On May 29, 2024, South Africa held its seventh general elections since the end of apartheid in 1994, to elect a new National Assembly and provincial legislatures in each of the nine provinces. The results showed that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) lost its national parliamentary majority and much of the dominance it had held since the 1994 elections that brought former President Nelson Mandela to power. This development marks a critical phase for South Africa, as the country’s governance system requires the parliament to elect the president within 14 days of the election results being announced.
While the ANC, which has led South Africa for over 30 years, remains the largest party by percentage in these elections, President Cyril Ramaphosa acknowledged the setback and announced that the ANC would form a national unity government in coalition with opposition parties of differing ideologies. This article examines the reasons behind the decline in national support for the ANC and its implications for South Africa’s foreign policy and positions on global issues such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the Israeli war on Gaza.
Domestic Reasons and Factors
Most reports before the elections predicted the ANC would struggle to achieve the majority it needed in parliament, due to the party’s performance in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The final results of the recent elections (in May 2024) released by South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission on Sunday revealed that the ANC secured only 40.18%, a significant drop from the 57.5% achieved in the 2019 elections. In the municipal elections held in 2021, the party received less than 50% of the total votes for the first time since the end of apartheid and also lost local support in major cities such as Pretoria (Tshwane Municipality), Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, and Durban (eThekwini Municipality).
The recent May 2024 election results serve as a warning from voters to the ANC, protesting its failure to address national issues and ignoring factors that have influenced voter trends, which can be summarized as follows:
A. Economic Factors: South Africa is one of the most advanced countries in Africa but also one of the most unequal globally. The country’s economy faces multiple crises exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, with unemployment rates rising to 32% according to an official report. Economic activities are affected by issues such as electricity shortages, floods, and transportation sector difficulties, alongside a high-cost economic environment. The economy also experiences negative per capita growth, and there are increasing complaints of inequality and growing poverty disproportionately affecting black citizens, despite them making up 80% of the country’s 61 million people and being the core supporters of the ANC for years. Additionally, government debt burdens the nation, with about 42% of the population living on grants amid a high rate of violent crime.
With declining support from black South Africans, millions of young people known as the “Born-Free Generation,” who were born after the end of apartheid in 1994 and did not witness the ANC’s efforts in overthrowing the apartheid regime, do not feel politically obligated or loyal to the ANC and evaluate its performance through economic and developmental lenses. Many opposition parties in South Africa have capitalized on this new generation’s perspectives, incorporating economic policies aimed at attracting youth into their campaign agendas. For instance, the uMkhonto weSizwe party and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have called for nationalizing parts of the economy, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) has presented business-friendly statements appealing to local traders and Western investors.
B. Public Discontent with Administrative Corruption and Failing Social Services: Economic factors have fueled public anger against the ANC government, whose members face numerous corruption and nepotism allegations, enriching themselves amidst the deterioration of basic government services affecting millions of residents, such as long power outages. The downward support trend for the ANC can be traced back to the emergence of corruption allegations against party leaders and complaints about weak basic services, particularly since 2015 when party leaders failed to decisively address public demands for legal action against specific party members. The most significant drop in ANC support began in 2021 in municipalities and major cities whose residents repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with severe water shortages, such as areas in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, which have not had tap water for 10 months, relying on water tankers that sometimes fail to deliver water on time. This discontent and anger were evident during the recent May elections, where voters insisted on casting their ballots, standing in lines despite the freezing winter from election day until 3 a.m. the next day.
C. Main Opposition Parties as an Alternative: Over 50 political parties competed in South Africa’s recent elections, and while many won only small shares, most opposition parties’ policies align with public grievances, and their agendas agree on the need to change the country’s direction. Three main opposition parties managed to present their platforms as alternatives to the ANC. These are: the Democratic Alliance, led by John Steenhuisen, who believes that the only way to save South Africa is to break the ANC’s majority; the uMkhonto weSizwe party, led by Jacob Zuma, who claimed election irregularities and fraud; and the Economic Freedom Fighters, led by Julius Malema, who praised the election results and the end of the ANC’s dominance over the political process in the country.
The Democratic Alliance (accused of prioritizing white interests over black South Africans) focused its 2024 election manifesto on the need to expand economic growth prospects in South Africa and the country’s ability to create jobs, accusing the ANC of failing to manage the country’s facilities and improve essential services, including electricity and water supply and port activation. It held the ANC responsible for the erosion of state institutions due to nepotism, corruption, crime, and the worsening educational system crisis that promotes illiteracy among children. These points align with the grievances of city residents, investors, and wealthy neighborhood residents, especially whites.
The Economic Freedom Fighters, in their 2024 election manifesto, emphasized the need for good governance, which the ANC has failed to achieve, and centered their programs on land restitution, job creation, and addressing the electricity crisis. These issues are critical for most South Africans, particularly blacks and youth. The uMkhonto weSizwe party’s programs combine the general desires of black South Africans and young people with the demands of rural residents, traditional leaders, and various ethnic groups calling for integrating traditional leadership into the parliamentary system. The party also focused its policies on solving economic inequality issues, inadequate access to quality education and healthcare, and addressing national security threats and unequal land distribution, while promoting foreign policies that reflect the country’s values and aspirations.
D. The Jacob Zuma Factor: Jacob Zuma, the former president who resigned in 2018 amid a cloud of corruption allegations, is a key reason for the ANC’s decreased share and support in the recent 2024 elections. South Africa witnessed a fierce political battle before the elections between Zuma and the ANC on one side and Zuma and his former deputy and current president Cyril Ramaphosa on the other. The battle peaked on July 7, 2021, after Zuma’s arrest and imprisonment for refusing to appear before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector, including Organs of State (also known as the Zondo Commission). Zuma defied the Constitutional Court’s order to appear before the commission and was sentenced to 15 months in prison. On December 16, 2023, Zuma launched the uMkhonto weSizwe party in Soweto, the city that witnessed the 1976 student uprising during the apartheid era.
Despite being among those who tarnished the ANC’s reputation and brought widespread criticism to the party during his presidency from 2009 to 2018, Zuma managed to gain local support for his new party by making statements critical of the ANC. For instance, when announcing his new party, Zuma claimed that his former party had brought much suffering to black South Africans, made inflammatory statements, and adopted populist positions such as calling for the replacement of South Africa’s parliamentary sovereignty with an unrestricted sovereignty of the country’s constitution.
Although the uMkhonto weSizwe party was established only five months before the 2024 elections, Zuma’s strategies proved effective, with his party securing nearly 15% of the national vote and attracting traditional supporters disillusioned with the ANC, reducing the ANC’s majority to 40.2%. The uMkhonto weSizwe party replaced the Economic Freedom Fighters as the third-largest political party in South Africa (after the Democratic Alliance, which is the second largest). In South Africa’s provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga proved to be the strongest support bases for the uMkhonto weSizwe party, with KwaZulu-Natal, Zuma’s home province, seeing the party advance with 45.32% of the vote to become a major party there, while the ANC fell to third place with only 17% of the province’s votes. In Mpumalanga, the uMkhonto weSizwe party, which garnered 17.1% of the vote to become the second-largest party in the province, caused the ANC’s share of votes to drop to 51%.
National Unity Government and Its Impact on Foreign Policy
The decline of the “African National Congress (ANC)” dominance in the recent elections to below 50.1% of the votes necessary to form the government means it is forced to seek partners to form a coalition government. This development will affect South Africa’s foreign policy for two reasons: first, the country’s stances on global geopolitical issues have been well-known and clear due to the ANC’s dominance and its administration’s rule; second, South Africa’s foreign policy was a major topic of debate before the elections, indicating that the country’s foreign policies will be among the negotiation points between the ANC and its other political partners.
This development comes at a time when South Africa has been a key player in global affairs, such as being a voice for Africa and the broader Global South since the COVID-19 crisis when it spoke out against what it termed “vaccine apartheid.” The country has had tensions with the West over the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and is a major player in the reorganization of global powers under its membership in BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Pretoria remains a prominent advocate for Palestinian rights, opposing Israel’s war on Gaza, and bringing a genocide case against Israel to the International Criminal Court.
President Cyril Ramaphosa, days after the announcement of the recent election results, stated that his party, the ANC, would form a national unity government with major opposition parties, suggesting that the party is trying to avoid relying mainly on a single rival party due to the challenges it would pose to the ANC’s programs and future. Since the two parties, “Mkhonto We Sizwe,” which ranks third nationally, and “Economic Freedom Fighters,” also third nationally, have refused to join the national unity government, the ANC’s available option is to ally with the “Democratic Alliance,” the smaller “Inkatha Freedom Party,” and the “Patriotic Alliance.”
Given that the national unity government comprises the ANC, the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the Patriotic Alliance, this new government is expected to moderate its foreign policy to balance the ideologies of the political parties forming it. The nature of the government might also lead to significant efforts to repair South Africa’s relations with the West, considering the Democratic Alliance is an ally of the West and European investments and represents the NATO axis. This could provide the new government with a potential boost for European investments and enhanced Western economic partnerships, which have recently declined due to the country’s global stances perceived by the West as contrary to its interests.
However, there are stark philosophical differences between ANC governments and the Democratic Alliance, especially regarding the role of government and ways to address social and economic issues. For example, the Democratic Alliance opposes two of the ANC’s major initiatives: the National Health Insurance Bill aimed at providing universal healthcare and the Black Economic Empowerment measures to provide economic opportunities to black South Africans and reduce the effects of the apartheid era. The Democratic Alliance is also accused of prioritizing the interests of the white population in South Africa and being anti-Russia, with actions of its members and leadership suggesting a pro-Israel stance. This indicates a potential change in South Africa’s position towards Israel or at least a reduction in the intensity of criticisms and leniency in international measures favoring Palestinians.
Another issue is related to dealing with China and recognizing Taiwan. The Democratic Alliance tends to reject China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan, while ANC governments accept China’s claim over the island. Regarding South Africa’s relationship with Russia, the ANC supports Russia in its foreign policy, while the Democratic Alliance supports Ukraine and opposes Russia, criticizing the South African government during tensions between Pretoria and Washington over hosting Russian ships and assisting in transporting weapons. Democratic Alliance leader John Steenhuisen visited Ukraine and expressed solidarity with Kyiv. The Democratic Alliance has also expressed dissatisfaction with BRICS; in August 2023, after the BRICS summit in South Africa, some party members opposed the group, describing it as an increasingly “unholy alliance” and a waste of money.
The coming years in South Africa may witness populist policies opposing African integration, considering that the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Patriotic Alliance, part of the national unity government, are against African migrants. The first party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, has been considered a conservative and pro-West organization since its establishment during apartheid, while the second, the Patriotic Alliance, is populist and pro-Israel under the guise of evangelical Christianity. This means that the ANC’s insistence on continuing its usual foreign policies and stances may be met with rejection by other members of the new government from the remaining political parties forming the government and objecting to those policies. The national unity government may also witness a series of resignations from those rejecting such positions or foreign policies.
It is worth noting that the ANC’s retreat from its current policies or adopting different positions to appease the new government partners may ignite protests and opposition from parties like Mkhonto We Sizwe and the Economic Freedom Fighters, whose stances are similar to the ANC’s. Most of the current foreign policy of the ANC (including joining BRICS) dates back to the era of Jacob Zuma, the founder of Mkhonto We Sizwe and former president of South Africa.
The fact that Mkhonto We Sizwe envisioned in its last electoral manifesto a government supporting justice and respect for all parties in international relations, ensuring that South Africa’s foreign policy represents the country’s interests and values, confirms this. It affirmed its support for resistance movements in Palestine and solidarity with countries that raised slogans against Western imperialist forces like Cuba and Russia, calling for South Africa’s sovereignty restoration by reviewing international treaties and agreements, including South Africa’s membership in the International Criminal Court. Mkhonto We Sizwe also urged South Africa to cooperate with BRICS countries to seek alternatives for currencies and global settlement methods, pointing to the need to end the country’s complete dependence on the West for foreign aid. The Economic Freedom Fighters, in its electoral manifesto, called for enhancing African continental integration, including the free movement of Africans, affirming its support for Russia, backing the Palestinians, and arming Hamas against Israeli aggression.
Conclusion
The significant decline in voter support for the ANC is an assessment of its weak performance in leading South Africa and meeting urgent national needs, creating a difficult situation for President Cyril Ramaphosa, who seeks a second term amid weak public satisfaction with his governance and programs. It is clear from the above that the road for the ANC to form the government is not easy and that its coalition with other political parties will affect its foreign policy. Cooperation with the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the Patriotic Alliance will mean a new government leaning towards the West, adopting more lenient positions regarding Israel, and being more neutral concerning Russia.
Despite South Africa’s expected assumption of the G20 presidency in 2025, the ANC’s partnership with other ideologically different political parties leads to a state of uncertainty in South Africa’s positions on global issues. This is especially true considering that foreign policy in South Africa is no longer solely crafted by the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation; almost every government department has an office for foreign affairs, and the decentralization of foreign policy may exacerbate disagreements among the parties forming the national unity government even if the ANC retains the ministry for itself.
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