routes, particularly given the establishment of military and Western presence in the Red Sea.
This intention is reflected in international responses to Houthi attacks. In addition to noticeable military bases in the Red Sea, the U.S. launched Operation “Guardian of Prosperity” in response to the Houthi disruptions to global trade. The U.S. and the U.K. have also carried out joint attacks against Houthi sites in Yemen. Furthermore, several European countries announced Operation “Speedy” in the Red Sea to protect navigation in the region last February. Consequently, the competition among regional and international powers for a presence in the Red Sea could lead to further militarization of the area and increased intervention in the internal affairs of regional states, potentially threatening regional security and stability.
Exacerbation of Organized Crime: Following international successes in combating Somali piracy since 2017, which had diminished in recent years after peaking in 2011 with around 212 attacks, Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea have created maritime instability, paving the way for a resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast. According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in April, approximately 33 piracy incidents against ships were recorded in the first three months of 2024, up from 27 incidents in the same period in 2023. The Red Sea coast remains a fertile ground for extremist groups, and if Houthi-al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda ties are considered, al-Shabaab might exploit the maritime insecurity to smuggle drugs, weapons, and engage in human trafficking, alongside the possibility of coordinated attacks in the Red Sea. Both al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab view Western countries as primary targets.
Reclassification of the Houthis as a Terrorist Group: Houthi attacks threaten global trade and major powers’ interests, prompting the Biden administration to classify the group as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)” entity on January 17, 2024, as opposed to the previous designation of “Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)” by the former administration. The U.S. had removed the Houthis from the terrorist list on February 16, 2021, to facilitate humanitarian aid to Yemen, which is suffering from a severe humanitarian crisis. The White House confirmed that measures against the Houthis would not affect food and medicine shipments to Yemeni ports. Now, with the potential coordination between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, classified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S., the American administration might reconsider its stance, as noted by U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking in July. This reclassification could impact Yemen, potentially creating obstacles to the delivery of essential goods like food and fuel to the Yemeni population.
Increased Internal Crises in Yemen and Somalia: Beyond maritime security threats and the regional security environment, the potential rapprochement between the Houthis, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab could complicate the situation in both Yemen and Somalia. On one hand, Houthi cooperation with al-Qaeda could escalate violence and confrontations with Yemeni government forces, favoring a military solution over political settlement. On the other hand, Houthi cooperation with al-Shabaab could increase al-Shabaab’s military capabilities through weapons reaching the group via Yemeni and Red Sea routes, potentially leading to broader attacks in Somali territory and expanded influence.
In conclusion, the growing relations between the Houthis, al-Qaeda in Yemen, and al-Shabaab in Somalia reflect an increasing role of non-state armed actors in the regional landscape, leading to several negative consequences. These include additional challenges to regional security systems, threats to maritime security particularly in the Red Sea, and heightened difficulties in achieving comprehensive political and peaceful resolutions to crises in the region. These developments raise questions about the effectiveness of international approaches to dealing with non-state armed actors in the Middle East and Africa.
