The battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood” launched by Hamas on October 7th has revived the Palestinian cause on the global stage. The repercussions of this battle have brought the issue of Israeli-African relations back to the forefront of discussions. The nature of these relations is reflected in the positions taken by African nations regarding Israel’s war on Gaza following the Al-Aqsa Flood battle, which can be seen as an expression of these countries’ relations with Israel and their stance on the Palestinian cause. Most African countries reacted to the Israeli army’s attacks on Gaza, with official stances varying between support and opposition, depending on the different agendas and orientations of African leaders. The war on Gaza has influenced African nations’ positions towards Israel, which had seen significant improvement over the past twenty years. This article will explore the development of Israeli-African relations from their inception until the Israeli war on Gaza, through several key points as follows:
1. The Emergence and Development of Israeli-African Relations
Africa has held a significant position in Israel’s foreign policy. Israel has sought to establish relations with African nations since its founding due to their strategic, political, and regional importance. Following Israel’s establishment in 1948, cooperation with many African countries quickly developed. Israel dedicated extensive diplomatic efforts to forming and developing relations with various African nations, especially following their independence from European colonial powers. The 1960s witnessed a notable development in Israeli-African relations, with Israel maintaining 33 embassies in Africa at that time. This period was marked by reciprocal visits between Israeli leaders and African heads of state.
However, following the outbreak of the October 6, 1973, war, Israel’s relations with most sub-Saharan African countries collapsed under pressure from the Arab League on African governments. This partly explains the lack of consistent Israeli investment in Africa during that period. In the early 1980s, in the favorable context of the Camp David Accords and Egypt’s signing of a peace agreement with Israel, Israeli-African diplomatic relations were gradually re-established. This trend gained more momentum after the Oslo Accords in 1993, which also coincided with the end of apartheid in South Africa and the conclusion of the Cold War. From the mid-2000s onward, Avigdor Lieberman, during his tenure as Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2012 and again from 2013 to 2015, diversified Israel’s diplomatic alliances with African countries. In 2016, this was followed by a historic visit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to East Africa. In June 2017, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) invited Netanyahu to speak at its summit, and in November 2017, the Israeli Prime Minister returned to Kenya to meet with eleven African leaders to discuss security cooperation in the geostrategically important Horn of Africa region.
With the increase in Israeli diplomatic visits to Africa in recent years, Israeli media has been discussing a “Israeli Spring” in Africa. This rhetoric intensified especially after the restoration of Israeli relations with Guinea in July 2016 and the visit of Chadian President Idriss Déby to Israel in November 2017, which the Israeli media described as historic. It was the first visit since Chad cut its ties with Israel in 1973, and Israeli media highlighted that relations with Chad open new horizons for Israel’s policy towards Muslim-majority countries in Africa.
Notably, Israel has also been active on a multilateral level to strengthen its presence in Africa. Israel sought to conclude Abraham Accords with African countries, with Prime Minister Netanyahu focusing on resuming old discussions with Sudan for normalization after the fall of former President Omar al-Bashir’s regime in April 2019. Sudan’s new rulers appeared eager to strengthen economic and security ties with both Tel Aviv and Washington, leading to the signing and implementation of the normalization agreement in 2020. Additionally, normalization with Morocco was celebrated, and Israel held initial talks for normalization with Somalia, Comoros, and Niger.
Israel initially regained its observer status in the African Union in 2021, and in May 2022, the first diplomatic conference on Africa and Israel was organized in Paris by the Israeli Embassy in France and the American Jewish Committee. Israel also continues to manage its diplomatic relations with the continent largely through the lens of its relations with Muslim-majority countries. For example, former Israeli Intelligence Minister and current Foreign Minister Eli Cohen visited Sudan in early February 2023 to discuss ways to enhance bilateral relations, especially economic and security ties, particularly concerning counter-terrorism. In January 2023, El Al, Israel’s national airline, launched its first flights to West Africa, serving the Nigerian cities of Abuja and Lagos. Before the current crisis in Gaza, Israel had also quietly campaigned at the United Nations to persuade specific African countries to distance themselves from the Non-Aligned Movement, showing initial signs of success before the current war halted these efforts.
2. African Reactions to Israel’s War on Gaza
Africa’s reactions to Israel’s war on Gaza, a continent that has suffered from colonialism and racism, have been contradictory and varied. While several African countries, along with the African Union, directly criticized Israel for its actions in Gaza, some countries supported Israel in its war. Although Tel Aviv initially received broad international support following the Al-Aqsa Flood battle, many African nations soon expressed their criticisms of Israel following its escalation in Gaza, which included attacks on civilians, an unprecedented number of casualties, the use of blockade and starvation tactics, and the increasing number of Palestinian martyrs.
African Union Commission Chairman Moussa Faki publicly condemned Israel during an African Union summit, describing Israel’s attack on Gaza as “the most egregious violation of human rights” and called for a two-state solution. Additionally, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas was given an honorary status at the African Union summit, while no Israeli delegation was invited. Algeria announced its “full solidarity with Palestine” early in the war, and Comoros President Azali Assoumani went as far as condemning the genocide being committed by Israel in Palestine. At the end of December 2023, South Africa filed a lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice and positioned itself as one of the world’s leading critics of the Jewish state.
North African Arab countries blamed Israel for the escalation in Gaza, with Chad being the only African country to recall its diplomats from Israel. The South African Parliament issued a resolution calling on the government to sever all ties with Israel. Many African countries condemned the brutal crimes committed by Israel against Gaza residents and emphasized the need to ensure humanitarian aid access and a ceasefire. Leading African economies like Senegal and Nigeria issued more moderate statements, calling for restraint from both sides. Ultimately, 38 African countries voted in favor of a United Nations resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
Despite the majority of African nations condemning Israel, some countries took a pro-Israel stance. For instance, Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda, Togo, Cameroon, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately condemned the Al-Aqsa Flood battle. The Kenyan President issued a statement condemning the battle and expressed full solidarity with Israel and its right to defend itself, urging the international community to hold the so-called “terrorist” factions accountable. Some countries, such as Togo, Cameroon, South Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea, abstained from voting in favor of the UN ceasefire resolution. Meanwhile, Ugandan Judge Julia Sebutinde was the only one at The Hague to oppose all accusations against Israel in South Africa’s case during the preliminary hearings last January. Additionally, several countries with good bilateral relations with Israel, such as Uganda and Angola, used vague and neutral language in their statements or ignored the war altogether. Some countries that initially condemned Hamas issued vague general statements about peaceful solutions.
3. The Impact of the Gaza War on Israeli-African Relations
Undoubtedly, the current war on Gaza marks a significant setback for Israel’s diplomatic standing worldwide, including in Africa. International pressure on Tel Aviv may also increase as the Israeli army prepares for an attack in Rafah. Given the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza, it can be said that its repercussions may negatively impact Israel’s future relations with some African countries, especially with the growing African rejection of Israel’s practices in Gaza. The African Union Chairman’s call for a global front to stop the violence in Gaza and the affirmation that the African Union remains steadfast in supporting the Palestinian people’s right to live in peace in their homeland are indicative of this shift. It is expected that anti-Israel sentiment within African countries will grow as violence against civilians continues, which will affect Israel’s interests on the continent.
However, public criticism of the war does not appear to be leading to the same diplomatic consequences that prevailed during previous crises. Unlike the October 6, 1973, war, during which most African countries suspended their diplomatic relations with Israel, the Second Palestinian Intifada, during which Tunisia and Morocco cut ties with Israel, and the first Gaza war in 2008, which led Mauritania to ask the Israeli ambassador to leave the country, African nations today have largely avoided taking drastic diplomatic steps against Israel. Even Muslim-majority countries like Morocco, Chad, and Sudan, which had no official relations with Israel until a few years ago, have not gone beyond publicly condemning the war in Gaza.
Despite Israel’s war on Gaza, it still maintains diplomatic relations with 46 African countries and is undertaking coordinated initiatives to build its influence on the continent as part of its efforts to counter Iran’s renewed engagement with Africa. This approach has borne fruit, as the agreements that have strengthened mutual security, diplomatic, and economic interests between Israel and many African countries seem robust enough to survive the current war. It is clear that most African leaders today are unwilling to sacrifice Israeli relations as they have in the past. So far, most African criticisms and condemnations have not translated into significant diplomatic setbacks for Israel. The steadily developing political, economic, and security
relations between Israel and Africa will likely continue in the coming years, even if some African countries’ relations with Israel become more discreet.
Nonetheless, in the near term, African public opinion will continue to hold Israel accountable for its actions in Gaza, particularly after reports of mass graves, while African leaders and governments will likely assess the sustainability of relations with Israel during and after the current conflict. This assessment will likely have a significant impact on the future of Israeli-African relations
References
Raisina Debates , The Israel-Hamas conflict: A divided African response , available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-israel-hamas-conflict-a-divided-african-response
Asher Lubotzky , Africa and the War in Gaza: Analyzing Israel’s Current Standing and Future Prospects in Africa , available at https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/africa-gaza/
Hannah Atkins , Israel-Palestine conflict: The view from Africa , available at , https://africapractice.com/israel-palestine-conflict-the-view-from-africa/
