In September 2024, the United States and Iraq began consultations on an agreement regarding the withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraqi territory. Sources indicated that the plan includes the departure of hundreds of coalition troops by September 2025, with the remainder leaving by the end of the following year. The agreement awaits approval from the leadership of both countries and the setting of a date for its official announcement.
Key Observations:
Several points can be highlighted regarding the disclosed details of the US withdrawal plan from Iraq, which can be elaborated as follows:
Absence of a Formal Agreement: Iraqi Defense Minister Thabit Al-Abbasi announced that Baghdad had reached an understanding with Washington on the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq over two years. He confirmed that the withdrawal would occur in two phases: the first phase, from September 2024 to September 2025, will involve the withdrawal of US forces from Baghdad and the military bases where American advisors are stationed. The second phase, spanning from September 2025 to September 2026, will see the withdrawal of US forces from bases in the Kurdistan region. However, these plans remain mere understandings as the two countries have not yet signed an official agreement. The Iraqi side has indicated the possibility of signing such an agreement in September 2024.
Retention of Some Forces: Based on statements from Iraqi and American officials, the purpose of the understandings and the anticipated agreement is not to achieve a full withdrawal of US forces and coalition troops, nor to end Operation Inherent Resolve, the military campaign launched by Washington in 2014 against the ISIS terrorist organization. Instead, the aim is to establish a new defense cooperation framework between Baghdad and Washington. This relationship is expected to meet Baghdad’s desire to reduce the number of international coalition forces and US troops in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that some US forces will remain in Iraq under the category of training and advisory roles. No specific numbers of US or coalition forces expected to stay in Iraq in an advisory and training capacity after the withdrawal is completed in 2026 have been disclosed.
Retention of Intervention Rights: The understandings reached between the Iraqi and US sides do not include any commitment from Washington to refrain from military intervention, including airstrikes on hostile targets within Iraq, without prior coordination with the official Iraqi authorities.
Potential Implications:
The agreements reached between Iraq and the United States are likely to have several ramifications within Iraq, which could extend to the regional environment surrounding the country and even affect the U.S. itself. These impacts can be summarized as follows:
1. For Iraq:
The potential U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would affect three main players in Iraq’s political landscape: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework and the Iran-aligned militias, and the Kurds.
For Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, a U.S. withdrawal, if it occurs, would represent a political victory for his government. This agreement would result in several political gains for the prime minister. The first benefit is the fulfillment of his promises to remove U.S. forces from Iraq, promises that he made upon assuming office in 2022. The second gain is that it would meet a core demand of the Coordination Framework to remove U.S. troops from the country, thus helping to ease escalating tensions between the government and the Framework. In recent months, there have been disputes between some factions within the Coordination Framework and Prime Minister al-Sudani regarding the delay in finalizing U.S.-Iraq negotiations to end the mission of the international coalition and withdraw U.S. troops. Additionally, tensions between al-Sudani’s government and the Coordination Framework have been rising, particularly after the arrest of senior officials from al-Sudani’s office for their involvement in managing a wiretapping network against political figures in Iraq. This led to calls within the Framework for a vote of no confidence against al-Sudani’s government. Therefore, fulfilling the Framework’s demand for a U.S. withdrawal could help calm the strained atmosphere between the prime minister and the Framework.
The third benefit is that the current version of the withdrawal agreements, if implemented, would maintain Iraq’s strong relationship with Washington. These agreements would not result in a complete U.S. military exit but rather the retention of some forces in Iraq. The fourth benefit is that al-Sudani could use this agreement to portray himself as a leader capable of maintaining positive relations with both Washington and Tehran while keeping Iraq from being dragged into a costly regional conflict. This narrative could be useful for al-Sudani as he prepares for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2025.
2. For the Coordination Framework and Armed Factions:
A potential U.S. withdrawal would be a significant victory for the Coordination Framework and the armed militias, as it would serve the political interests of the Framework. They would declare success in removing U.S. forces, a central component of the Framework’s political agenda since its formation. The Framework could also leverage the U.S. withdrawal to rally its electoral base and attract new voters, using the withdrawal as a key element in the campaign platforms of its candidates.
For the armed factions, the U.S. withdrawal represents an important gain as well. It would allow these militias to expand their influence in Iraq with little to no resistance. Furthermore, the U.S. withdrawal would enable Iran-aligned armed groups to extend their operations, particularly in the transportation of weapons and missiles through Iraq, without American surveillance.
3. For the Kurds:
The Kurds stand to be the biggest losers from a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The U.S. military presence benefits the Kurdistan region, as it provides both physical security and military support, including training and arms supplies to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Beyond the weakening of Peshmerga military capabilities, the growing influence of Iran-aligned militias, which would follow a U.S. withdrawal, could have detrimental effects on the Kurdistan region. There are many unresolved issues between Baghdad and Erbil, chief among them the distribution of oil revenues and the contested status of Kirkuk, which both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi federal government claim. The increasing power of the militias in post-withdrawal Iraq would likely harm the Kurdish position in these disputes.
4.Regional Actors:
It is likely that a potential U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will have significant impacts, especially on Iran and Turkey. For Iran, the American withdrawal would represent a victory in its struggle against Washington in Iraq. Consequently, Iranian influence in Iraq would face little competition. Iran would seize the opportunity to expand its political and economic influence in Iraq in the absence of U.S. presence. For example, Iranian President Masoud Bezhkian’s visit to Iraq on September 11, 2024, might have been aimed at discussing post-withdrawal arrangements. Moreover, Iran is expected to increasingly rely on Iraq as a corridor for transporting arms and military equipment to Lebanon following the U.S. departure.
Regarding Turkey, it is likely that the country would capitalize on the American withdrawal by expanding its military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. It is also unlikely that Ankara would reach bilateral agreements with the Kurdistan government, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party, regarding the nature of Turkish presence in northern Iraq. This absence of agreements would leave Turkey free to stabilize areas under the party’s control while cooperating in the fight against the PKK.
5.United States:
Should the U.S. carry out its withdrawal from Iraq, it could have far-reaching consequences, potentially affecting not only its domestic policy but also its strategy in the region. Domestically, the timing of the withdrawal is sensitive, as it coincides with the approach of the U.S. presidential elections. While a significant portion of the American public, especially younger voters, supports the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, there are concerns among the political elite about repeating the chaotic withdrawal seen in Afghanistan in 2021. Such a scenario could damage the U.S.’s global image and negatively impact its allies in the region. Moreover, the timing of the withdrawal could harm the campaign of Democratic candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris, as Republican candidate Donald Trump and his campaign are expected to make the withdrawal a key election issue. They would likely criticize the failure of the current administration—of which Harris is a part—in managing foreign policy. Trump is also expected to use the withdrawal to reinforce his previous accusations that the Biden-Harris administration surrendered to Iran.
On the regional front, a large-scale and poorly executed U.S. withdrawal would weaken American influence in the region. Such a move would allow Iran to expand its reach in Iraq and strengthen its position in Syria. Additionally, the withdrawal would highlight the U.S.’s lack of commitment to regional security and its unwillingness to confront Iran, further signaling that the Middle East is no longer a strategic priority compared to the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could reveal inconsistencies in U.S. policy. On the one hand, the U.S. is providing significant military equipment, ammunition, and aid to support Israel, while on the other, it is distancing itself from addressing the Iranian threat, which could pose a danger to the region if left unchecked.
Future of Withdrawal:
The future of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the implementation of the aforementioned agreements will depend on several key factors.
Firstly, the outcome of the U.S. elections will play a significant role. If Kamala Harris wins, her administration is likely to reduce the number of American troops in Iraq. This would be a continuation of President Biden’s approach and the U.S. national security strategy for 2022, which prioritizes other theaters of operation beyond the Middle East, particularly Southeast Asia, in an effort to compete with China and prevent its expansion.
In contrast, if Donald Trump were to win the elections, he might adopt a more hardline stance toward Tehran. It is probable that he would reinstate the Maximum Pressure policy against Iran, which would inherently position Iraq as a battleground for competition with Iranian influence.
Secondly, the threat posed by ISIS remains a crucial factor in the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. The primary purpose of these troops is to combat and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Therefore, the key determinant of whether or not the U.S. will withdraw hinges on the status of the organization, its presence on the ground, and the capability of Iraqi security forces to contain its threat. If the threat remains limited and the effectiveness of Iraqi security forces’ operations against ISIS continues, there would be little justification for maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq. However, if the threat from ISIS escalates in the coming months, this could provide a rationale for the United States or its local allies, such as the Kurds, to request an extension of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
In conclusion, it can be said that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could potentially create a security gap due to the technological capabilities employed by U.S. forces. The United States possesses advanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities that enable it to monitor the threat posed by ISIS and conduct preemptive strikes against it. This gap is likely to be temporary, however, until Iraqi security forces—including the army, popular mobilization forces, and federal police—are able to develop their own capabilities to counter ISIS. This development is primarily contingent on these forces, particularly the popular mobilization factions, focusing on combating ISIS rather than getting involved in regional conflicts.
