The fall of several northern Malian cities into the hands of armed groups in 2012 marked a significant turning point in the competition for the Sahel and West Africa, particularly through military means. The rapid collapse of the Malian army in the face of the advance of Azawad fighters and fighters from the “Ansar Dine” movement, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, placed the capital (Bamako) in a precarious position, with insurgents only hundreds of kilometers away. This situation prompted the former transitional president, Dioncounda Traoré, to call upon France for immediate military intervention in January 2013 to save his country.
France’s response to this request was swift. Within just a few days, French air and ground forces were deployed in Mali, successfully regaining control of cities previously held by armed groups. However, they were unable to eradicate these groups entirely, leading to the expansion of their activities into neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger. This expansion provided a pretext for the increased presence of French troops in the region, ostensibly to combat armed groups, through Operation “Barkhane,” launched in 2014. This operation encompassed Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.
In 2020, France announced, in collaboration with several European and African allies, the start of Operation “Takuba,” aimed at fighting alongside the Malian and Nigerien armies against armed groups that posed an escalating threat to Sahel and West African nations. Under the same pretext of combating armed groups, the United States, Germany, and Italy also deployed military forces in Niger. Washington sent special forces to Chad, which faced triple armed threats: groups affiliated with al-Qaeda on its border with Niger, the Boko Haram insurgency along its border with Nigeria, and threats from armed Chadian rebel groups along its border with Libya.
It is crucial to note that economic interests and strategic dimensions primarily drive foreign nations in strengthening their influence in the region under the guise of protection and training. The failure to achieve these objectives has been publicly cited as a significant reason behind a series of coups in several Sahelian countries in recent years, which resulted in the expulsion of French forces from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and their replacement by Russian support, including military equipment and troops in some instances.
In light of this new reality, France and the United States are now maneuvering to redeploy their forces to other countries in the region, while Turkey has intensified its competitive entry through arms sales.
France in the African Sahel: From Influence to Adaptation
France’s colonial past in many African countries in North, West, East, and Southern Africa allowed it to retain considerable influence in these nations post-independence. This situation enabled France to benefit from the continent’s resources for decades under various agreements that appeared to be partnerships and cooperation but were fundamentally aimed at preserving Paris’s economic and strategic interests.
Former French President Jacques Chirac famously stated that “without Africa, France will slide into the ranks of third world countries.” Prior to him, Socialist President François Mitterrand argued that “France, without Africa, will have no history in the twenty-first century.” These quotes highlight France’s deep economic dependence on Africa; its companies dominate various resources in the Sahel and West Africa, with some African countries providing about 25% of France’s nuclear reactor needs. Approximately 80% of Africa’s extracted resources and minerals are overseen by French entities for export to other continents.
To justify its overwhelming presence in Africa post-independence, France emphasized that it was the true protector of these countries and their ruling regimes. Consequently, it deployed military forces in several of these nations to counter any potential risks. Over the last six decades, France has conducted numerous military operations, some independently and others alongside African, Western, or international forces.
France began military interventions early in the independence era in various African countries, such as Gabon in 1964 and Chad between 1968 and 1972, subsequently expanding its interventions to the Central African Republic in 1979, the Comoros in 1989, and Rwanda in 1990.
In the initial phases, French military interventions in Africa focused on protecting ruling regimes to safeguard its interests, thwarting numerous coups and failed rebellions. Later on, the rationale for French military interventions also included countering armed groups, as seen in Mali in 2012 through Operation “Serval,” which subsequently transitioned to Operation “Barkhane,” expanding to encompass several neighboring countries facing armed threats.
However, the failure of French forces to curtail the threat posed by armed groups in the Sahel over more than a decade led to a backlash, with public protests demanding their withdrawal. Several regional armies capitalized on this rising public discontent, executing military coups that ousted civilian leaders allied with France, while proclaiming sovereignty. As a result, French forces were expelled from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, marking a significant decline in French influence in its traditional sphere of presence across security, economic, and diplomatic dimensions.
Consequently, France is now seeking mechanisms for adaptation that would allow it to remain in the region while securing its military bases in other Sahelian and West African countries to avert further expulsions. Recent reports from French media suggested that French President Emmanuel Macron is considering reducing the number of troops in Senegal and Gabon from 350 to 100, as well as similar cuts in Ivory Coast, which hosts about 600 soldiers. In Chad, Paris aims to maintain around 300 troops from an original deployment of approximately 1,000.
The United States: A Difficult Withdrawal and the Search for New Destinations
The series of military coups that have swept through the Sahel and West Africa since 2020 has placed the U.S. administration in a complicated position. The U.S. found itself faced with two difficult choices: either to maintain its military presence to protect its strategic interests by engaging with the new military rulers or to oppose the coups, in line with its continental strategy centered on democracy and human rights.
With no third option apparent, the United States has struggled to navigate the new dynamics in the region through hard power, evidenced by its expulsion from Niger and threats of expulsion from Chad. The announcement by the military council ruling Niamey in March 2024 to terminate the military cooperation treaty with Washington, established in 2012, marked a complete standstill in U.S.-Niger relations.
The military council, which took power after the coup that ousted civilian president Mohamed Bazoum in late July 2023, cited several reasons for its decision, including labeling the agreement as “illegal” and a violation of “all constitutional and democratic norms.” In response to this official position, which drew significant public support through protests mirroring calls for French troop withdrawals—albeit to a lesser extent—the United States agreed to withdraw its forces, setting mid-September 2024 as the deadline for the departure of its last soldiers.
The U.S. withdrawal began with Air Base 101 in the capital, Niamey, with the U.S. and Nigerien defense ministries stating the operation was “uncomplicated.” A total of 766 personnel departed, alongside six aircraft, including two Raptor helicopters, four drones, and 1,593 tons of equipment.
The next step is a gradual withdrawal from Air Base 201 in Agadez, a facility deemed critical by the United States, which houses significant aviation equipment.
In a parallel scenario to its exit from Niger—though less acute—the United States received a request from Chad for its forces to leave, attributed to the absence of an agreement permitting their presence. Reports indicate a Pentagon spokesman noted the departure of around 60 U.S. personnel from Chad to Germany for continued operations. The full withdrawal process would follow subsequently.
The retreat of U.S. forces in these two nations, along with the prior withdrawal of French troops from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, coincides with an increasing Russian presence. While Chad has not expelled French troops or welcomed Russian forces yet, burgeoning ties between N’Djamena and Moscow are evident. Following Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s visit to Moscow in early January 2024, the Russian foreign minister visited Chad in June of the same year—his first such trip in decades.
Nevertheless, the United States has not resigned itself to this growing Russian encroachment on its influence. Reports from French media suggest that Abidjan has greenlighted the establishment of a U.S. base in Ouidah, northwestern region, where jihadist groups in the Sahel threaten the Gulf of Guinea states. This signals a potential repositioning of U.S. military presence in the area.
Additionally, senior U.S. military officials have held extensive discussions with African defense ministers at the recent “Defense Leaders in Africa” conference held in Botswana—marking the first such event since it was initiated by the United States in 2017—which underscores Washington’s ongoing efforts to seek new footholds on the continent.
“Wagner” and “The African Legion”: Russia’s Entry into Africa
Following its diminished presence in Africa since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has recently reasserted itself on the continent through various avenues. The recent military coups in the Sahel and rising popular and official backlash against French presence have highlighted security and military engagement as a primary gateway for Russia in traditional French spheres of influence.
The strengthening ties between Russia and Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have been facilitated by the fact that some military leaders involved in the coups received training in Russia and maintained good relations with certain circles there.
Currently, Russia does not officially maintain any military bases in Africa. However, since 2017, it has broadened its military interests in its relations with the continent through cooperation agreements involving arms exports and military training.
The “Wagner Group” has emerged as one of Moscow’s tools for gaining influence. This group outwardly presents itself as a security apparatus that any African or non-African country can contract. However, it serves as a means for Russia to gauge internal situations and establish a stable presence, laying the groundwork for securing a military base that aligns with its objectives.
The Wagner Group and the Landscape of Presence in Africa
The Wagner Group appeared in 2014, coinciding with the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, with its first external operations starting in Syria in 2015. Its presence in Africa dates back to 2017, directed by its late leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef.”
There are conflicting reports regarding the number of African countries hosting Wagner forces, but it is confirmed that they are at least present in four African nations: Libya, particularly in the cities of Sirte in the east and Jufra in the southeast; the Central African Republic since 2018; and Sudan since 2017. Additionally, Wagner forces of an estimated several hundred personnel have been deployed in Mali following the full withdrawal of French troops.
Some sources indicate that the Wagner Group also operates in several other African nations, including Botswana, Burundi, the Comoros, Guinea, the Congo, and Zimbabwe.
However, the announcement of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death following a plane crash on August 23, 2023, raised numerous questions about the future of Wagner. Various scenarios have emerged, ranging from the disbandment of the group, its nationalization by Russia, or the appointment of a new leader.
The African Legion: A New Russian Expansionist Endeavor
At the beginning of 2024, a new Russian military formation named the “African Legion” was revealed, primarily concerning five countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic. The legion is overseen by General Yunus Bek Yevkurov, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense.
One of the main distinguishing features of the “African Legion” is its official Russian character. Through this formation, Russia aims to publicly distance itself from the armed militias that its Western adversaries label as “Wagner,” often claiming this group is associated with widespread human rights violations in various countries.
Although Russia previously described Wagner as a private entity that any interested party could contract, the African Legion reflects its desire for a military presence in Africa that is more official, similar to that of France and the U.S., through signing agreements with the nations where these forces will be deployed.
It is not unlikely that the scope of the “African Legion” will expand to include additional countries in the continent, especially given Russia’s increasing interest in several Sahelian and West African nations.
Turkey and Drone Diplomacy
Turkey’s interest in the Sahelian countries that have experienced military coups has visibly increased, reflected in a series of mutual visits and agreements, some related to arms exports. Among the latest visits was a high-level Turkish delegation that included ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and energy, along with heads of intelligence and defense industries, who traveled to Niamey.
During this visit, Turkey and Niger signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas,” aimed at “supporting and encouraging Turkish companies in the development of oil and natural gas fields in Niger.”
Earlier, the Malian ground forces commander, Harouna Samaké, visited Turkey at the invitation of his Turkish counterpart, General Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, in late June 2024. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also hosted Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara in Ankara, where both sides discussed enhancing cooperation in defense industries.
As a sign of strengthening bilateral Turkish-Malian relations, Bamako received “TB2 Bayraktar drones” of Turkish manufacture in December 2022. In April 2024, the transitional president of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré—who had previously awarded a state honor to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the Turkish drone company Baykar—delivered a number of Bayraktar drones acquired from Turkey to his Ministry of Defense.
Several officials from Traoré’s administration have visited Turkey, signing various cooperation agreements across multiple sectors. Niger similarly pursued this route, reportedly acquiring Turkish drones in May 2022, alongside several other countries in the region.
Like other nations vying for influence in Africa, Turkey aims to solidify its security and military relationships with African nations in order to enhance its influence. It has signed agreements with over twenty-five countries on the continent in the defense and security sectors. This includes Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria, and it has conducted security training in over ten nations, including Gambia.
This aspect underscores Turkey’s interest in the Sahel and West Africa, as it seeks to assert its presence amidst the declining military involvement of Western countries. Additionally, Ankara has a comprehensive interest in various African nations, with a strong military aspect. It currently operates two military bases: one in Somalia with around 2,000 personnel and another in Libya with dozens of soldiers, alongside some drones and armored vehicles.
The role of the Turkish military base in Libya is expected to grow in the upcoming period, given Libya’s borders with Niger—a matter of interest for Turkey since the civil presidency of Mahamadou Issoufou and later during Mohamed Bazoum’s term, which remains a priority under transitional president General Abdrahmane Tchiani.
In this context, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Amin Zein visited Turkey in February 2024, responding to an invitation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Nigerien media reporting concurrent efforts by Ankara to establish a military base in Agadez, northern Niger, situated close to Libya, Chad, and Algeria.
In addition to its strategic location, Agadez holds significant importance for Turkey, as a U.S. military base exists there—Air Base 201, which cost $110 million to construct—though preparations are underway for U.S. withdrawal as a part of its comprehensive military exit from Niger, expected to conclude by mid-September 2024.
China and Arms Export Dynamics
China maintains one military base in Africa, established in Djibouti in 2017, amidst intense international competition for influence in this small yet strategically significant country controlling movement through the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
Due to its strategic position, Djibouti hosts six military bases belonging to China, France, the United States, Japan, Spain, and Italy, all aimed at protecting their strategic interests and expanding influence in the region.
In addition to competing in the Horn of Africa through military bases, China is also making inroads into the Sahel through arms sales and training soldiers. Reports indicate that Beijing, the world’s second-largest arms producer and the fourth-largest exporter, has significantly increased its arms exports to sub-Saharan African countries.
Chinese arms flow into several nations within the Sahel and West Africa, such as Chad and Nigeria. One of Beijing’s companies has even opened a sales office for small arms, artillery, and armored vehicles in Senegal.
It appears that China has effectively capitalized on the void left by Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, which substantially reduced Russian arms exports to Africa by nearly 44%, allowing China to bolster its presence, becoming a key supplier to twenty-one African nations.
A report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on major arms exporters in 2022 positioned China in fourth place at 5.2%, trailing behind the United States and Russia at 31% each and France at 11%.
These figures indicate that China had not previously prioritized arms exports to Africa as a means to enhance its presence; however, it has recognized that through this channel, major powers are racing to expand their influence, thereby achieving a range of objectives. The increased interest from China and other competing nations has been intensified by some countries in the Sahel seeking new allies, viewing Western powers as part of the problem behind deteriorating security and economic conditions, rather than a solution.
Conclusion
In recent years, the military dimension has become a primary arena of competition among major powers for influence in the Sahel and West Africa, serving as a significant entry point for enhancing their presence and capitalizing on the region’s abundant resources.
The resources of gold, cotton, zinc, phosphate in Burkina Faso, uranium, gold, gas, and oil—expected to commence production—in Niger, as well as gold, cotton, fertilizers, and iron in Mali, make the military aspect the key entrance for dominating exploitation rights over these resources.
The situation extends beyond these countries to many others, including Ivory Coast, which has oil, gas, diamonds, iron, copper, and bauxite, and Chad, where crude oil remains one of its main exports to France, the United States, and China, key commercial partners.
Historically, France’s colonial legacy has rendered it the dominant foreign partner—often the sole or principal one—for all these countries, maintaining a significant level of that dominance despite the observable decline in some areas of its traditional influence.
To preserve its strategic interests in Sahel and West African nations, France has deployed thousands of troops and established several military bases to safeguard allied leaders from military coups. When security challenges arose and the activities of armed groups escalated, confronting these threats became an integral part of French forces’ roles, including deploying special operations units against these groups.
Over time, as the security threat expanded to more countries in the region, various other nations entered through military channels, establishing bases and deploying armed forces, while many companies from these countries profited from mining exploration rights and substantial trade agreements.
The pursuit of interests and the enhancement of geopolitical positioning explain the international competition for military entry into the Sahel region. Early indications suggest an expanded map of competition and presence toward the Gulf of Guinea states, which are grappling with piracy and represent a vital source for many of these powers’ oil and gas needs.
References
600 US troops remain in Niger as withdrawal continues, published on June 14, 2024, senn on July 13, 2024, https://shorturl.at/St2XH
La France va réduire ses troupes en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre , publié le 17 Juin 2024, vu le 07 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/ydxG
Le départ des soldats américains de la base de Niamey au Niger est achevé, publié le 08 Juillet 2024, vu le 10 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/nsJu5
Niger: Pourquoi la base militaire d’Agadez est stratégique pour les États-Unis, publié le 18 Mars 2024, vu le 10 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/Xq9Sq
Chassés du Niger, les États-Unis redéploient leur dispositif militaire en Côte d’Ivoire, publié le 09 Juillet 2024, vu le 11 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/qw8Yt
Où se trouvent les principales activités de Wagner en Afrique?, publié le 27 Juin 2023, vu le 12 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/GHaG5
Mali-Turquie: le ministre Sadio Camara en visite à Ankara, publié le 07 Avril 2022, vu le 13 Juillet 2024, https://shorturl.at/PdOPC
