Both the Malian army and the Russian Wagner Group have admitted to suffering heavy casualties — some unofficial estimates suggest more than 80 soldiers from both sides — following armed clashes that took place from July 22, 2024, and lasted for five days with armed groups belonging to separatist Tuaregs and Al-Qaeda in the town of “Tinzaouatene” in the far north of Mali near the Algerian border. Wagner’s helicopter was shot down there.
This dramatic development in northern Mali reflects a real crisis affecting Wagner’s reputation in the eyes of the African public and some Sahel governments, which welcomed Russia as an alternative ally to Western countries capable of eradicating terrorism, especially after France and its European allies’ failures over the past decade.
The current scene in the region highlights Wagner’s retreat in the operational theater on the African stage, particularly given its negative experience in northern Mozambique five years ago when ISIS forced it to withdraw from the country. At the same time, Rwandan forces achieved some military victories in containing ISIS activity there, prompting an examination of the reasons and implications of Wagner’s defeat in northern Mali and its potential impact on Wagner’s future in the Sahel and the broader implications for Russia’s policy towards Africa, which relies heavily on the Sahel region to achieve its strategic interests across the continent.
Important Implications
Wagner admitted to its first defeat in Mali since its involvement there in 2021, based on an agreement with the ruling transitional military council to deploy 1,000 elements. Expectations are that this won’t be the last defeat given the escalating confrontations between the Malian army and rebel groups in the north of the country. Despite the Malian forces and their Wagner ally achieving significant victories in recent months, reclaiming the town of Kidal in the north, some attribute the recent failure to Wagner’s overconfidence. This was revealed by some images broadcast by a Telegram channel showing Wagner elements mocking the Tuaregs and the rebel groups in northern Mali.
Wagner claimed the battle was not a fair fight, blaming its defeat on an unexpected sandstorm that allowed the rebels to regroup and launch a counterattack. However, the reality might indicate a fundamental shift in alliances among the armed groups in northern Mali, contributing to a change in the power balance there recently. Estimates suggest an alliance between the Tuareg and Arab groups with the Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, aiming to preserve the town of “Tinzaouatene” as the last stronghold for establishing an independent Tuareg state in northern Mali, as indicated by Wagner in one of its statements following the recent battle. This implies the growing military power of the more organized rebels in northern Mali, in contrast to the weak military and combat capabilities of the Malian army, resulting in Wagner suffering its bloodiest losses in Africa in the recent battle.
The recent battle is also seen as a retaliatory attack by the Tuaregs and Arabs in response to what they called massacres committed by Malian forces and their Wagner ally in the north and center of the country in recent months. They also achieved some strategic gains, primarily Wagner’s human losses, especially targeting some of its leaders like Sergei Shevchenko and the effects on the morale of their fighting elements. This calls into question some claims of improved security under the transitional military council, which came to power through military coups in August 2020 and May 2021, and refutes claims about Wagner’s ability to achieve what France and the West failed to do in eliminating terrorist organizations in the Sahel.
In another context, Wagner seems to still be suffering from the aftermath of the death of its founder and leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, particularly regarding internal structure levels and operational movements in various troubled areas. This prompted its current leader, Anton Yelizarov, to appeal to the Russian Ministry of Defense for help following the recent events in northern Mali, raising several questions about the nature of the relationship between Moscow and the group after Yevgeny’s death, and whether Moscow will benefit from these losses to decide on dissolving Wagner and replacing it with the African Legion announced in late 2023.
An Intelligence Operational Theater
The geographic scope of northern Mali has become an arena for international conflict after Ukrainian intelligence allegedly became involved in the recent fighting, which resulted in the deaths of more than 50 Wagner fighters according to unofficial statistics, by providing vital intelligence information that enabled Tuareg and Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin rebels to inflict significant losses on Wagner and the Malian army. It is still unclear the extent of Ukrainian soldiers’ involvement in this ground combat, despite claims of a group of Ukrainian soldiers in some indirect neighboring countries to Mali.
This highlights the complexities of international conflict dynamics, given Ukraine’s desire to retaliate against Russia in its strategic areas of influence by targeting the more experienced Wagner fighters, reducing the group’s military capabilities, and avenging its military operations in Kyiv. Additionally, depriving Moscow of seizing more African resources and wealth used to finance its war against Ukraine. However, this development raises questions about the nature of the relationship between armed groups and terrorist organizations in the Sahel and some international parties, especially after the “Kyiv Post” published a photo of Malian rebels raising the Ukrainian flag, indicating solidarity with Ukraine against Moscow.
The implications of these clashes are expected to go beyond the regional level to affect international security, posing new challenges in the region given the international support intersection for terrorist organizations in Africa, including the Sahel, with the developments and complexities of the international scene, potentially leading to a more complex context in the coming stage.
A Foggy Future
There is anticipation of the implications of the recent battle in northern Mali on multiple levels. On one hand, Wagner’s image may be shaken among the African public in the coming stage, amidst fears of repeating the West’s failed experience in the war on terrorism. This may drive the Russian company to try to improve its image either through its media tools spread across African countries, especially the Sahel, or by reorganizing its ranks and launching a military campaign in northern Mali in an attempt to restore its reputation.
The most pressing question remains about the Kremlin’s potential policy towards Wagner’s continued presence in Africa, especially since such losses could clearly hinder Russia’s efforts to expand its influence in the Sahel region, which serves as a strategic belt linking Moscow to several other strategic areas such as North Africa, especially Libya, and East Africa, including the Horn of Africa.
On the other hand, it is expected that rebel groups in northern Mali will build on the recent victory by intensifying their operations against the Malian army and its Wagner ally to pressure them into a tactical retreat from northern Mali, to reclaim areas lost to the army in recent months like Kidal.
This indicates an expansion of fighting in northern Mali in the coming stage, suggesting the exclusion of reaching a new peace agreement between the Malian government and the rebel groups in the north, thereby reinforcing internal Malian public fears of another failure by Wagner in addressing security threats in the north, reminiscent of the French and Western failure to contain terrorism risks in the Sahel since 2012.
There may also be growing concerns among some Sahel countries about Wagner’s Russian capabilities in combating terrorism, potentially pushing the Sahel Confederation to expand its international alliances and not rely on a single international ally, to ensure strengthening regional capabilities in facing security challenges.
However, this may not affect Moscow’s plans to establish potential military bases in the Sahel. Instead, the region’s countries may view it as a first step towards expanding Russian military presence through reinforcements, including doubling the number of Russian soldiers and enhancing arms exports to the region in the coming stage, reflecting on the expansion of Russian intervention in the war on terrorism.
On another level, tensions between Mali and Algeria may escalate in the coming period amid accusations against Algeria of supporting the Tuaregs and armed groups in northern Mali, especially given its concern about Wagner’s presence at its southern borders, which could also undermine its relations with Russia, thereby enhancing regional tensions in the Sahel. This may be exploited by terrorist organizations to expand their operations to strengthen their jihadist influence in the region in the coming period, threatening regional security and stability in the Sahel.
The Russian-Western competition in the Sahel is expected to escalate, particularly as the West will exploit Wagner’s failure to try to turn African public opinion against it, possibly engaging both sides in a new wave of misinformation through their tools to mislead Africans to maximize each side’s interests at the expense of the other.
This may represent a good opportunity for other international parties, such as Turkey, to present themselves to Sahel countries as the most capable party in combating terrorism, by intensifying its arms exports, including drones, which have become an important tool in the war on terrorism, potentially intensifying international competition in the Sahel in the coming stage.
In summary, Wagner’s future in Africa seems to be at stake, given the internal complications within the group following its founder’s absence in 2023, coinciding with Russia’s desire to replace it with the African Legion under direct Kremlin control to avoid past mistakes and engage in tools of Russian policy aimed at strengthening its influence on the African stage. Wagner’s defeat in northern Mali may be the start of a series of subsequent defeats that could undermine the significant role the Russian company plays in Russia’s policy towards Africa.
However, Wagner’s absence or the undermining of its role on the African stage will not affect Moscow’s movements on the continent, as Russian President Vladimir Putin still bets on Africa as a strategic arena through which he can negotiate with the West on several strategic files in different competition areas, especially the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, enhancing Moscow’s vital interests there, including seizing African resources and wealth.
Sources:
- Chinedu Asadu and Sam Mednick, Russia’s Wagner has deadliest loss in Africa’s Sahel, highlighting the region’s instability, Associated Press, 29 July 2024, accessible at: AP News
- Shaun Walker, Ukraine military intelligence claims role in deadly Wagner ambush in Mali, The Guardian, 29 July 2024, accessible at: The Guardian
- Todd Prince, Wagner’s Bloody Mali Debacle Shows Cracks In Russia’s Sahel Strategy, Radio Free Europe, 30 July 2024, accessible at: RFE/RL
- Jason Burke, Russian mercenaries behind slaughter of 500 in Mali village, UN report finds, The Guardian, 20 May 2024, accessible at: The Guardian
