Translate By SAKHRI Mohamed
The concept of religious sectarianism describes an individual’s affiliation with a “religious subculture” within the broader framework of a particular religion. This affiliation often leads to a cultural, political, and social identity that distinguishes them from others within the same larger religious community. Sectarianism is a common phenomenon across all religions and, in many cases, religious sects themselves can fragment into sub-identities. These sub-identities may sometimes clash more fiercely among themselves than they do with external groups. Some scholars attribute internal religious conflicts to two main factors: differences in the intellectual understanding of religious texts, influenced by intellectual levels or cultural heritage before collective religious affiliation, or the exploitation of these differences by elites within each sect to expand their influence based on internal political or social changes or external factors, particularly from differing societies.
Quantitative indicators suggest that there are over ten thousand religious sub-identities globally, although the adherents of most of these sub-identities constitute a relatively small proportion of the world’s population. The largest populations are concentrated within the sub-identities of the major religions, which together account for approximately 77% of the world’s population: Christianity 31%, Islam 24%, Hinduism 15%, and Buddhism 7%. The rest are distributed across numerous religions like Judaism, or traditional or folk religions such as Taoism, Sikhism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism, and others. Additionally, 16% of the world’s population does not adhere to a specific religion, including atheists, agnostics, or those who believe in God without associating with a particular religion, like some Gnostics. This suggests that religious sectarianism is not exclusive to any particular region, religion, or area. The pyramidal-segmentary theory explains the impact of overlapping sub-loyalties on conflicts of priorities between religious sects and other forms of identity, such as national or linguistic affiliations. Moreover, 43 countries currently designate a state religion or sect, with 27 identifying Islam as the state religion, 13 choosing Christianity, 2 Buddhism, and 9 European Christian countries specifying a state religious sect.
Although religious wars throughout recorded human history account for 6.98% of all wars—123 religious wars out of a total of 1,763 recorded wars—the number of internal religious wars between sects within the same religion is a central feature of religious conflicts. The divisions among Christian sects, particularly after the Great Schism between Orthodox and Catholic Christians and later between Catholics and Protestants regarding the role of the Church, were witnessed in various parts of Europe during 1524-1648, with short, fragile periods of peace. The eight so-called “Wars of Religion” in France between Catholics and Protestants (1562-1598) and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) are notable examples of this. In modern times, there are still sectarian conflicts within Christianity, with political sectarian conflicts in places like Ireland and Scotland. Some studies indicate that contemporary sectarian conflicts among Christians are concentrated in three main regions: Latin America, particularly between Catholics, Protestants, and Pentecostals; sub-Saharan Africa; and East Asia. Similarly, India has experienced sectarian conflicts within Hinduism between Shaivites, Vaishnavites, Jains, and Buddhists, and Japan witnessed similar conflicts among Buddhist sects in its medieval history, despite the “Ahimsa” culture of peace and love. These are phenomena that have also been observed throughout Islamic history and other traditions.
Modern quantitative studies analyzing the reasons behind international conflicts based on religious and non-religious factors have found the following:
- Non-religious causes of conflicts saw a linear increase from 35 conflicts in 1975 to about 65 in 1990, but then decreased to around 58 conflicts by 2015.
- In contrast, religious factors driving international conflicts increased significantly during the same period, rising from 3 conflicts in 1975 to 31 conflicts in 2015.
- When examining the geographical distribution of religious conflicts, the following regional percentages are observed:
- 1% in the Americas.
- 3% in Europe.
- 18% in the Middle East.
- 38% in Asia.
- 41% in Africa.
- Conflicts within the same religion remain significantly more common than conflicts between different religions, with nearly double the occurrence.
The drivers of sectarianism generally vary between social, political, and economic factors. In terms of explaining sectarian religious conflict, particular focus is often placed on “foundational” views within the religious sect or the political exploitation of sectarian differences during periods of modernization.
What does all this mean?
- Sectarian conflicts between religious sects are not limited to a specific religion or region. Almost all religions have experienced sectarian struggles, making sectarianism a global phenomenon, not exclusive to Islam or the Middle East, as some Western media may suggest.
- Quantitative indicators of “civilizational” conflicts between religions challenge Samuel Huntington’s theory. Indicators show that conflicts within civilizations, particularly those defined by religious characteristics, are more frequent than conflicts between different civilizations. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war is a contemporary example of this, with the Orthodox Church splitting into Russian and Ukrainian factions, each supporting one side of the conflict. Moreover, many conflicts in Latin America occur between predominantly Catholic nations.
- Dividing the world based on levels of political, technological, and economic development reveals that more developed regions experience fewer “inter-religious” or intra-religious conflicts.
- The Middle East ranks lower in the number of “inter-religious” conflicts, with its share accounting for about 47% of Asia’s total and around 44% compared to Africa, as indicated by the above statistics.
Sectarianism between Political and Religious Exploitation in Arab-Iranian Relations
The Iranian Revolution marked a turning point in political interactions, particularly in the Arab East. These interactions intensified in the same year, 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Juhayman Al-Otaibi, the change in leadership in Iraq with Saddam Hussein’s rise to power, and Egypt’s signing of a peace treaty with Israel. These strategic and concurrent events resulted in several significant outcomes, notably:
First, the rise of jihadist tendencies against various parties, primarily Soviet communism. This led to the emergence of training camps and financial donation drives to support the Afghan Mujahideen. Following this, the Egyptian president was assassinated, jihadist movements appeared in Palestine, Lebanon, and other areas, and opposition to Western influence in Arab societies grew. This opposition was evident in the success of Islamic parties in legislative elections, particularly in countries that offered a minimum level of transparency, including Turkey.
Western powers and Israel recognized the threat posed by this growing movement and attempted to adopt policies that aimed to exploit it for their benefit, while weakening any efforts to redirect this burgeoning force toward resisting Western and Israeli expansion in the region. They sought to infiltrate some factions of the movement, steering them in the opposite direction, and further bolstered this effort by encouraging normalization between Israel and the Arab world, thereby depriving the movement of a potential direction for its growing influence.
Western powers and Israel also adopted a diplomatic strategy aimed at dismantling this rising force, which had recently manifested in the “Axis of Resistance.” They did so by:
Deepening the concerns of Arab political regimes that these forces would seek to seize power. This led Arab regimes to coordinate, to varying degrees, with Western powers to curb the growth of this movement. This coordination took the form of media wars against this rising force, intelligence infiltration into these organizations, and attempts to push these organizations in questionable directions, particularly by fostering a civil society aimed at spreading skepticism about the liberation or developmental roles of these groups.
Seeking to prevent the unity of these organizations by exploiting theological differences between them, with the Sunni-Shiite divide being the most suitable foundation for achieving this division. Iraq played a role in solidifying this dichotomy during the Iran-Iraq war, and later, Israel and several Arab countries began to fuel these sectarian policies for clear political purposes. This is evident in projects like the “New Middle East” and the “Greater Middle East” and the concept of “creative chaos,” as well as the writings of Bernard Lewis, Oded Yinon, Bernard Lévy, and others.
A study conducted by an American think tank for the U.S. State Department, analyzing Saudi educational materials from 100 textbooks between 2017 and 2020 (and continued later until 2022), revealed content that elevates the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam while demeaning or casting doubt on other Islamic sects. Comparing the changes in educational content from a sectarian perspective, one can clearly observe the connection between political shifts in the region and the content of these revisions.
Tightening security measures and restricting the financial and logistical growth of these movements, coupled with a counter-cultural attack. Political regimes in the Gulf States played a central role in performing this task, driven by the fear of these organizations taking control of power in the Arab region, a concern that extended to the Gulf itself.
Utilizing the Sunni-Shiite dichotomy to encircle Iran, along with political, media, and economic isolation, and surrounding it with military bases. There was also encouragement of internal opposition to Iran, coordinated with Israel, as these powers recognized that Iran is the cornerstone of the Axis of Resistance that must be broken. It is noteworthy that the media’s focus on the factions within this axis links sectarianism to other parties such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, while downplaying the Sunni nature of the Palestinian faction and other Sunni organizations supported by the axis.
Although the period between 1952 and 1970, known in Arab political literature as the era of Arab nationalism, especially Nasserism, exhibited a stance entirely different from the post-Iranian Revolution period, religious movements during that time enjoyed substantial financial and media support from countries that are now hostile to them. This highlights the pragmatic approach taken by Arab political regimes toward religious movements, demonstrating that the stance of these regimes is centered around “how to utilize these movements” against their adversaries. Thus, they adopt an instrumental approach to these relationships, which has rendered the role of these religious organizations ambiguous in the eyes of many researchers, particularly concerning their relationship with Iran.
The Role of Sectarianism in Iranian Foreign Policy
When the Islamic Revolution succeeded in Iran, the most popular Sunni Islamic movement in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood, expressed support for the revolution. Communication between the leaders of both sides began, and eventually, coordination was established between the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran through the Forum for Islamic Unity in 2007. One of the factors that might have contributed to this closeness was the influence of the writings of Sayyid Qutb, which were of significant interest to Iranian leaders. In fact, Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, translated one of Qutb’s books into Persian and praised its content and methodology extensively. This rapprochement, however, raised concerns among Arab political regimes, Israel, and the United States, which led these forces to work on dismantling this cooperation, especially after the victory of the Islamic movement in Egypt’s parliamentary elections. This was followed by Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s visit to Tehran in 2012, after more than three decades of estrangement.
These Iranian positions align with the Iranian constitutional texts, as evident in various articles of the constitution. Article 11 of the constitution emphasizes that “the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must base its general policies on the solidarity and unity of the Islamic peoples and continue to work towards the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.” Article 12 further states:
“The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja’fari school. As for other Islamic sects, which include the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi sects, they are fully respected. Their followers are free to perform their religious rituals according to their jurisprudence, and these sects are officially recognized in matters of religious education, personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills), and related legal proceedings. In regions where the followers of one of these sects form the majority, the local regulations of that region, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the local councils, shall follow that sect, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other sects.”
However, the Iranian constitution includes provisions that weaken the modern meaning of citizenship and undermine equality, which is one of the core values of political systems. It stipulates that the president, not to mention the Supreme Leader, must be a follower of the Ja’fari Shiite sect. This provision excludes approximately 8-10% of the Sunni population, around 8-9 million people, from this right. Moreover, there are restrictions on the representation of Sunnis in some senior bodies, such as their proportion in provinces and districts with a Sunni majority or the establishment of institutions that focus on Sunni affairs. Some political groups, especially among the Sunni Kurds, such as the Iranian Call and Reform Organization, which has connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, are active in Iran and field candidates in parliamentary elections. However, this does not negate the existence of violence between the two largest sects.
It is important to note that within the Sunni wing of the global Muslim community, there are various schools of thought—Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, etc. However, political polarization has not been sharply reflected in these schools or their political behavior. Instead, it has generally remained within the realm of jurisprudential and intellectual disagreements. This indicates that the current political tendencies of Arab countries towards Iran have employed these jurisprudential differences for political purposes, mainly revolving around the Arab regimes’ concern about the transformative approach that took place in Iran. These regimes did not attempt to use these differences to enrich cultural diversity or foster intellectual pluralism. Rather, they adopted a strategy of political “containment” of the Iranian revolution’s effects in cooperation with the United States.
Iraqi political literature during the Iran-Iraq war, with clear Gulf support, focused on the ethnic divide—Persian versus Arab—on one hand, and on historical periods that inflamed this divide to rally the Arab world behind Iraq against Iran on the other. Western powers also encouraged this approach. However, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf’s complete reversal of its stance towards Iraq, the ethnic narrative fractured to the point where Saddam Hussein sent 137 of his warplanes to Iran for protection from American attacks launched from Gulf bases. This strengthens the interpretation that Gulf states’ positions, in particular, have used sectarianism for political purposes benefiting their regimes, rather than serving the interests of the Arab or Islamic peoples.
The Azerbaijani Model in Iranian Foreign Policy
It is necessary to begin with a statement by the philosopher Karl Popper, based on Hegel’s dialectics: “History is full of conspiracies, but history itself is not a conspiracy.” The conspiracy as an “event” cannot explain the greater historical trend. While conspiracies exist and fill the pages of history, the movement of history is linked to technological, intellectual, and value-driven developments, and to the intertwining of organic links—technical, economic—and the importance of mechanical links such as religion, language, and ethnicity. If we attempt to explain Iranian-Azerbaijani relations based on historical perspectives, the mechanical links of religion and Shi’ism are indeed strong, but they do not shape the nature of the relationship between the two countries. Both Iran and Azerbaijan have the highest percentage of Shi’a Muslims globally, and there is an ethnic overlap, with Azeris forming a large majority in northern Iran, making up about 24% of the country’s total population. This makes them the largest ethnic minority after the Persians. However, when measuring the weight of these mechanical links (Shi’ism and Islam) in defining the relationship between the two countries, it becomes clear that these factors are weak.
The ethnic factor, Azeri identity, is also weak despite the fact that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is of Azeri descent. Furthermore, the historical ties between the two were severed in 1813 after the Russo-Persian wars through the Treaty of Gulistan. Clearly, the Shi’ite bond has failed to foster any harmony between the social and political structures of the two countries. While Iran is a religious state with a societal commitment to religion ranging between 70% and 75%, Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is the most secular state among Islamic nations. Its constitution explicitly separates religion from the state in Article 18, and the state is declared secular in Article 7. The level of religious commitment in Azerbaijani society does not exceed 50%, likely due to the influence of the Soviet era, which Azerbaijan was part of for several decades.
Thus, if sectarianism were a central factor in Iranian foreign policy, how can we explain the fact that Iran’s worst relationship in West Asia is with Azerbaijan, the country with the second-highest percentage of Shi’ites?
When examining other indicators, Azerbaijan surpasses Iran in several areas. The Gini coefficient, which measures wealth distribution, stands at 25% for Azerbaijan compared to 41% for Iran. In terms of democracy, Iran scores 1.96 compared to 2.8 for Azerbaijan (on a scale of ten), and both countries have negative scores for political stability, with Azerbaijan at -0.93 and Iran at -1.59. This indicates that the internal structures of the two countries differ significantly in their political dimensions, explaining their divergent political behavior, in which their shared sectarianism plays no political role.
In the field of international relations, using the Political Distance Index, Azerbaijan’s best external relationships are with Israel, particularly in military, political, and economic cooperation since 1992. Azerbaijan established relations with Israel just six months after separating from the Soviet Union, whereas Israeli-Iranian relations are among the worst in Iran’s international relations. To illustrate this disparity, Israeli arms sales to Azerbaijan and its support in the war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh are notable, along with Israel’s reliance on Azerbaijani oil, which accounts for approximately 40% of its supply.
In contrast, Iran’s closest partners according to all sub-indicators of political distance are Confucian China, which has the lowest religiosity index globally, and Orthodox Christian Russia. Iran’s major trade partners include China, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Turkey, and India, while its trade with Azerbaijan accounts for just 2.8%. This suggests that sectarianism holds little weight in the fabric of relations between the two countries.
This analysis shows that explaining Iran’s foreign policy based on sectarianism does not align with the nature of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations or Iran’s international relations more broadly. Therefore, the concept of the “Shi’ite Crescent” does not provide sufficient insight into Iran’s political behavior, especially when compared to the geostrategic dimension of its foreign policy.
Iran’s foreign policy towards Arab and non-Arab Shia:
Upon reviewing media trends in countries with significant Shia populations, it is evident that accusations of Iran politicizing sectarianism in its relations are largely confined to Arab states. Non-Arab countries with considerable Shia populations do not raise this issue of politicizing sectarianism, even when Sunni-Shia disputes arise. For instance, the combined Shia population in India and Pakistan totals around 62 million, surpassing that of Arab Shias. Yet, Iran’s relations with India and Pakistan are not based on religious sectarianism, despite the ongoing Kashmir issue between these two South Asian countries. Iran is the third-largest global recipient of Indian exports, even though the Sunnis of Kashmir and a portion of the region’s Shia do not align with Iran’s views. Iran has even attempted to mediate between India and Pakistan, particularly concerning the Sunni-majority Kashmir.
On another note, major Arab Shia groups, such as Iraq’s Sadrist movement, do not always align with Iran’s foreign policy, especially towards Iraq. This implies that non-state Shia forces do not necessarily side with Iran.
Iran’s foreign policy is shaped by three competing currents: Islamic unity, Persian nationalism, and sectarianism. Hence, it is essential to move away from viewing this foreign policy solely through a sectarian lens.
The establishment of associations, clubs, or financial aid funds abroad is not unique to Iran. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have similar institutions operating in African and Asian countries, yet they are not accused of politicizing sectarianism. This accusation only surfaces when Iran engages in such activities.
Some researchers distinguish between two aspects of Iranian foreign policy. Iran does not emphasize sectarianism in its relations with “states” but leans more towards sectarianism in its relations with “non-state actors,” as seen in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine. However, the degree of politicizing sectarianism by Iran does not match the level of politicization by its regional rivals. Many researchers who have studied Iranian foreign policy since 1979 argue that Iran’s decision-making process is more grounded in realism than in sectarianism. The stance of Alawites in Syria and Morocco, for instance, differs from Iran’s, especially concerning the issues of Israel and Western Sahara.
The Al-Aqsa Flood between religious sectarianism and the strategic vision of the conflict:
Yasser Arafat, the late president of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood figure, led the first official foreign delegation to visit Tehran after the victory of the Iranian revolution on February 17, 1979. The severing of Iranian-Israeli relations and the conversion of the Israeli embassy in Tehran into a Palestinian embassy on February 18, 1979, just a week after the revolution and a day after Arafat’s visit, marked a profound shift in Iranian-Israeli relations. This shift was further fueled by Iran’s opposition to any Arab normalization with Israel, which led some Arab states to hide behind the veil of sectarianism.
Iran’s stance was not disconnected from prior relations between Iranian revolutionary forces and Palestinian organizations before the Iranian revolution. There was also a historical relationship between Nasser’s Egypt and the Iranian opposition during the Shah’s era, especially following the revolution of Mohammad Mosaddegh. Sectarianism was not a factor in these relationships, as the political rapprochement transcended sectarian affiliation.
With the rise of the religious movement in Palestinian resistance after the Iranian revolution, Iran began supporting this movement, particularly after the first intifada. Iran’s invitation to a Hamas delegation to attend a conference in Tehran in 1990 to support the Palestinian cause marked the beginning of a relationship that experienced some tension during the Arab Spring due to the Syrian crisis. The relationship between Iran and the Islamic Jihad Movement also developed as a result of the Arab world’s abandonment of support for Palestinian resistance, according to the leader of Islamic Jihad.
What has been outlined requires both Arab and Iranian parties to separate sectarian differences from shared political interests. They must develop an ethical framework for managing sectarian disputes in a way that supports their mutual political goals.
Moreover, Iran adopted a specific strategy outlined in its “Vision 2025” document, which was drafted in 2003 by numerous experts and Iranian institutions. This vision aims to establish Iran as a leading regional power in West Asia, relying on scientific and economic development, in line with the constitutional mandates of preventing foreign influence and eradicating imperialism (Article 5, Section 3), and considering the Islamic nation as one (Article 11). This means that the core components of Iranian foreign policy are technological and economic on one side and ideologically unifying on the other. These principles gradually stabilized in Iranian foreign policy after the initial revolutionary fervor subsided.
Iran’s conflict with Israel is rooted in fundamental contradictions, which contributed to the rapprochement between the religious wing of Palestinian organizations and Iran, independent of sectarian tendencies:
- The historical negative image of Jews in the Islamic mindset, a view shared by both Sunnis and Shias.
- Viewing Israel as an obstacle to Iran’s aspirations for regional dominance, which aligns with Palestinian resistance movements that consider Israel a colonial force imposed on the region.
- The U.S.-Israeli relationship, which Iran sees as a threat to its regional ambitions, while Palestinian movements view U.S. support for Israel as a key barrier to Palestinian liberation.
- Iran’s concern about the alignment of Arab normalization states with both the U.S. and Israel, combined with these regimes’ hostility towards popular Arab support for Islamic movements’ actual political representation. This created an opportunity for cooperation between those affected by Arab-Israeli rapprochement.
In line with this, it is not in Iran’s interest to provoke sectarianism. A study of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speeches, analyzed through content analysis, along with editorials from two Iranian newspapers—one in English, Tehran Times, and another in Arabic, Al-Wifaq—over three years revealed the following:
- In Khamenei’s speeches, the concept of Islamic unity appeared 76.3% of the time, while sectarianism appeared 19.8%, and nationalism (Arab/Persian dualism) 3.7%.
- In the Tehran Times, the topic of Palestine was mentioned in 61.9% of editorials, while the Sunni/Shia divide appeared 32% of the time, and Arab/Persian nationalism 4.5%. In Al-Wifaq, the Palestinian issue appeared 77.9% of the time, sectarianism 4.5%, and Arab/Persian nationalism 7.1%.
Adding to this, the global protests in support of Al-Aqsa’s liberation reflect the following:
- Iran ranked fifth globally in terms of the number of demonstrations supporting Al-Aqsa, with a total of 1,032 protests by the end of August, placing it fourth in the Islamic world after Yemen, Morocco, and Turkey.
- Iran’s voting record aligned 100% with Palestinian resistance demands in votes on various resolutions or amendments at the United Nations General Assembly between October 27, 2023, and December 12, 2023. Iran opposed three resolutions or amendments, supported one, and abstained from voting on another.
In conclusion, Israel’s management of its international relations deserves attention. It maintains close ties with most of the Christian world, across its various sects. Israel is one of the primary arms suppliers to Hindu-majority India, Catholic-majority Philippines, and Shia-majority Azerbaijan. Its military sales to Arab Abraham Accords countries increased by 17% between 2021 and 2023. Before the Al-Aqsa flood, Israel was the Middle East’s top trading partner with Sunni-majority Turkey and enjoys advanced relations with Japan, a Shinto-Buddhist country. This demonstrates that the primary variable in international relations management is not sectarianism but a realistic perspective based on national interests. Sectarianism is politically employed to enhance national interests and restrict the strategic maneuvering of adversaries, particularly Iran.
The majority of the official Arab stance towards Iran is merely the politicization of sectarianism for political purposes, centered on blocking any forces of change to political systems, especially hereditary ones. These systems prioritize regime security over societal and state security. Thus, Arab-Iranian relations, particularly within the axis of resistance, must be based on a rational, gradual shift towards a non-zero-sum approach, prioritizing common ground over differences, without compromising the strategic goal of liberation from settler colonialism.
References
[1] An expert in future and foresight studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Cairo University and is a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University in Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Ombudsman Bureau, and the Higher Media Council. He has authored 37 books, most of which focus on future studies from both theoretical and applied perspectives, and has published approximately 120 research papers in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
[2] Many social and political studies link the concept of “sect” with other dimensions, such as nationalism or others, while the Oxford Dictionary focuses on hierarchical fragmentation within a single religion, meaning that an individual belongs to a sub-identity within a particular religion. See:
T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in Contemporary World (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–77; and Sectarianism, site of Oxford English Dictionary (OED), https://www.oed.com/search/advanced/Meanings?textTermText0=sectarianism&textTermOpt0=Definition
[3] Alexander De Juan, “The Role of Intra-Religious Conflicts in Intrastate Wars,” in Terrorism and Political Violence journal, vol. 27, 2015, https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/api/core/bitstreams/6bf31312-d50d-4f13-a81f-0fb4e29924fb/content
[4] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in Contemporary World, pp. 74–77.
[5] Pam Wasserman, World Population by Religion: A Global Tapestry of Faith, site of Population Education, 12/1/2024, https://populationeducation.org/world-population-by-religion-a-global-tapestry-of-faith
[6] Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially, site of Pew Research Center, 3/10/2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/10/03/many-countries-favor-specific-religions-officially-or-unofficially
[7] Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004), vol. 3, pp. 1484–1485, https://prussia.online/Data/Book/en/encyclopedia-of-wars/Encyclopedia%20of%20Wars%20(2005),%20OCR.pdf
[8] Political science literature distinguishes between a dispute, where disagreement occurs through non-violent means, and a conflict, where violence is employed.
[9] Jason Bruner and David C. Kirkpatrick, “Intra-Christian Violence and the Problematisation of the World Christian Paradigm,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 74, no. 2, August 2022, pp. 375–397.
[10] For intra-religious conflicts within various religions, see:
Edward Rodrigues, Religion and Society (India: Jinal, 2018), chap. 21 and 30; The eight wars of religion (1562–1598), site of Musée virtuel du protestantisme, https://museeprotestant.org/en/notice/the-eight-wars-of-religion-1562-1598; site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Europe/The-Wars-of-Religion; Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict Over Church and State: A Divisive Threat to our Democracy?, site of Commentary, https://www.commentary.org/articles/will-herberg/the-sectarian-conflict-over-church-and-statea-divisive-threat-to-our-democracy; and A Dictionary of Buddhism: Sōhei, Kamien Keown, A Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford University Press, 2004).
For the differences in the nature of violence between religions and within the same religion, see the psychosocial analysis of both phenomena:
Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer, “Intra- and Inter-Religious Hate and Violence: A Psychosocial Model,” Journal of Hate Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255659806_Intra-_and_Inter-Religious_Hate_and_Violence_A_Psychosocial_Model
[11] Isak Svensson et. al., “Disputes over the Divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) Data, 1975 to 2015,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 62, no. 5, May 2018, pp. 1137–1139.
[12] Catherine R. Antosh, “The Drivers of Sectarian Violence: A Qualitative Analysis of Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey,” Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=honors201019
[13] Lucian N. Leustean, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The First Religious War in the 21st Century,” site of LSE Religion and Global Society blog, 3/3/2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2022/03/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-the-first-religious-war-in-the-21st-century
[14] For details on the strategies of dismantling the region based on minorities, sects, and religions and the implications for stances on “Israel,” see:
Walid Abdul Hai, The Greater Middle East Project: The Geostrategic Dimension, publications of the General Secretariat of Arab Parties, No. 10, 2006, pp. 23-45; and also see:
Raffaella A Del Sarto, “Sectarian Securitization in the Middle East and the Case of Israel,” International Affairs, vol. 97, no. 3, May 2021, pp. 759–778, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/3/759/6210559; and Morten Valbjørn, Approaching Sectarian Identity Politics and Middle East International Relations in the First Post-Arab Uprisings Decade − A Stocktaking, site of The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 31/5/2023, https://www.iemed.org/publication/approaching-sectarian-identity-politics-and-middle-east-international-relations-in-the-first-post-arab-uprisings-decade-%e2%88%92-a-stocktaking
[15] Henry Burbridge et al., “Comparative Review of Violence and Social Hostility in the Curriculum of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: High School Religious Studies Textbooks (2017 to 2020),” site of International Center for Religion & Diplomacy, 2022, pp. 10, 21, and 33.
[16] F. Gregory Gause, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, site of Brookings Institution, 2014, pp. 12–15.
[17] Tamer Badawi and Osama al-Sayyad, Mismatched Expectations: Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Uprisings, site of Carnegie Middle East Center, 19/3/2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/mismatched-expectations-iran-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-after-the-arab-uprisings?lang=en¢er=middle-east
For the introduction to the book written by Khamenei, see: Islamic Thought: Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, The Message of Unity, issue 12, site of Iran and the Arabs, at: http://iranarab.com/Default.asp?Page=ViewArticle&ArticleID=213
[18] The Constitution of Iran issued in 1979, including its amendments until 1989, translated by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, updated project on comparative constitutions, site of CONSTITUTE, at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=ar
[19] Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Sunnis in Iran: Protesting Against Decades of Discrimination and Repression, site of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21/11/2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sunnis-iran-protesting-against-decades-discrimination-and-repression
[20] History of Sunni Political Islam in Eastern Kurdistan (Iran), site of The Kurdistan Tribune, 16/1/2014, https://kurdistantribune.com/history-of-sunni-political-islam-eastern-kurdistan-iran
[21] Mattin Biglari, “ ‘Captive to the Demonology of the Iranian Mobs’: U.S. Foreign Policy and Perceptions of Shi’a Islam During the Iranian Revolution, 1978-79,” Diplomatic History, vol. 40, no. 4, 2016, pp. 579–605.
[22] Appendix A: Chronology – February 1991, site of Naval History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/re
search/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/a/chronology-of-the-gulf-war-february-1991.html
[23] A Timeline of U.S. Relations with Iran, site of PBS Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/timeline
[24] Abdalaziz Al-Mutairi, “Tehran’s Support for Al-Qaeda: The Untold Story,” The Majalla magazine, 18/1/2021, https://eng.majalla.com/node/117916
