Turkish policy towards the Arab region during the period (2002 – 2020)

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic at the hands of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish foreign policy has turned towards the West, and the relationship with the United States of America has remained the center of its political interests, and membership in NATO has represented the basis of Turkish military and strategic interests, while the file of accession to the European Union remained the core of Turkish economic interests, With the end of the Cold War, Turkish policy began to seek a more active role in the Arab region, and the Gulf War was a starting point for Turkey to realize its potential to play a more active role in the region, but despite this, Turkish policy did not witness a major transformation during the nineties, as The most notable shift came with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in 2002[1]. In this paper, we will address the current Turkish policy towards the Arab world by studying the motives behind this policy, as well as its most important manifestations, and then evaluating the effectiveness of this policy.

Motives of Turkish policy towards the Arab world:

In this part, we will discuss the motives of the current Turkish policy towards the Arab region, and in this regard it is possible to distinguish between two types of motives. Others came as a result of the circumstances and conditions in the region.

First: Motives arising from internal developments in Turkey:

The rise of the Justice and Development Party: The arrival of the Justice and Development Party to power had an impact on Turkey’s aspiration to play a new regional role in the region, as the party’s vision is based on the fact that Turkey’s role as a vassal state has become a thing of the past and that Turkey should have a high regional and international prestige[2] ].

The transformation in the form of the Turkish political system: The Turkish political system has recently undergone a major transformation, represented in the transformation of the political system from the parliamentary system to the presidential system, and this came as a result of the constitutional amendments in 2017, which expanded the powers and powers of the President of the Republic to the fullest extent[3], so that it became Decision-making in Turkey is centered in the hands of the President of the Republic, which is reflected in the process of making foreign policy, as the roles of other traditional elements in making this policy, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council, have declined, and the role of the armed forces as an actor in the process of making Turkish foreign policy has disappeared, and that After the failed coup attempt in July 2016, this transformation in the form of the political system confirmed the control of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the process of making Turkish foreign policy, so that this policy clearly reflects the directions and goals of President Erdogan[4].

Turkish efforts to join the European Union faltered: One of the most important reasons that deepened Turkish engagement in the Arab region was the faltering efforts of Turkey to join the European Union, especially after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016 and the continuous violations of human rights inside Turkey, which greatly reduced the number The chances of Turkey joining the European Union, and this was reflected in the direction of Turkish policy so that the Arab region became a major focus for Turkey, which coincided with the state of regional liquidity in the region, which stimulated the Turkish side to realize its ambitions to extend its influence, but not through soft penetration, but from Through the use of hard force and aggression against the sovereignty and rights of the countries of the region[5].

Second: Turkish interests in the Arab region:

The economic importance of the Arab region for Turkey: The Arab countries represent an important market for Turkish goods, which enjoy a competitiveness in the region that is not matched by those enjoyed in the European market. Therefore, Turkey sees the military presence on Arab lands, whether in the form of agreed military bases or through the presence of forces Military forces on Arab land such as Syria or Iraq to ensure access to regional markets as an alternative to European markets, especially after the deterioration of Turkish relations with the European Union countries. Turkey also believes that these markets can represent a starting point for other markets in the future, in addition to that, the Arab countries are a source It is also important for tourism in Turkey[6].

The geopolitical importance of the Arab region for Turkey: where the geopolitical determinant is one of the most important determinants of Turkish policy in the Arab region, and this is linked to a number of issues, including the issue of water, which is one of the most prominent issues in Arab-Turkish relations, as Turkey seeks to monopolize the investment of water wealth and ignore Arab demands Whether from the Syrian or Iraqi side, their historical rights in the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which Turkey considers to be two Turkish rivers that cross the border, and therefore no one has the right to decide how the waters of the two rivers are used, because this is an assault on its sovereignty [7].

On the other hand, the Arab region is of particular importance to Turkey’s energy security, as the Arab region, with its energy reserves, is an important attraction for Turkey. A major energy resource, especially in light of Turkey’s relentless attempts to explore for gas in the eastern Mediterranean[8].

In addition to the issue of water and energy security, we also find the Kurdish issue, which is a determining factor for Turkey’s relationship with the region, where Turkey accuses both Iraq and Syria of establishing a safe haven for PKK fighters. From strengthening his political, media and organizational influence, and even moving into the Turkish interior[9].

Turkey views the Middle East as the best place to play a leadership role, as Turkey realized that this region, which it ignored for a long period of time, now represents for it the trump card to achieve the dream of leadership, and the conditions in the Arab region during the last decade paved the way for Turkey to play a major role in it; When the Arab revolutions erupted, Turkey saw an opportunity to take the lead in light of the transformations taking place in the Arab region, whether by exporting the AKP rule as a political model for the countries of the region, or by supporting organizations opposed to the old regimes in the region, especially those organizations that fall under Under the so-called current of political Islam[10], and with the continued deterioration in the situation in the Arab region, Turkish interference in the affairs of the region increased; Where the conditions in the region and the weakness it is witnessing constituted a great opportunity for Turkey that had not happened before. The Arab countries are now alone and in a state of disintegration.

The manifestations of Turkish policy towards the Arab world:

As previously said, since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey has tried to play an active and effective role in the Arab region. In this context, we can distinguish between two main stages in Turkish policy towards the region. The second one started in 2011 and continues to this day.

With regard to the first stage, we find that the Turkish vision for the Arab region was based on a set of foundations formulated by Ahmet Davutoglu, who is rightfully considered the architect of Turkish foreign policy. Davutoglu’s vision is that no country that is mired in rivalries and enmities with its neighbors can pursue a positive and effective foreign policy. As for the second principle, what is known as the principle of “strategic depth.” , while the third principle was referring to “Turkish soft power” by emphasizing the idea of ​​the Turkish democratic model and using the cultural aspects of Turkey in its relationship with the region[12]. And the establishment of cultural centers, as its relations with countries were characterizedThe Gulf is distinguished with distinction, as well as the growth of its economic relations with Egypt [13].

As for the second stage (which is basically our focus), it witnessed direct intervention from Turkey in the region’s issues, to become a major player in it in a way that exacerbated its crises, as the approach to zeroing problems was overturned and an interventionist and even hostile policy was adopted towards many of the countries of the Arab region; This new approach appeared in Turkish policy towards the Arab region with the outbreak of the Arab revolutions in 2011; The most important aspects of Turkish policy towards the Arab region at this stage can be monitored as follows:

First: The increasing use of the military tool in Turkish policy towards the Arab region:

Where the Turkish policy relied on direct military intervention, especially in the neighboring Arab countries (Syria and Iraq); In Syria, we find that Turkey launched a full military operation in which its ground and air forces participated, which is the “Euphrates Shield” operation, with the approach of the control of the People’s Defense Units of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party on the last corridor linking Turkey to the city of Aleppo and its countryside. In August 2017, another military operation was launched, known as the “Sword of the Euphrates,” against the Kurds in Afrin, as the city that the Kurds aspire to be an extension of their control in northern Syria. Turkey also intervened in the Syrian city of Idlib in October 2017 to support the Syrian opposition factions it supports. [14] Then, in February 2018, it launched another operation known as Operation Olive Branch, with the declared goal of which was to eliminate the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in northern Syria[15]. In October 2019, Turkey launched a new campaign in

In addition to what was previously said about direct Turkish intervention, it is also noted that Turkish military bases are spreading in the Arab region to a large extent, and this major shift in Turkish policy comes as part of its aspiration to enhance its regional position by establishing bases that consolidate real Turkish communication with the countries in which those bases are located, and therefore was keen Turkey to establish military bases in areas of great geopolitical importance; In Somalia, in September 2017, Turkey inaugurated a military base in the Somali capital Mogadishu, and in Sudan we find the Turkish-Sudanese agreement in 2017 to hand over the Sudanese island of Suakin to Turkey for the purpose of managing and rehabilitating it. It was reported that the purpose of this agreement is to establish a Turkish military base there, but With the recent developments in Sudan and the overthrow of Al-Bashir’s regime, it has become clear that it is difficult to complete the Turkish plan, especially with the rumors that the Sudanese authorities have asked Turkey to stop work completely on the island, and in Qatar we find that Turkey

Second: Sectarian Policies and the Use of Regional Agents:

With the beginning of the second decade of this century, Turkey began to be seen as not only a model of moderate political Islam that is heading towards the neo-Ottoman, but as a country that supports sectarian politics, in light of the emergence of a state of sectarian hostility in the Middle East, especially after the American invasion of Iraq and then the outbreak of The Arab revolutions, which resulted in areas of Shiite-Sunni tension such as Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, as well as the intensity of interactions in the region between the various regional axes resulted in the flourishing of patronage relations for non-state actors in an unprecedented way in the history of the region. Known as the proxy war, Turkish models of sponsorship of non-state actors in the region can be identified in several forms:

Organic relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood:

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and the Turkish regime is based on several factors. On the one hand, we find that there is a participation in the ideological aspect, which means that there is an organic relationship between the two parties; After the rise of the Justice and Development Party, ideas began to be raised about the possibility of reproducing the Turkish model in the region, and these ideas witnessed a remarkable rise after 2011, and even began to talk about Turkey as the center of gravity of the Islamic world, and on the other hand, the Turkish regime was able to employ the transnational dimension The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in favor of strengthening Turkish influence and expanding its scope in the region, and perhaps this explains the secret of Turkey’s strong adherence to this organic relationship, despite the problems it raises regarding Turkey’s relationship with many countries in the region, especially Egypt and the Arab Gulf states, on the other hand. Brothers for Turkish support; Turkey was among the few countries that opened its doors wide to receive the Brotherhood fleeing from Egypt after the fall of Egypt The regime on June 30, 2013, and even the media machine was mobilized to serve the organization in achieving its goals. In the Syrian context as well, we find that the historical relationship between Turkish intelligence and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria had a significant impact on the development of the relationship between the two parties after the Syrian revolution; As Turkish support flowed from an early age to the Ahrar al-Sham movement, which includes Brotherhood elements alongside Salafi groups, we also find that the Brotherhood in Syria was one of the strongest supporters of the Turkish intervention in northern Syria[21].

Turkish support for armed organizations and factions in the region:

In its territorial moves, Turkey relies on the roles of local agents; In the Iraqi case, we find that Turkey uses elements such as the Turkmen forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and the National Mobilization Forces to serve the goals of Turkish national security. Turkey has often employed the National Mobilization Forces, or what is known as the Nineveh Guards, and some Turkmen militias to prevent the PKK from controlling the Sinjar Mountains, In the Syrian case, we find that Turkey has tended from an early stage to support, arm and train the forces of the Free Syrian Army, which includes within it many organizations affiliated with Turkey, such as the Murad Army Bloc, the Mu’tasim Brigade, the Sultan Othman Brigade, the Mustafa Regiment, the 23rd Division, and the Suleiman Shah Brigade, The Commandos Brigade, the Suqur al-Shamal Brigade, the Jazira Revolutionaries, the 9th Division, and Jaysh al-Ahfad. In this context, it is clear that the pattern of Ottoman names carried by many militias reflects a perpetrator of the Turkish project in Syria[22], and in the Libyan case, we find that Erdogan’s government enjoys strong relations

Third: The Turkish role in regional competition in the region:

Immediately after the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, Turkish policy witnessed a rapprochement with the positions of the Arab countries, and this was evident in the Turkish-Arab position on the Syrian crisis at its beginning, considering that Iran represented the main threat to both parties, but with the development of events in the Arab region, especially after the overthrow of the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt, Turkey found itself in a contradictory situation with the policies of prominent Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while the Turkish-Qatari policies have become compatible with all revolutions and events in the region, and we find that this position generated a split between two main axes in the region, namely the “Turkish-Qatari axis On the one hand, and the “Saudi-Emirati-Egyptian axis” on the other hand, as Turkey and Qatar now have consensus in their orientations and roles, both of them want to increase their influence in the region politically and in the media. With the support of the Brotherhood in the first case, the National CongressGeneral, then Libya Dawn Forces, and then the Government of National Accord in the second case. It is true that the relationship between the two axes has witnessed a rapprochement, especially after the Houthis managed to seize power in Yemen in September 2014 and the emergence of Iran as a threat factor for both axes. However, this rapprochement did not last long, as it returned Differences to reappear between Turkey on one side and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Turkey began rapprochement with Iran after the failed coup attempt in Turkey, as well as began coordinating with Iran and Russia to reach a political solution and reduce tension in Syria within the framework of the Astana meetings, then The Gulf crisis caused by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt severing diplomatic relations with Qatar led to an increase in the dispute between Turkey and these countries on the other hand. 24].

Evaluating the effectiveness of Turkish policy towards the Arab world:

As we saw in the previous section, the recent events in the Arab world played an important role in redrawing Turkish policy towards the region to a large extent, and this had important negative effects and repercussions on Turkey. On the one hand, the new phase in Turkish foreign policy witnessed the end and collapse of the policy of zeroing problems With neighboring countries, the Turkish economic project, which is one of the most important means of achieving Turkey’s regional status, has also collapsed, and Turkish soft power has failed to achieve effective breakthroughs in the region.It can be said that the Turkish policy did not succeed in what it aspired to be a regional power with initiative and influence in the course of events and crises experienced by the Arab region. The Turkish role has become outside the sphere of influence with the developments of regional events. Indeed, the repercussions of the situation inside the Arab region, especially Syria, have begun to rebound and affect the Turkish interior, so that the Turkish national security itself is under threat, as a result of several factors, including the increasing danger of terrorist organizations and groups that have taken Turkey as an arena To cross into areas of conflict and conflict in Syria and neighboring countries, the increase in the number of Syrian refugees inside Turkey has also reflected on the internal economic and social conditions, in addition to the escalation of the Kurdish threat to Turkey, which is the biggest security concern for the Turkish decision maker[25].Consequently, the current Turkish policy towards the Arab region has had negative repercussions on more than one level. Not only was the Turkish-Arab relations deteriorating, but these repercussions extended to the Turkish interior as well. Therefore, we will analyze the effects of this policy on several levels as follows:

First: The negative repercussions of the Turkish policy towards the Arab region on the Turkish interior:

The Turkish policy had negative repercussions on the Turkish interior itself. As a result of the Turkish interventionist approach in the region, the Turkish economy began a state of bleeding, and this appears through the decline in the growth of the Turkish economy, the high level of unemployment, the increase in the inflation rate and the depreciation of the lira exchange rate, as well as the internal anger that began to rise as it increased The opposition within Turkey towards the current Turkish policy in the Arab region, which has plunged Turkey into a series of crises, which has been reflected in the decline of the Turkish regional role[26]. On the other hand, the current Turkish policy has had serious repercussions on Turkish security; As a result of Turkey’s employment of terrorist groups, the activities of ISIS increased and the establishment of networks for it inside Turkey, and these networks worked to collect money and recruit Turks[27]. As a result, Turkey witnessed many terrorist operations during the past years at the hands of the organization, which claimed hundreds of lives Victims [28].

Second: The deterioration of Arab-Turkish relations:

The Turkish policy towards the Arab region during the recent period had many negative repercussions on its relations with a number of Arab countries with significant regional influence and weight. This foreign approach of Turkey had negative repercussions on its relations with Egypt. This is a result of Turkey’s embrace of the Brotherhood’s elements on its soil, as well as the continuous media campaign led by Turkey in coordination with Qatar against the Egyptian political system. This dispute has also deepened in Turkish-Egyptian relations after Turkey attempted military expansion in Sudan through the establishment of a military base project in Suakin Island, and in Libya through the signing of the security agreement with the Government of National Accord [29]. On the other hand, Turkish relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been greatly affected, as a result of Turkey’s policy in the region and its continuous support for the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its positions in support of Qatar, which angers Saudi Arabia and the UAE very much. . Consequently, Turkey has become more isolated in the region than ever before, as a result of its interventionist policy in the Arab world[30].

Third: The negative repercussions of Turkish policy towards the Arab region on its relations with European countries:

The negative impact of Turkish policy towards the Arab region on its relationship with the European Union cannot be overlooked, and this is evident in the European opposition to the Turkish interventionist policy, whether in Syria or Libya. Turkish military operations in northern Syria are re-establishing ISIS, in addition, the continued Turkish threat to European countries with the file of Syrian refugees is a major factor in tension in Turkey’s relations with the countries of the Union, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan constantly threatens to open the way for Syrian refugees to reach Europe [31] We find that in October 2019 Erdogan repeated his constant threat to this file during a speech he gave in Ankara in response to European criticism of the recent Turkish military attack on northern Syria [32]. We find it clear tooRegarding the Turkish interference in the Libyan file, where the European position came clear after the Turkish government signed a memorandum of understanding to demarcate the maritime borders with the Libyan Government of National Accord, which threatens European interests in exploration for gas in the eastern Mediterranean, the European countries announced their rejection of this agreement [33].

Conclusion:

In this paper, we dealt with the current Turkish policy towards the Arab world, and it became clear through our study of this policy that there are a set of developments in the Arab region that made Turkey bet more on taking a leading role in it, and this came with the rise of the Justice and Development Party and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Erdogan imposed his control over the Turkish political scene, so Turkish policy has witnessed a remarkable transformation represented in the increasing interference in the affairs of the region, whether through the use of the military tool, or through its proxies in the region, or through its rapprochement with some Arab countries, especially Qatar, in the face of Other countries in the Arab region, and finally, we have seen how this policy has been negatively reflected, whether on the Turkish interior or at the level of its relations with Arab countries or its relations with European countries.

List of references

First: References in Arabic:

books:

1- Dr. Arkan Ibrahim Adwan, Syrian-Turkish Relations, Determinants and Issues (Cairo: Al-Araby for Publishing and Distribution, 2019).

2- Abdel Fattah Al-Shardan, Nizam Barakat, Arab Regional Relations – Reality and Prospects (Jordan: Center for Middle East Studies, 2018).

periodicals:

1- Abu Bakr Al-Desouki, Turkey between the Ottoman legacy and the ideological mantle, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

2- Bassem Rashid, Turkey and the European Union.. Limits of Divergence and Convergence, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

3- Jamal Mazloum, Turkish Politics in the Arab Region and the World, International Politics, Vol. 55, v. 219, January 2020.

4- Kawthar Mubarak, The Internal Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

5- Malek Awni, Geopolitics clash.. the inevitable clash between the “neo-Ottomanism” and the restoration of Egyptian power, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

6- Muhammad Juma, Turkey and Non-State Actors in the Middle East.. Dangerous Partnerships, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

7- Muhammad Abdul Qadir Khalil, “The Old Ottomanism” .. Turkey’s Policies towards Syria and Iraq, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

8- Mona Suleiman, Dimensions and developments of European and international positions on the Libyan file, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 220, April 2020.

9- Mustafa Kemal, Turkey between safe havens and foreign employment of terrorism, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020.

10- Fathia Yatim, Turkey and the New Regional Role in the Middle East, Al-Moftaker Magazine, No. 5, March 2018.

11- Sayel Falah Miqdad Al-Sarhan, The Impact of Geopolitical Determinants on Turkish-Arab Relations: 2002-2011, The Jordanian Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, v. 2, 2013.

   scientific messages:

1- Mawlham Mariam, The European dimension in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during the rule of the Justice and Development Party, PhD thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Batna, 2018.

Research and reports:

1- Mustafa Salah, Repercussions of Pressure.. European and American Options and Their Repercussions on the Turkish Intervention in Syria, Arab Center for Research http://www.acrseg.org/41387 and Studies, 10/22/2019, available at:

2- Mustafa Salah, Escalating Internal Pressures.. Turkish Parties and the Future of the Justice and Development Party, Arab Center for Research and Studies, http://www.acrseg.org/4151301/03/2020, available at:

3- Abd al-Majid Abu al-Ela, The Turkish Military Intervention in Libya.. Its Image and Its Repercussions on Terrorist Groups, Arab Center for Research and Studies, http://www.acrseg.org/41453 12/01/2020, available at:

websites:

10/06/2019, available at: France 241- Erdogan announces the launch of the Turkish military operation “Peace Spring” in northern Syria,https://www.france24.com/ar/20191009-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8 %A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8% AF-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8 %A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 %B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D8%B1%D8%A3% D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86

, 08/18/2019, available at: BBC Arabic 2- Turkish military bases abroad and their tasks,https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-49376606

06/02/2018, available at: BBC Arabic 3- What does Erdogan seek to achieve from Operation Olive Branch in Afrin?, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity-42968068

Second: References in English:

Books:

1- Işıksal, Hüseyin.” Political Chaos in Iraq, ISIS, and Turkish Foreign Policy: The High Cost of the Westphalian Delusion.” in Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East, edited by Hüseyin Işıksal, and Oğuzhan Göksel,83-103. Istanbul: Near East University,2018.

Periodicals:

2- Haugom, Lars.” Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan: A change in international orientation?”. Comparative Strategy 38 (2019):206-223. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606662 .

Websites:

1- Cagaptay, Soner, Erdogan’s Failure on the Nile, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Spring 2019, Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/erdogans-failure-on-the-nile

2- DAVUTOGLU, AHMET, Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy,20/05/2010, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/

  [1] Mawlham Mariam, The European Dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the rule of the Justice and Development Party, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Batna, 2018, pp. 191-192

 [2] Fathia Leitim, Turkey and the New Regional Role in the Middle East, Al-Mufker Magazine, No. 5, March 2018, p. 214.

 [3] Kawthar Mubarak, The Internal Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, International Policy, Volume 55, v. 219, January 2020, p. 120. [4] Lars Haugom, “Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan: A change in international orientation?”, Comparative Strategy 38 (2019): 214. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606662 .

 [5] Malik Awni, The clash of political geography… the inevitable clash between the “neo-Ottomanism” and the restoration of Egyptian power, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, p. 200.

 [6] Jamal Mazloum, Turkish Politics in the Arab Region and the World, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020, p. 114.

 [7] Mawlham Maryam, The European Dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East in the Period of Justice and Development Party Rule, previous reference, p. 208.

 [8] Jamal Mazloum, Turkish Politics in the Arab Region and the World, previous reference, p. 114.

 [9] Sayel Falah Miqdad Al-Sarhan, The Impact of Geopolitical Determinants on Turkish-Arab Relations: 2002-2011, The Jordanian Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 6, Vol. 2, 2013, p. 228. [10] Lars Haugom,” Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan: A change in international orientation?”,213.

 [11] Jamal Mazloum, Turkish Politics in the Arab Region and the World, ibid., p. 114. [12] AHMET DAVUTOGLU, Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 20/05/2010, Available at: https://foreignpolicy. com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/

 [13] Abu Bakr El-Desouki, Turkey between the Ottoman legacy and the ideological mantle, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020, p. 110.

 [14] Imad Kaddoura, The Political Dimensions of Arab-Turkish Relations, in: Abdel Fattah Al-Shardan, and Nizam Barakat, Arab Regional Relations – Reality and Prospects (Jordan: Center for Middle East Studies, 2018), p. 26.

06/02/2018, available at: BBC Arabic [15] What does Erdogan seek to achieve from the “olive branch” operation in Afrin?, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity-42968068

06/10/2019, available at: France 24 Erdogan announces the launch of the Turkish military operation “Peace Spring” in northern Syria, [16]https://www.france24.com/ar/20191009-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8 %A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8% AF-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8 %A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 %B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D8%B1%D8%A3% D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86

 [17] Imad Kaddoura, The Political Dimensions of Arab-Turkish Relations, previous reference, p. 27.

 [18] Jamal Mazloum, Turkish Politics in the Arab Region and the World, previous reference, p. 113.

 [19] Muhammad Abdul Qadir Khalil, “Old Ottomanism” .. Turkey’s Policies towards Syria and Iraq, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020, p. 159.

, 08/18/2019, available at: BBC Arabic [20] Turkish military bases abroad and their tasks,https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-49376606

 [21] Muhammad Juma, Turkey and Non-State Actors in the Middle East.. Dangerous Partnerships, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 219, January 2020, pp. 180-181.

 [22] Muhammad Abdul Qadir Khalil, “Old Ottomanism” .. Turkey’s policies towards Syria and Iraq, previous reference, p. 157.

 [23] Abdel-Majid Abul-Ela, The Turkish Military Intervention in Libya.. Its Image and Its Repercussions on Terrorist Groups, Arab Center for Research and Studies, http://www.acrseg.org/41453 12/01/2020, available at:

 [24] Imad Kaddoura, The Political Dimensions of Arab-Turkish Relations, previous reference, pp. 30-32.

 [25] Dr. Arkan Ibrahim Adwan, Syrian-Turkish Relations, Determinants and Issues (Cairo: Al-Araby for Publishing and Distribution, 2019), pp. 238-242.

 [26] Mustafa Salah, Escalating Internal Pressures.. Turkish Parties and the Future of the Justice and Development Party, Arab Center for Research and Studies, http://www.acrseg.org/4151301/03/2020, available at:

 [27] Mustafa Kemal, Turkey between Safe Havens and External Employment of Terrorism, International Politics, Vol. 55, No. 219, January 2020, p. 186. [28] Hüseyin Işıksal,” Political Chaos in Iraq, ISIS, and Turkish Foreign Policy: The High Cost of the Westphalian Delusion,” in Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East, ed. Hüseyin Işıksal, et.al. (Istanbul: Near East University,2018),97.

 [29] Malik Awni, The clash of political geography… the inevitable clash between the “neo-Ottomanism” and the restoration of Egyptian power, previous reference, p. 202.

  [30]  Soner Cagaptay, Erdogan’s Failure on the Nile, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Spring 2019, Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/erdogans-failure-on-the-nile

 [31] Mustafa Salah, The Repercussions of Pressure… European and American Options and Their Implications for the Turkish Intervention in Syria, Arab Center for Research http://www.acrseg.org/41387 and Studies, 10/22/2019, available at:

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 [33] Mona Suleiman, Dimensions and developments of European and international positions on the Libyan file, International Politics, Vol. 55, p. 220, April 2020, p. 101.

Prepared by: Angelos Abdel-Malik Adly – Supervised by: Prof. Ahmed Youssef Ahmed

Arab Democratic Center