Introduction:
Three concepts are being circulated in the literature of international relations and require the control of their meanings and uses, especially when transferred from the literature of the field of international relations in the English language to the Arabic language. The international movement can also be addressed by understanding the relationship between these concepts.
Preparation: a. Dr.. Walid Abdel Hai . [1]
(for Zaytuna Center).
First: The concept of the international system:
The international relations literature uses sub-concepts that are all translated into the “international” system in the Arabic language[2] without distinguishing their meanings and contents. These concepts are represented in:[3]
1. International Regime: It means precisely the set of legal and customary controls on which the units of the system operate and interact on the basis of, as it represents the “Constitution of International Relations”.
2. International Order: This concept defines the position of the state in the structure of the international system; The hierarchy of the international system, is it a superpower, a major, a regional center, a small country, or a state, and accordingly the state’s position in the international scale of power is determined.
3. International System: This concept is primarily concerned with the nature of the interaction between units on the basis of the number of central powers in the international system; It may be unipolar, or bipolar, or the balance of power, or multipolar, or that the international system is non-polar, and Richard Haass is the most famous theorist on the subject of non-polarity, then is it dominated by peaceful or military interaction [4]
4. International Structure: A [5] It includes all of the above rules regulating international relations, the hierarchy of forces (the hierarchy of forces) and their distribution on the power ladder and the general feature of the interactions of international units. Accordingly, the structural transformation of the international system means a degree of radical change in the rules regulating the interaction between the units of the international system, or a change in the position of the state in the scale of power in the international system / or a change in the general feature of the interaction between peace and war.
Second: The concept of zero and non-zero perspective:
The network of international relations is characterized by the interests between the units of the international community in three ways:
1. conflicting interests; Where the parties do not meet at any level of consensus.
2. Common interests; Which is beneficial to both parties.
3. Mixed interests; That is, that combines contradiction in certain aspects and sharing in others.
The management of this network of interests is evaluated on two bases: [6]
1. The zero sum game: what one party gains is a loss equal to the other party. Every Jewish immigrant, for example, to Palestine is a direct loss to the Palestinian party. So the equation is +1 for one side and -1 for the other side, so the result is zero.
2. The non-zero-sum game: It is based on how to reconcile the contradiction in certain interests and harmony together in common interests with others. For example, China has interests that conflict with the United States, Taiwan for example, but it has common interests with it; It is her first business partner.
Third: The concept of relationship management in the contemporary international system:
The units of the contemporary international system are the national or national state, then supra-state units (such as international governmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, or cross-border political organizations, whether armed or unarmed), and finally sub-state units (such as minorities and sub-cultures). and local armed groups), and perhaps the fabric of the relationship and overlap between the units of this huge network; He is responsible in one of its dimensions for the difficulty of managing international relations, in light of this huge number of parties conflicting interests at times and harmonious at other times, which requires the establishment of research bodies to identify scientific models to deal with the continuation of this overlap and interdependence in the areas of interests, values, natural environment, and curricula In order to be aware of this overlap and its complexities, it is sufficient to identify some indicators:
1. The problem of managing relationships in the light of interdependence and overlapping and common interests:
In essence, globalization expresses the widening of the circle of political, social, economic and technical interdependence between the units of the international community, which makes drawing the boundaries of common interest and conflicting interests very complicated, especially since this interdependence is increasing in a clear and accelerating manner, and it is sufficient to consider the following indicators For the year 2021: [7]
a. The number of countries immersed in globalization has increased, and the following table clearly shows this increase. In 1970, the number of countries that reached more than 60 points in the globalization index was 14, while the number increased in 2021 to 98 countries.
Table No. 1: Number of Countries by Globalization Index Score [8]
| the year | Globalization index score below 40 points | Globalization Index score 40 – less than 60 | Globalization Index score 60 – less than 80 | Globalization Index Points 90-80 |
| 1970 | 116 | 63 | 14 | Zero |
| 2021 | 11 | 84 | 66 | 32 |
B. The size of the interdependence of interests, i.e. the average globalization score for all countries of the world in all the central political, economic and social globalization indicators and its sub-indicators. The available data indicate the following:
• The correlation rate in 1970 was 38.47 points, and it became 62.23 points, ie an increase of more than one point in the annual globalization rate.
• The number of mergers between banks increased from 247 in 1985 to 1,316 in 2020.
• The volume of international trade in 2021 is 28.5 trillion dollars. Global exports, which accounted for 13.3% of global GDP in 1985, rose to 29.49% in 2020, more than doubled.
• 80% of the trade agreements that were concluded between the countries of the world since 230 BC until now took place during the past thirty years.
• There are 338 major American companies currently operating in China, of which 90 companies sell all their production inside China, and in contrast there are 2,400 companies in the United States controlled by Chinese capital.
• 19% of the US debt is Chinese, $1.17 trillion, and 2.6 million American employees work in companies that produce their goods to cover the need of the Chinese market.
• There are 4.65 billion people around the world connected to the Internet.
• There are about 60,000 multinational companies, with about half a million branches, and they control about half of the world’s trade, including trade between the branches of these companies.
• The value of the activities of private security companies operating at the global level increased from 78 billion in 2011 to 132 billion in 2020.
This means that this interdependence will increase the overlap of common interests, making international relations proceed at an accelerating pace towards the non-zero perspective, which makes the management of international relations more complex in terms of calculating losses and profits or in terms of how to calculate these profits and losses, and the application of the impact matrix technique becomes Mutual relations in international relations is necessary for every country that wants to identify the changes that have the most negative or positive impact on its network of international relations, and thus draw up its strategies based on what has been reached from the matrix.[9]
2. The problem of managing relations in light of the complexities of the existing international scene:
The current international reality can be described as a reality in which the central powers seek “to ward off evil more than to bring about gain,” which is evident in the following scene:
a. There is an empire that has disintegrated and seeks to prevent the disintegration from penetrating into its heart; It is the Soviet Union after its transformation into Russia.[10]
B. There is a second empire that is declining in the levels of its position in the international scale of power and is seeking to stop or slow this decline; It is the United States.[11]
c. There is a country that invokes its nationalism to build an economic rather than a political empire, and to achieve “peaceful development or peaceful rise”; It is China.[12]
Dr.. There is a great neo-mercantilism that does not have the ambitions of the international pole and is content with its new mercantilism; It is Japan.[13]
e. There is a region that is confused between the conscience of its political history and its ethnic and sectarian diversity on the one hand, and its tendency to complete its integration and post-functional integration on the other hand, and its tendency to autonomy violated by the shadows of the pressures of the polar forces on the third hand; It is Europe.[14]
And the. As for the remaining regions of the world, they live between their conflict and social fragmentation on the one hand, and their inability to adapt to the accelerating technical, economic and social interdependence in light of globalization on the other hand.[15]
g. Overlap and mutual influence between each of the previous dimensions, which is described by the mutual influence matrix.
3. The problem of relationship management in light of the problem of measuring strength:
Scholars of international relations have divided international systems in various forms, but most of them were more concerned with the behavior of polar states than measuring the basis for determining the nature of the polar system. Morton Kaplan classified international systems into six, and focused in his classification on the coherence of the structure of the system; flaccid, tight, balanced, etc., while George Modelski went to link the international system with the dominant mode of production; Agricultural or industrial…etc. As for David Singer, David Singer developed an equation that measures the concentration of force in a particular international system, and determines the structure of the polar system based on this equation: [16]
Singer assumed that the result would range from zero to one, and whenever the result was between 0.5 to one, the polar system was monopolar, and in the range of 0.4 to 0.3 means bipolar, and below that means multipolar.
This calls for continuous measurement so that fluctuations and trends in force concentration rates can be observed, and thus determine the polar level in the international system.
The other aspect that deserves attention; It is the role of the middle or non-polar powers in determining the polar structure of the international system, a contribution made by Edward Mansfield in his study on “the concentration, polarity and distribution of power”,[17] rather, the Chinese researcher Yang Jiemian believes that the shift from a particular polar system To an alternative polar system that is carried out by economic rather than military factors, which is the basis for his theory that the world is moving towards multipolarity. He believes that the economic crisis in 2008 constituted a turning point in the international system, and produced what he called the four groups: the beneficiaries of the crisis; China, the defender of the status quo; secondly, the United States, the group weakened by the crisis; And thirdly, most of the developing countries, and finally the losing group, which is the European Union, Russia and Japan. All of this restructured the international system towards multipolarity, from the Chinese perspective.[18]
The other aspect of the issue of polarity is the transitional stages between one polar system and another, and here several questions arise that deal with the length of the transitional period, its characteristics, and the determination of the forces of decline and forces of ascent, and whether the indicators of rise and decline remain the same in all historical stages. [19]
A final aspect, is if change is the unit of analysis in the future study, then the pace of change (acceleration) determines the results of the race between international forces, especially that the interval between each technological invention and the next invention is shrinking, and the required period between the invention and its transformation into a traded commodity is shrinking. Also, for example, China set a plan in 2015 to spend 1.68 trillion dollars in the field of artificial intelligence in the year 2025, to be dominant in this sector by 2030. “They called the plan Made in China” and the results would be that the GDP “in purchasing parity PPP” in 2030 will be “trillion dollars” as follows:
• China: $64.2 trillion.
• India: $46.3 trillion.
• America: $31 trillion.
To confirm this, we point out that measuring competition in artificial intelligence showed that after calculating the number of citations from the research of 10% of the highest-cited journals, the share of citations from Chinese authors was 26.5% compared to 29% for the United States, but it is remarkable that the American share has been declining since 2011 while it is rising China since 2009, which means that China will outperform within 2026.[20]
4. The problem of determining the greatest trends in the management of international relations:
Despite the detailed differences between researchers in defining the greatest trend, the components of these definitions indicate that “a pivotal tendency in a particular phenomenon to change negatively or positively over time. There is no guarantee that the trend observed in the past will continue into the future.[21]
The greatest trends that are most agreed upon among researchers in the field of international relations can be monitored as follows: [22]
a. The global shift in economic power: The most prominent of these shifts is the class shift, as the global middle class constituted 27% in 2009, but it tends to be about 60% in 2030 according to available estimates.
As for debt at the global level, estimates indicate that the size of the debt to GDP in 2035 will be 133% in Europe, 213% in the United States, and 385 percent in Japan.
Most studies indicate that 25% of global GDP will be in India and China in 2030. Asian progress is evident from that Asia’s share of global GDP is developing from 20% in 2010 to 28% in 2017, and it is expected that the year 2030 will be about 35%.
B. Change in the population pyramid: The demographic pyramid in the world indicates that 8% of the world’s population is over 65 years old, and this percentage is expected to rise in 2030 to 13%; As a result of the declining number of births, 35% of the world’s population in 2030 will be in China and India only.
c. Overcrowding in cities: In 2013, 50% of the world’s population lived in cities, but the proportion will rise to 60% in 2030, and 80% of the increase in urban congestion will be in cities on two continents; They are Africa and Asia.
Dr.. The acceleration of technological development: Most researchers agree that technology in its broad sense represents the central variable in contemporary international life, and the recent developments in the next few decades in the field of artificial intelligence, the Internet, mobile phones and computers will continue to have a profound impact on political, social and economic structures and within a short period of time up to 25 years, which is the average of the logistic curve, while the time difference between animal domestication for transport and the invention of the wheel took centuries.
e. Climate change: Specialized studies reveal that an increase in temperature with the year 2050 by 2 degrees will need to adapt to it from 70 to 100 billion dollars annually, and will cause the displacement of about 240 million people.
And the. Scarcity of resources: The world is living in a state of depletion of its natural resources, for example, the difference between supply and demand for water will be about 40% in 2030, and the demand for various energy resources will increase at a rate of 40% compared to the present time due to the increase in population, economic growth and technological development, which may result in the depletion of many of raw materials.
Determining the repercussions of interdependence and greater trends on the international community:
The interdependence of societies due to the mechanisms of globalization and the greater trends in international life resulted in a number of results, most notably:
1. The decline in the rate of international wars and the continuation of interstate-intrastate wars:
Table No. 2: Comparison of the percentage of civil and international wars during the period 1945–2020 [23]
| number/year | 1950 | 1970 | 1990 | 2010 | 2020 |
| civil wars | 3.9 | 8.3 | 16 | 7.9 | 7.5 |
| international wars | 3.7 | 3.3 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
Quantitative studies of international conflicts “wars” indicate that from 1946 to 2020, the number of wars was 285 military conflicts, including 122 civil wars, 35 wars between states, 45 wars against an external organization, and 83 civil wars that turned into an international war, but the important thing in these indicators is that that:
a. Wars against an organization outside the country’s borders are decreasing.
B. Wars between two nations are decreasing.
c. Wars of external international intervention are slowly increasing.
Dr.. Civil wars are increasing in the general trend.
International relations literature indicates that the inability to adapt to rapid changes on the one hand led to an increase in civil wars, while the acceleration of globalization in a way that transformed international relations from zero to non-zero, made interdependence a factor in reducing the number of international wars.
2. Increasing economic blockade policies and international guarantees: [24]
During the period from 1914 to 2012, ie about 98 years, the economic blockade policy was applied with the aim of changing political regimes 165 times, and the blockade succeeded in achieving its goal in 40 cases, or about 24.3%.
The United States participated with other countries in 115 cases of siege, of which 26 succeeded, meaning that the success rate is 22.4%, while the United States alone imposed the siege in 50 cases, the number of success cases in which was 14 cases, or 28% of the cases. Which means that the United States alone in taking the measure increases the chances of success by approximately 5.5%.
However, the most important indicator in this context is monitoring the historical trend of the levels of success of the economic blockade. Monitoring shows that there is a linear decline in the success rate. If we divide the entire time period, we will find that in the first period 1914-1945; The success rate in achieving the objectives of the siege was higher than in the second period from 1945-1969, and the success continued decreasing in the third period 1970-1989, and in the fourth period 1990-2012, which means that the success rate of the siege policies in overthrowing regimes is declining, which is something I see that the main reason, and not the only reason, is globalization, which has made it extremely difficult or perhaps impossible to control the mechanisms of the blockade.
There is another phenomenon that has significance in the same context. They are the international guarantees that a major country gives to a smaller country to protect it from other powers, especially the major ones.
Monitoring shows that the history of this phenomenon – international protection – is also no more tempting to rely on it than the policies of the economic blockade. During the period from 1815-2014, two centuries of time, the major countries gave 116 international guarantees, whether individually or joint guarantees for a small country. implementing 20 of them, or only 18% of them.
future scene:
In a study published in November 2020, we previously compared American power with Chinese power to determine the pattern of polarity prevailing in the current international system,[25] but we added in this study the Russian Federation to determine whether the structure of the international system is pluralistic or not, as We added to the measurement variables of power four variables, bringing the total of the comparison variables to 24 instead of 20, and then we calculated the distribution of global power for the great powers based on the Singer equation, which we referred to at the beginning of this study, and the study covers the period from 2018 to the beginning of 2021, as shown in the table next one:
Table No. 3: Indicators of strength in international relations for the period 2018-2020
The previous table reveals a stable trend in international relations towards a multipolar international system, which makes the diplomatic space wider for medium and small countries.
Summary and recommendations:
The results of this analysis can be defined as follows:
1. The extreme complexity in the network of international relations requires the increase of specialized study centers to present their perceptions of how to deal with an international community in which the area of non-zero perspective increases at the expense of zero, and organic links grow at the expense of laxity of mechanical ties.
2. The pace of the increasing acceleration, the pressure of greater trends in the international environment, and their mutual effects require the development of a forward-looking culture to help find adaptation mechanisms in advance before the occurrence of the future shock, in the words of A. Toffler.
3. The Asian shift towards a broader role in international relations is likely given the growing international standing of this region, which requires Arab attention to this, and work to strengthen the relationship with the rising Asian powers, which we have previously devoted an independent study to.[27]
4. The growing organic ties of “Israel” will make it less able to maintain its mechanical ties, which will dismantle the essence of its Zionist ideology based on the temptation of historical models.
5. The policies of the major powers in the coming stage will be more defensive than offensive, and it is an opportunity for the middle powers to reap benefits by investing in multipolarity.
6. The shift from the billiard ball model in international relations to the cobweb model means a steady increase in the influence of external factors in policy-making at the expense of the weight of internal factors,[28] which makes small and medium-sized countries more fragile and vulnerable to turmoil, which is what It is gradually pushing towards building regional or even cross-border blocs, which the Arab political systems have not yet realized.
Margins:
[1] Expert in future and forward-looking studies, formerly a professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan, he holds a doctorate in political science from Cairo University, and he is a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University in Jordan, Irbid National University, and the National Center for Human Rights Human Rights, the Board of Grievances, and the Supreme Media Council. He is the author of 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies from the theoretical and applied perspectives, and about 120 research papers have been published in refereed scientific journals.
[2] We will notice in the subsequent pages that the concept of “international” is no longer confined to the state as a unit of international relations analysis. Look:
Vito Tanzi, “The Demise of the NationState,” International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper, August 1998, pp. 7-14.
[3] About the implications of these concepts, you can refer to the following references:
Kyle M. Lascurettes, “International Order in Theory and Practice,” International Affairs, Lewis & Clark College and Michael Poznansky, Strategic and Operational Research Department, U.S. Naval War College, 31/8/2021,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354402563_International_Order_in_Theory_and_Practice; international-system analysis, site of Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-system-analysis; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analyzing Change in International Politics: The New Institutionalism and the Interpretative Approach,” discussion paper, MPI for Societal Research, Cologne, 5/4/1990,
https://d-nb.info/1051463386/34; and Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization journal, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, pp. 185–205, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520
[4] Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs magazine, May/June 2008,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity
[5] Structures, institutions, and levels of analysis, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-relations/Structures-institutions-and-levels-of-analysis
[6] Hongji Zhang, “How Game Theory Impact International Relations,” Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, Atlantis Press, vol. 569, 2021, pp. 323-326.
[7] This data was collected from the following references:
KOF Globalisation Index, site of KOF Swiss Economic Institute, https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html; Robert T. Kudrle, “Globalization by the Numbers: Quantitative Indicators and the Role of Policy,” International Studies Perspectives journal, vol. 5, Issue 4, November 2004, pp. 341–355; Hyeon-Seung Huh and Cyn-Young Park, “A New Index of Globalization: Measuring Impacts of Integration on Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” ADB Economics Working Paper Series, no. 587, July 2019,
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/513856/ewp-587-new-index-globalization.pdf; “Globalization Report 2020: Who benefits the most from globalization?,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020,
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_uploadGlobalizationReport 2020_2_final_en.pdf; and Size of the security services market worldwide from 2011 to 2020, by region, site of Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/323113/distribution-of-the-security-services-market-worldwide
[8] To learn how to calculate globalization indicators see:
Overall globalization – Country rankings, 2019, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/kof_overall_glob
[9] Manuel Sebastian Mariani et. al., Measuring economic complexity of countries and products: which metric to use, The European Physical Journal, vol. 88, no. 11, September 2015, pp. 3-8; Cross-Impact Analysis, site of European Foresight Platform (EFP), http://foresight-platform.eu/community/forlearn/how-to-do-foresight/methods/analysis/cross-impact- analysis; and William P Fox, “Applied Game Theory to Improve Strategic and Tactical Military Decision,” Journal of Defense Management, vol. 6, no. 2, January 2016, passim.
[10] Mychailo Wynnyckyj Valerii Pekar, The deconstruction of Russia and reconstruction of a “post-Russia space”: a risky but inevitable scenario, site of New Eastern Europe, 7/9/2022, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/09/07/the-deconstruction-of-russia-and-reconstruction-of-a-post-russia-space-a-risky-but-inevitable-scenario
[11] Walid Abdel Hai, “The American Retreat in International Prestige and the Dilemma of Arab and Israeli Strategic Options,” Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations website, 4/11/2020, at: https://www.alzaytouna.net/
[12] China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004, site of Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20050616bijianlunch.pdf
[13] Milton Mueller, “Asia and Digital Neo-mercantilism,” EAST Asia Forum Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, April-June 2022, pp. 10-12.
[14] Josep Borrell Fontelles, “Staying on Course in Troubled Water: EU Foreign policy 2021,” site of EUNEIGHBOURS EAST, 2022, pp. 23-42, 77-81, 145-159 and 200-205.
[15] Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, “Economic Integration and Political Disintegration,” site of UCLA Anderson, https://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/2000_separatism.pdf
[16] Mathematics modeling, site of Great Power Relations, https://greatpowerrelations.com/great-powers/status-of-great-powers/mathematics-modeling
[17] Edward D. Mansfield, “Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, Issue 1, March 1993, pp. 105–128.
[18] Yang Jiemian, “The Concept of Harmonious World and the Development of China’s International Strategy,” China International Studies, September-October 2009; and Shaun Breslin and Ren Xiao (eds.), China Debates Its Global Role (Routledge, 2022), Chapter no. 3.
[19] Kemal Derviş, Can multilateralism survive?, site of Brookings Institution, 23/7/2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/can-multilateralism-survive
[20] Pablo Robles, China plans to be a world leader in Artificial Intelligence by 2030, site of South China Morning Post, 1/10/2018, https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/2166148/china-2025-artificial-intelligence/index.html
[21] Ronald Poon-Affat, “Megatrends,” Actuary Magazine, vol. 7, Issue 1, February/March 2010, https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/library/newsletters/the-actuary-magazine/2010/february/act-2010-vol7-iss1-poon-affat.pdf
[22] Regarding the greatest trends in international relations, several trends have been observed, see:
Lebedeva M., “Modern Megatrends of World Politics,” World Economy and International Relations Journal, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, vol. 63, no. 9, 2019. pp. 29-37; “Welcome to 2030: The Mega-Trends,” Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/assets/epsc/pages/espas/chapter1.html; Olena Koppel and Olena Parkhomchuk, “Megatrends of the world politics,” Economic Annals journal, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Serbia, vol.192, no. 7-8, February 2021, pp. 4-14; “Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping governments,” KPMG International, Mowat Centre, https://www.worldgovernmentsummit.org/api/publications/document?id=b5d469c4-e97c-6578-b2f8-ff0000a7ddb6; and “Five Megatrends And Their Implications for Global Defense & Security,” site of PwC, November 2016, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-public-services/assets/five-megatrends-implications.pdf
[23] Thomas S. Szayna et. al., “What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy?,” site of RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf
[24] Özgür Özdamar and Evgeniia Shahin, “Consequences of Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art and Paths Forward,” International Studies Review journal, International Studies Association, vol. 23, Issue 4, December 2021, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/4/1646/6309628; Jonathan Masters, What Are Economic Sanctions?, site of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 12/8/2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions; and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “Economic Sanction as Foreign Policy,” in The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322628790_Economic_Sanction_as_Foreign_Policy
[25] See: Walid Abdel Hai, “The American Retreat in International Prestige and the Dilemma of Arab and Israeli Strategic Options,” Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 4/11/2020.
[26] The researcher chose the indicators and their values based on a number of references, see:
2022 Russia Military Strength, site of GlobalFirepower (GFP), 9/10/2022, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=Russia; RUSSIA, site of Lowy Institute – Asia Power Index, 2021 edition,
https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/russia; The world’s most powerful countries, site of U.S. News & World Report,
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/rankings/power; Top 15 Countries by GDP in 2022, site of Global PEO Services,
https://globalpeoservices.com/top-15-countries-by-gdp-in-2020; Debt to GDP Ratio by Country 2022, site of World Population Review,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-national-debt; Crime Rate by Country 2022, World Population Review,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country; Aid by DAC members increases in 2019 with more aid to the poorest countries, site of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 16/4/2020,
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ODA-2019-detailed-summary.pdf; The world’s top 100 universities, site of QS Top Universities, 27/10/2022,
https://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/choosing-university/worlds-top-100-universities; William Yang Taipei, ‘Unfavorable views’ of China reach historic highs, site of Deutsche Welle (DW), 6/10/2020,
https://www.dw.com/en/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-new-report-finds/a-55175187; China, site of GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx; Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf and Mara Mordecai, U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly, site of Pew Research Center, 15/9/2020,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly; World’s Largest Companies 2022, site of Global Finance magazine, 13/9/2022,
https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/largest-companies; UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables, site of Dag Hammarskjöld Library,
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto; List of countries with overseas military bases, site of WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases; International organization membership of the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_organization_membership_of_the_United_States#cite_note-CIA_World_Factbook-1; Gini Coefficient by Country 2022, World Population Review,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country-; Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in highest spending countries 2021, statista,
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