The tension has escalated between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and former Prime Minister and leader of the “State of Law” coalition, Nouri Al-Maliki. Many suggest that Al-Maliki is waging a “soft war” against Al-Sudani by intensifying pressure and expanding disagreements on contentious issues, including calling for early parliamentary elections in an attempt to disrupt the current Prime Minister’s calculations.
This public conflict between the two men warns of potential risks, not only to the future of the “Coordination Framework” but also to the entire Iraqi political scene. Al-Maliki’s bloc holds the majority in parliament, while Al-Sudani enjoys notable support from prominent Iraqi factions, including the “Wisdom Movement” led by Ammar Al-Hakim, the “Victory Alliance” led by former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, as well as significant backing from Sunni and Kurdish blocs.
Conflicting Interests
As their disagreements escalate, both Al-Maliki and Al-Sudani are working to reestablish their internal political balance in preparation for upcoming political events, most notably the legislative elections scheduled for 2025. Both are aiming to dominate the scene and marginalize the other. The main reasons for their disputes are as follows:
Al-Maliki’s Call for Early Elections: On June 11, 2024, Al-Maliki called for early parliamentary elections by the end of 2024 to pressure Al-Sudani’s government. While political forces loyal to Al-Sudani rejected this call, Al-Maliki insisted that it was an obligation of Al-Sudani’s government based on its electoral program. He emphasized the need to prevent government officials from running if they resigned from their positions.
Al-Sudani’s Distance from the Coordination Framework: A portion of the tension stems from Al-Sudani’s efforts to distance himself from Al-Maliki’s influence and, by extension, the “Coordination Framework.” This has alarmed Al-Maliki’s camp, which fears that if Al-Sudani runs for the next parliamentary elections with a separate list, he could attract a significant portion of the Framework’s electoral base, thus diminishing Al-Maliki’s majority and weakening the Framework’s political influence in Iraq.
Rising Popularity of Al-Sudani: Although Al-Maliki is seen as a “kingmaker” in Iraq and retains political and popular support, Al-Sudani has emerged as a significant competitor. His achievements on key issues, such as energy, oil, and security, have increased his popularity. Notably, Al-Sudani has succeeded, to some extent, in distancing Iraq from the consequences of the U.S.-Iran conflict, preventing it from becoming a battleground for settling scores. According to a Gallup poll published in February 2024, Al-Sudani had an approval rating of about 69% in 2023, the highest for an Iraqi prime minister since Gallup began tracking this in 2012.
Divergent Views on Political Reform: The differences between Al-Sudani and Al-Maliki have widened, with Al-Sudani favoring the parliamentary system, while Al-Maliki advocates for a presidential system, believing that a firm governance model is essential for Iraq’s future. In an August 14, 2024 statement, Al-Maliki emphasized that resolving Iraq’s problems required moving towards a presidential system, a stance that does not align with Al-Sudani’s vision.
Differences in Relations with Iran: Al-Maliki’s ties with Iran run deep, reflected in his strong support for Tehran’s policies towards Israel and his backing from major Iranian leaders and pro-Iran militias in Iraq. In contrast, Al-Sudani seeks a balanced approach with Iran and Iraq’s regional surroundings. This was evident in his efforts to strengthen relations with the U.S., including a visit on April 15, 2024, where he led a high-level delegation to discuss key issues of mutual interest. Al-Sudani has also expanded relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey, and has promoted Iraq’s mediation role in Turkish-Syrian rapprochement.
Despite Al-Sudani’s commitment to strategic relations with Tehran, he condemned Iran’s strikes on Iraq’s Erbil province on January 16, 2024. Furthermore, unlike Iranian-backed armed factions and the Coordination Framework forces, Al-Sudani does not favor a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, recognizing that Iraqi security forces are not yet fully capable of handling ISIS without external support.
Potential Repercussions
Given the escalating tension between Al-Maliki and Al-Sudani, several negative outcomes could unfold in Iraq in the coming period, including:
Fragmentation of the Coordination Framework: This tension, compounded by some political forces’ opposition to Al-Maliki’s call for early elections, could lead to the internal collapse of the Coordination Framework. For example, on September 3, 2024, the “Victory Alliance,” led by Haider Al-Abadi, rejected Al-Maliki’s call for early elections. Additionally, Ammar Al-Hakim’s “Wisdom Movement” described Al-Maliki’s call as “dead on arrival.”
Increased Political Polarization: Iraq is witnessing growing political tension, particularly among Shiite factions. The ongoing conflict between Al-Sudani and Al-Maliki is likely to exacerbate internal instability, especially as Al-Sudani garners broad support and many seek to rally behind him to secure a majority in the next elections.
Return of Chaos to Iraq: Continued mutual threats between Al-Sudani’s and Al-Maliki’s factions, particularly with the involvement of Iran-backed militias close to Al-Maliki, may lead to further escalation. The possibility of chaos increases as Al-Maliki attempts to disrupt the political scene through early election calls or changing the political system.
Increased Threat of Terrorist Organizations: The growing political discord between Iraqi elites, especially within the Coordination Framework, could provide an opportunity for ISIS to increase its activities. This has already been evidenced by attacks in Salahuddin and Diyala provinces in May 2024, exploiting Iraq’s political polarization.
Greater Role for Foreign Actors: The ongoing disputes between Al-Sudani and Al-Maliki are likely to enhance the influence of foreign players in Iraq, particularly concerning the 2025 parliamentary elections. Regional and international powers, concerned about the possible outcomes of these elections, are expected to intervene, especially as the internal conflicts within the Coordination Framework and Kurdish components of the Kurdistan Region deepen.
Al-Sudani’s Advantage
In conclusion, while the intensifying conflict between Al-Sudani and Al-Maliki poses risks to Iraq’s political future, especially for the Shiite factions, there are indications that Al-Sudani might successfully realign Iraq’s political landscape and secure the internal balances within the Coordination Framework to his advantage. This is especially true given the regional and international support his government enjoys, as well as Tehran’s need to stabilize its regional front amid potential U.S. policy shifts if Donald Trump wins the upcoming U.S. presidential elections in November 2024.
