The Philadelphi Corridor: A Negotiation Tactic or an Israeli Strategic Interest?

In recent months, there has been significant discussion surrounding Israel’s insistence on maintaining control over the Rafah Crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor, the 14-kilometer strip separating and connecting Gaza and Egypt. This issue has become a central point in negotiations between the Israeli occupation and Hamas, especially as they work toward a potential deal.

Netanyahu’s Exaggeration of the Philadelphi Corridor’s Importance:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to amplify the importance of controlling the Philadelphi Corridor, reaching a peak during a press conference where he spoke for an hour defending its strategic significance. He described it as the “cornerstone” of the occupation, claiming that it was Hamas’s “lifeline” and asserting that the goals of the war could only be achieved through control of this corridor. Netanyahu made it clear that he would not withdraw from the area and that the Israeli occupation would manage security in Gaza after the war, preventing any smuggling activities.

However, Netanyahu has not explained why this strategic importance only became apparent in the eighth month of the war, even though some of his ministers had raised the issue from the beginning. This contradiction was highlighted by Gadi Eisenkot, the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli army.

As indirect negotiations with Hamas continued, Netanyahu convened a meeting of the Israeli government on Thursday, August 29, 2024, where he secured a decision to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor. This decision effectively stalled negotiations by introducing a new obstacle that had not been present in previous drafts, which Israel itself had approved. Israeli negotiators in Doha proposed maintaining control over five monitoring points, each 300–400 meters deep. This stance was in contrast to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and other security officials who believed withdrawing from the corridor should be part of the deal, as the “achievements” in Gaza would allow for a shift in focus toward the north.

Netanyahu’s aim in controlling the Philadelphi Corridor was to further the vision of the right-wing nationalist and religious factions regarding Gaza’s future. If successful, he would appear as a savior of Israel. If not, he could use it as a bargaining chip for political and security gains in the deal with Hamas. In either case, Netanyahu would ensure the extension of his government’s longevity and his own political survival.

Unanswered Questions:

Netanyahu’s presentation of the corridor as a vital strategic issue has left him in a precarious position. What if he fails to gain Palestinian, Arab, or international cooperation? What if Palestinian resistance remains effective, continuing to inflict casualties on Israel? What if efforts to release Israeli captives held by Hamas fail, leading to further deaths? How long can Israel continue to sink into the military, security, and economic quagmire of this war, especially as international isolation intensifies? What if opposition and internal pressure within Israel grow, or if resistance in the West Bank and attacks from southern Lebanon and Yemen escalate?

Israeli Opposition:

Yair Lapid, the Israeli opposition leader, summed up the situation by stating that Netanyahu’s focus is not truly on the Philadelphi Corridor but on the alliance between Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, referring to their influence over him. In this sense, the corridor is not about strategic interests or national security, but rather a tactical issue tied to the survival of Netanyahu’s government, which depends on the support of these religious Zionist leaders.

Former Prime Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak echoed this sentiment, declaring that “the Philadelphi Corridor is not our lifeline, but rather the hollow gamble of a compulsive gambler [Netanyahu] who is gambling with the lives of citizens he has abandoned.”

Eisenkot further revealed that Netanyahu, in justifying control over the corridor, referenced various historical events but ignored the most important date: May 27, 2024. On that day, a draft deal with Hamas had been presented to the Israeli cabinet, where it was confirmed that a majority supported it. Yet, Netanyahu refused to bring it to a vote, as his two partners, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, were opposed and effectively held him hostage.

Eisenkot argued that the claim of a strategic necessity for the corridor was false, as there were already technological and intelligence measures in place to prevent smuggling. Since the Egyptians sealed the tunnels and built an underground barrier, “not even a pin” could pass through.

Similarly, Harel, the former commander of Israel’s southern region, criticized Netanyahu, saying he does not truly want a deal to release the captives, preferring instead to prolong the war indefinitely. He revealed that Netanyahu had sabotaged the agreement 12 times, leaving Israel stuck in Gaza, with increasing resistance in the West Bank and the north being neglected.

Palestinian, Arab, and International Rejection:

On the other hand, there is strong Palestinian rejection of Netanyahu’s attempt to impose a new reality in the Philadelphi Corridor. Egypt and the Arab world also oppose this move, along with global rejection, including among Israel’s Western allies. Even the Americans are uneasy with Netanyahu’s position, with their proposals still advocating for Israel’s withdrawal from the corridor. According to a senior U.S. official cited by CNN, Netanyahu’s rhetoric has derailed the negotiations.

If Netanyahu cannot find any partners to engage with, how will he proceed with his plan?

Internal Shifts Undermining Netanyahu’s Strategy:

The killing of six Israeli captives on Friday, August 30, after the army failed to rescue them, marked a significant blow to Netanyahu and his “strategy,” causing a shift in Israeli public opinion. The anger of the captives’ families, who now believe that Netanyahu’s strategy has failed and that their loved ones will return only in coffins at best, has sparked widespread sympathy.

This has also given the opposition more grounds to attack Netanyahu and his alliance. According to the Hebrew site Hadashot Bzman, protests on Sunday, September 1, 2024, saw around 700,000 demonstrators—the largest in Israel’s history—demanding a deal for the captives’ release.

The deaths of the six captives also prompted Defense Minister Gallant to renew calls for a government meeting to reverse the decision to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor.

Another blow to Netanyahu came from opinion polls. The “honeymoon” period he enjoyed after his return from the U.S. and the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Muhammad Shaker ended. A Maariv poll published on August 30 showed Benny Gantz overtaking Netanyahu in popularity for the first time in weeks. A separate poll by Israel’s Kan Channel, published on September 4, showed that 53% of Israelis support withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor to secure a prisoner exchange deal, while only 29% oppose it. Additionally, 61% of Israelis expressed distrust in Netanyahu’s handling of the war, while only 32% supported him.

Conclusion:

It is evident that Netanyahu has manufactured the issue of the Philadelphi Corridor, exaggerating it as a “strategic” matter to derail negotiations and prolong his government’s survival. He will likely backtrack on this stance under increased pressure from Palestinian resistance, the continued loss of Israeli captives due to his stubbornness, internal dissent, and the widespread Palestinian, Arab, and international opposition to the reality he is trying to impose. Netanyahu will likely present his retreat from the corridor as a “major sacrifice” or concession in exchange for significant gains and guarantees. However, it will be crucial for the resistance and its supporters to clearly demonstrate that the Philadelphi Corridor was never truly on the negotiation agenda and that Netanyahu’s retreat is worth no more than “zero,” cloaked in failure and shame. This will further solidify the success of the resistance in asserting its agenda and will.

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

Articles: 14911

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *