On Monday, September 9, 2024, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Nasser Kanaani, expressed Iran’s desire to return to nuclear negotiations with the West, claiming that Tehran is the only party that has fulfilled its obligations under the 2015 nuclear agreement.
These statements align with what Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, said in his first meeting with the new Iranian government, headed by President Masoud Bezshkian, on August 27, 2024. Khamenei stated that there is no obstacle preventing Tehran from dealing with its “enemy,” referring to the United States and the West, though he cautioned, “We should not place our hopes in the enemy” and warned against trusting them.
During the same month, Khamenei announced what he called a “tactical retreat” on some issues, clarifying that there is no harm in such a move, although he emphasized that “non-tactical retreat in any field, whether military, political, propaganda, or economic, leads to God’s anger.” This is similar to the concept of “heroic flexibility” that Khamenei introduced before signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.
These statements from the head of state in Iran open the door for Bezshkian’s nascent government to potentially resume negotiations with the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program, following a pause since September 2022.
Driving Incentives
Recently, several factors have prompted Tehran to reconsider returning to the negotiation table regarding its nuclear program. Previously, Iran had dismissed this idea and announced it was not a priority. However, key developments have reignited the possibility of negotiations:
1. Formation of the New Government:
The election of President Masoud Bezshkian, who has strong support from the reformist bloc, has reinvigorated talks about negotiating over Iran’s nuclear program in order to lift the sanctions that have severely burdened the Iranian economy. These sanctions have also widened public discontent and frustration with the regime’s policies. During his election campaign, Bezshkian pledged that lifting sanctions, and by extension reaching an agreement on the nuclear program with the West, would be a top priority for his government. His appointment of Abbas Araqchi, who was part of the Iranian delegation during the negotiations that led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal and headed the negotiations during the last six months of former President Hassan Rouhani’s government on reviving the agreement, is a strong indication of Iran’s readiness to engage in talks with the West. After taking office as Iran’s foreign minister, Araqchi stated that negotiations are “important and necessary to reduce the costs of sanctions on the people.”
Additionally, the appointment of former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as Deputy President for Strategic Affairs, after he had chaired the advisory committee that proposed names for cabinet positions, also reflects Bezshkian’s government’s interest in returning to the negotiating table over Iran’s nuclear program.
It is noteworthy that Bezshkian, Araqchi, and Zarif have all reaffirmed their commitment to the so-called “Strategic Act to Lift Sanctions,” which was passed by Iran’s parliament in 2020. This law mandates continued nuclear escalation by Iran, meaning that Iran’s readiness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West remains conditional on preserving the nuclear achievements it has made over the past years. This poses a significant challenge to any effort to revive negotiations, as will be detailed later.
Furthermore, reports in May 2024 indicated that the selection of the Supreme Leader’s advisor, Ali Shamkhani, to handle nuclear negotiations with the West could also facilitate a return to talks, especially under Bezshkian’s government. The 2015 nuclear deal was signed during Shamkhani’s tenure as Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, and he is known as the “deal-maker,” having successfully brokered the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023, under Chinese mediation.
2. Approaching “End Day” of the Nuclear Deal:
Tehran is eager to revive negotiations with the West before October 18, 2025, the expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement and the corresponding UN Resolution 2231, which serves as its international framework. “End Day” for the deal would signify Iran’s formal exit from Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the full removal of pre-agreement UN sanctions.
European countries are aware that after October 18, 2025, they will no longer be able to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. Their only option would be to bring Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council, where it could face a Russian or Chinese veto, rendering new sanctions unlikely.
Thus, Iran is attempting to deny the European trio (Britain, France, and Germany), who are parties to the deal, their last opportunity to use the so-called “snapback mechanism.” This mechanism allows for the automatic reimposition of pre-existing UN sanctions on Iran if any signatory to the nuclear agreement files a complaint with the Security Council regarding a clear breach of the deal by Iran.
While it is true that the agreement has become largely symbolic, no party has officially declared it defunct, likely to avoid the economic and strategic consequences of such a declaration. Moreover, the European trio has refrained from using the “snapback mechanism” in recent years to avoid the risk of Iran fully withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opting instead to impose successive rounds of sanctions on Iran. They also announced the continuation of restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs, despite the deal stipulating that these restrictions were to end on October 18, 2023. This marked the Europeans’ first explicit violation of the agreement in response to Iran’s ongoing development of these programs and its military support for Moscow in the war against Ukraine.
3. Capitalizing on Regional Tensions:
Iran is attempting to leverage the heightened regional tensions since the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation in Gaza on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent escalation of other fronts in the region, to achieve its own gains. One such objective is to break the deadlock in the nuclear negotiations. Indirect communications between Iranian and American officials have continued since the conflict began, with the aim of managing the situation and preventing it from spiraling into a regional war. Tehran has revealed two rounds of talks, one held in January and another in May 2024, in Oman.
Despite factors pushing Iran towards expressing its readiness to return to nuclear negotiations, several obstacles make this challenging, particularly at the present time.
Iran continues to escalate its nuclear program, taking advantage of global and regional preoccupations with the turbulent situations in the area. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s quarterly report, released on August 28, 2024, Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, a level close to that needed for weapons-grade fuel (90%), has increased by 22.6 kilograms in the past three months, reaching 164.37 kilograms. Meanwhile, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched at varying levels grew by about 676 kilograms, bringing the total to approximately 6201.3 kilograms—more than 30 times the limit set by the 2015 agreement. The agency also noted that Iran is only two kilograms away from producing four nuclear bombs if it chooses to do so.
This nuclear escalation continues despite the IAEA’s decision in its last meeting in May 2024, which called on Iran to cooperate with the agency, reinstate inspectors expelled in September 2023, provide answers regarding uranium traces found at undeclared sites, and hand over surveillance camera recordings from its nuclear facilities. Tehran has not complied with any of these demands.
This indicates Iran’s intention to create a new nuclear reality, positioning itself just steps away from possessing a nuclear weapon, even if it does not actually build one. The idea is that the “bomb is on the shelf,” as is the case in countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea. This is in line with statements made by Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, who declared on August 29, 2024, that Iran has achieved self-sufficiency in nuclear knowledge. His statements echo those of his predecessor Ali Akbar Salehi, who also served as foreign minister, asserting in February 2024 that Iran possesses all the components of a nuclear bomb, with only assembly left to be done.
Western contexts are also unfavorable. Iran’s readiness to return to negotiations comes at a time when the United States is preparing for presidential elections in November 2024. This complicates the possibility of resuming nuclear talks during the final months of President Joe Biden’s administration, especially with uncertainty over the next president. Will it be the Republican nominee and former President Donald Trump, who imposed the “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran and called the nuclear deal “the worst in history”? Or will it be the Democratic candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris, who might continue Biden’s diplomatic approach with Tehran?
In Europe, the rise of right-wing factions raises the likelihood of adopting a more hardline stance toward Iran, particularly concerning its nuclear program, missile development, regional role, and support for militias, as well as its human rights record and detained European nationals. This could lead to further sanctions against Iranian individuals and institutions and possibly even the inclusion of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthis on European terrorism lists. It is noteworthy that the European Parliament agreed in January 2023 to classify the IRGC as a terrorist organization, though the European Commission has yet to approve the decision.
Thus, Iran’s desire alone is insufficient for the resumption of nuclear negotiations, as the other parties—the U.S. and the European troika—are unprepared to return to the table, especially given Iran’s continued nuclear, missile, and regional escalations.
Despite the election of a reformist president, Tehran remains firmly committed to its regional influence, considering it a strategic approach that transcends changes in leadership. Prominent figures such as Bazeshkian and Foreign Minister Araqchi have affirmed their adherence to the Supreme Leader’s directives in this regard, collaborating closely with the deep state institutions, particularly the IRGC, to uphold Iran’s regional policies. These policies include supporting the so-called “axis of resistance,” referring to Tehran’s regional proxies, and continuing to confront the “hostile policies of Israel and the United States.”
In line with this strategy, Tehran appointed Ali Mohammad Rezai as its new ambassador to the Houthi government in Sanaa, which is not internationally recognized, following the mysterious death of the previous ambassador, Hassan Irlou, in late 2021. This move is seen as an Iranian attempt to undermine local peace agreements in Yemen, supporting the Houthis’ military escalations against ships and tankers in the Red Sea, despite the de-escalation commitments outlined in the agreement signed between Iran and Saudi Arabia concerning the Yemen conflict.
Various scenarios are conceivable regarding Iran’s return to nuclear negotiations with the West. One possible outcome is the conclusion of a new agreement. The new Iranian government’s readiness to resume talks could lead to a new deal, dubbed “JCPOA 2.” However, this also hinges on the American side. If Trump wins the presidency, the chances of achieving this scenario diminish, whereas a Harris victory might enhance them.
It is important to note that returning to the original 2015 nuclear deal is unlikely, as Iran’s nuclear position has changed significantly. Some of the deadlines outlined in the deal have already passed, such as the expiration of the conventional arms embargo in October 2020 and the missile and drone embargo in October 2023. Biden himself has remarked that the nuclear deal is “clinically dead,” and Iran’s former foreign minister Abbas Araqchi confirmed that the current deal cannot be revived but instead requires a new negotiation.
However, the possibility of reaching a new agreement remains dependent on Tehran’s reluctance to relinquish the nuclear, military, and regional gains it has achieved in recent years, along with its strategic relationships with Russia and China. Additionally, internal opposition to any agreement with the West could arise, especially if the deal does not provide Iran with sufficient benefits compared to the obligations it imposes.
Another potential outcome could involve partial agreements. Given the difficulty of reaching a comprehensive new deal, Iran and the West may instead arrive at partial understandings, similar to the U.S.-Iran prisoner swap in August 2023, mediated by Qatar. This deal led to the release of American detainees in exchange for Washington allowing South Korea to unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian funds and the release of Iranian prisoners.
Regional mediation could facilitate such partial agreements. For instance, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani visited Tehran on August 26, 2024, his first visit since the new government was formed. During the visit, he met with the Iranian president and foreign minister to discuss regional developments and the lifting of sanctions on Iran.
These agreements may include Iran ceasing uranium enrichment at the 60% level and allowing the IAEA to enhance oversight of its nuclear facilities. They could also involve extending deadlines from the 2015 nuclear deal beyond 2025, ensuring Iran’s commitment to any new obligations. Such agreements might form part of a broader regional settlement, possibly addressing issues in the Gaza Strip.
A third scenario is the activation of the “snapback” mechanism. If no new agreement is reached, and no partial settlements are achieved, European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal could invoke this mechanism to reinstate U.N. sanctions on Iran before the mechanism’s expiration in October 2025.
Alternatively, Washington and its European allies could resort to striking Iran’s nuclear program with Israel’s assistance, or they might continue imposing maximum sanctions on Iran and those dealing with it, preventing Iran from benefiting from the lifting of international sanctions after the deal’s expiration in October 2025.
In conclusion, Iran’s willingness to return to negotiations over its nuclear program is a recurring tactic to prevent the imposition of U.N. sanctions and to thwart Israel’s plans to strike its nuclear facilities. It is also a message aimed at calming domestic unrest by signaling that the regime is working to lift sanctions that have caused significant economic losses.
However, reaching a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the West appears unlikely, especially at this moment, given Iran’s ongoing nuclear and missile escalations, regional tensions, and the U.S. preoccupation with its presidential elections. Partial agreements remain the most plausible scenario, as they could prevent the activation of U.N. sanctions against Iran while allowing it to retain some of its nuclear, military, and regional achievements from the past few years.
