There are growing concerns regarding the current escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, particularly because it differs in context and mechanisms from the skirmishes and light exchanges that have persisted since October 8, 2023, coinciding with the war on Gaza. Israel has begun employing new tactics and tools to weaken Hezbollah, including the infiltration of communication systems. This was evident in the recent explosions of Hezbollah’s wireless communication devices, which injured thousands of Lebanese, even though Israel has not officially acknowledged involvement in these attacks. Additionally, direct strikes by Israel on southern Lebanon in recent days have resulted in the deaths of over 500 individuals and injuries to thousands of civilians, drawing widespread regional and international condemnation. This situation has led many analysts to question the future of this escalation and whether it might expand into a comprehensive regional war, given the varying positions of regional and international powers regarding the conflict, as well as the internal conditions of both Israel and Hezbollah, both of which have been worn down by the war in Gaza.
Military Pressure
Israel has shifted its strategy in response to the October 7 attacks, moving its focus from the war in Gaza to confrontations on the northern front with Hezbollah. The aim is to weaken Hezbollah’s strength and restore civilian populations in the border areas between Israel and Lebanon. The current escalation is characterized by several key developments:
1. Infiltration of Hezbollah’s Communication Systems: Israel executed a surprising operation to infiltrate communication systems in Lebanon, leading to a series of explosions over two days targeting the “pager” wireless devices used by most Hezbollah members. This action was taken out of fear that members could be tracked via mobile phones. The explosions resulted in the deaths of several party members and injuries to thousands of civilians. Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for these attacks, some Israeli think tanks have begun to justify the action as aligned with international law principles, framing it as a self-defense measure, arguing that the explosions targeted Hezbollah members rather than civilians. Overall, this attack has revealed significant internal issues for Hezbollah, raising doubts about the party’s security policies concerning external infiltration attempts.
2. Targeting of Hezbollah Leaders: Israel is attempting to drain Hezbollah by eliminating its leaders. Multiple attacks on Hezbollah strongholds have resulted in the deaths of several party leaders, the latest being Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed on Friday, September 27, 2024, in an airstrike that could alter the dynamics of the confrontation between the two parties. Hezbollah confirmed Nasrallah’s death in a statement about air raids targeting the party’s central command in southern Beirut, which also resulted in the deaths of other leaders, including “Ibrahim Aqeel,” commander of the party’s Radwan force, and “Ahmed Wahbi.” Additionally, there was an attempted assassination of “Ali Karki,” one of Hezbollah’s military leaders in southern Lebanon. These assassinations are considered a violation of the tacit rules of engagement agreed upon between Israel and Hezbollah based on mutual deterrence.
3. Efforts to Undermine Hezbollah’s Military Capabilities: The current escalation reflects Israel’s efforts to diminish Hezbollah’s qualitative military capabilities, particularly its missile capabilities. Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari stated on September 24, 2024, that Israel aims for the campaign against Hezbollah to be as short as possible while remaining prepared for a prolonged conflict. He mentioned that Israel is currently focused on addressing the party’s strategic capabilities, hence the immense force used in their strikes. On the same day, the Israeli military announced the killing of Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Qubaisi, whom they described as the “commander of the missile and shell system in Hezbollah,” along with two other leaders from the missile unit. The military explained that they launched airstrikes to “disarm Hezbollah’s capabilities and target military infrastructure.”
4. Intensified Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon: In recent days, Israel has escalated its airstrikes on southern Lebanon. On September 23, 2024, Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari confirmed that Israel had commenced a large-scale aerial assault in Lebanon, stating, “Every house we targeted in Lebanon contained weapons for Hezbollah.” He added, “We will strike Hezbollah’s strategic weapons in the Bekaa Valley. Civilians there must evacuate.” According to Israeli broadcasting authority, the Israeli Air Force conducted approximately 300 missile strikes on southern Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah warehouses and positions. These attacks have had a severe toll on Lebanon, with Lebanese Health Minister Firas Al-Abyad reporting on September 24, 2024, that at least 569 people had been killed, including 50 children and 94 women, due to Israeli airstrikes since the morning of September 23, 2024.
5. Hezbollah’s Expansion of Attacks on Israeli Military Bases: Hezbollah has launched new missile strikes on military targets in Israel, totaling around 100 attacks so far, according to Israeli media, utilizing missiles like “Fadi1” and “Fadi2,” as well as “Katyusha” rockets. This prompted Israel to declare a state of emergency in anticipation of further Hezbollah attacks. On September 24, 2024, Hezbollah announced the bombardment of a military base near Safed in northern Israel with 90 missiles. According to Hezbollah statements, the base targeted was “Dado,” the northern command center near Safed, located approximately 15 km from the Lebanese border, with the strikes executed in two waves of 50 and 40 missiles, described as defensive actions for Lebanon and its people. The party also claimed responsibility for targeting the “Atlit” base belonging to the Israeli navy south of Haifa using drones. Moreover, Hezbollah reported bombing the main warehouses of the northern region at the Israeli military “Nimra” base and hitting the northern command base south of Haifa with “Fadi2” missiles, in addition to targeting logistical warehouses of the 146th Division at “Naftali” base and striking “Shimson base,” which serves as a command and regional preparation center, with “Fadi3” missiles.
Limits of the Conflict
The potential for further escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, leading to an all-out war, hinges on several key determinants:
1. Success of Israeli Airstrikes in Establishing a Buffer Zone with Hezbollah: Israel expresses a desire to control southern Lebanon to transform it into a buffer zone that protects it from Hezbollah attacks, enabling residents of northern Israel to return to their homes. Thus, if the ongoing Israeli airstrikes succeed in persuading Hezbollah to comply with Israeli demands, whether related to disengagement from the Gaza war or cessation of attacks on northern Israel, the likelihood of a full-scale war between the two parties may diminish.
2. Ongoing Influence of the Far-Right on Decision-Making in Israel: The months of war in Gaza have revealed a rising influence of the far-right on decision-making in Israel. Therefore, if this influence persists regarding the Lebanese front, the situation could explode, leading to a widespread conflict. This hypothesis is supported by continuous far-right statements advocating for an escalation of the war with Hezbollah. For instance, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for a broad war against Lebanon, stating in a radio interview in Israel on September 5, 2024, that “we are now paying the price for 30 years of the false notion of not being prepared to pay the costs of war. We have allowed the monsters of terror in Gaza and Lebanon to grow stronger, and this must end during our tenure. The war must conclude, with (Hamas) and (Hezbollah) no longer existing.” He added, “There will be a war; there’s no avoiding it, and it will have complex objectives. After thirty years, the time for change has come.”
3. Netanyahu’s Use of the War in Lebanon as a Political Opportunity: Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu faces significant challenges following the “Storming of Al-Aqsa” operation and is aware that he will be held politically accountable after the war in Gaza concludes. He might utilize the conflict with Hezbollah to alleviate the internal pressures he faces due to his inability to end the Gaza war and recover hostages. The attacks against Hezbollah have seen the Likud party regain the lead in local opinion polls in Israel, amidst growing international concern over the potential for the conflict to expand into a comprehensive war. This political use of the conflict could lead to events spiraling out of control.
4. Israeli Military Engagement with the Possibility of War in Lebanon: So far, Israel has confined itself to executing airstrikes against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon while attempting to convey messages that it does not wish to launch a ground invasion of Lebanon. Israeli UN envoy Danny Danon stated on April 24, 2024, that “Israel is open to ideas for de-escalating the conflict in Lebanon and does not wish for a ground invasion.” This indicates Israel’s desire to mitigate international criticism. Additionally, there are concerns that a ground assault on Lebanon could cause divisions within the Israeli military, which is already exhausted from months of prolonged warfare in Gaza.
5. Limits of Hezbollah’s Escalation: Currently, it can be argued that Hezbollah’s escalation against Israel is controlled; the attacks executed by Hezbollah are not significantly effective, and most of them target Israeli military sites, indicating the party’s desire to avoid civilian targets out of fear of Israeli retaliation. Moreover, Hezbollah aims to use propaganda to warn Israel against a ground invasion of Lebanon. Hassan Nasrallah has declared that Israel cannot repatriate its citizens to the north by any means, even if tensions escalate to a comprehensive regional war, threatening that if Israel invades Lebanon, it will provide an excellent opportunity for Hezbollah forces to target and eliminate Israeli soldiers.
However, there is no guarantee that Hezbollah will maintain this approach, especially since continuous Israeli attacks have depleted the party and led to the loss of several leaders. Therefore, there could come a moment when the party’s ability to control its elements weakens, resulting in an unplanned attack that could push the two sides toward a large-scale war.
Conclusion
The current situation between Hezbollah and Israel presents a precarious balance of military engagement, political maneuvering, and regional dynamics. The potential for escalation into an all-out war depends on various factors, including the effectiveness of Israeli military operations, the influence of political factions within Israel, the strategic decisions made by Hezbollah, and broader regional responses. The interplay of these elements will determine whether the conflict remains contained or spirals into a wider confrontation, with significant consequences for both parties and the region as a whole.
