The Houthis Targeting Israeli Interests in the Red Sea: Prospects and Repercussions
The Houthis’ escalation towards Israel and its interests in the Red Sea, since October 19, 2023, was one of the most prominent events accompanying the Al-Aqsa Flood operation carried out by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) against the Israeli army in the Gaza envelope area, on October 7, 2023. This escalation is linked to the events in Gaza, as the Houthis condition stopping their attacks on the port of Eilat (um al-Rashrash) and commercial ships associated with Israel in the Red Sea in return for ending the Israeli aggression on Gaza.
This paper discusses the contexts of this escalation, defines its theaters of operations and military technologies, highlights the political, military and security repercussions arising from it, and then reviews the limits of the Israeli and international response – what has occurred and what is expected in the future.
First: The Political Contexts of Escalation
The ongoing humanitarian truce and its entitlements between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, since its entry into force on April 2, 2022, represents the most important local variable that exists and is closely related to the Houthis’ military escalation towards Israel and its interests and the interests of associated countries in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during the last quarter of this year (2023). The Israeli war on the Gaza Strip was a valuable opportunity for the Houthis to gain several points at different levels, most notably moving the peace process in the direction of their rigid political will, and behind them Iran, or returning to the path of war, and recording a solid position highlighted by a brave Arab force, in exchange for the reluctance of all Arab countries to take such a position or less.
Perhaps this is confirmed by the state of field decline in which the Houthis were mired during the twenty months of the truce, and the faltering of their additional demands, which they set as conditions for the official renewal of the truce (1). The truce hindered their rush in the oil-rich geography and others controlled by the government, and gave their opponents in this government enough time to sort out their scattered cards, whether each of them separately, or all within the presidential leadership council formed five days after the truce was announced. The Houthis are also concerned about the escalation of the revolutionary spirit towards them in their areas of rule, as a result of the poor economic, educational and health conditions, their inability to pay public sector salaries since 2016, and their restriction of freedoms manifested in the repression of those celebrating the sixty-first anniversary of the revolution of September 26, 1962 (2).
Throughout the truce, the Houthis have been stressing that Yemen is still under Saudi, American and Israeli aggression, as described in their official speech, and the speeches of their leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, and the speeches of the head of their Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, have not been without the threat of resuming the war (3). This contradicts reality, as clashes between the two parties continue at various points of contact, and the Houthis even targeted the oil port of Al-Dhabbah with ballistic missiles and unmanned aircraft in November 2022.
At the regional and international level, Saudi-Iranian reconciliation is emerging as a political variable closely related to the Houthis’ escalation. On the one hand, this escalation puts them in the axis of resistance, in which their only international ally, Iran, is present, and confirms their close attachment to it, and gives it additional opportunities to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement, and the United States, which exited it. On the other hand, the Houthis are seeking to narrow the options for the Yemeni government, by pushing Saudi Arabia and the United States to pressure this government to accept their demands related to extending the truce and entering the peace process. The Houthis know the Saudis’ keenness to withstand this reconciliation, and their efforts to put down the hotbeds of tension that have slowed down the implementation of giant strategic projects, foremost of which is Saudi Vision 2030 (4).
In a political context governing most of the above, the United States is keen to deal with the Houthis with some strategic patience, based on a set of its regional calculations towards allies, such as the Gulf states and Israel, and towards international adversaries and competitors, such as Iran and China, and groups described as terrorists, especially al-Qaeda and ISIS. In addition to the calculations of the administration of President Joe Biden towards the hotbeds of violence in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, and towards the presidential elections scheduled for late next year 2024, in which he announced, in April 2023, his candidacy, as he promised his voters during the 2020 elections, to work to stop the war in Yemen and reduce US military support for Saudi Arabia in it.
It is clear that the Houthis are aware of these dimensions, but they are working to account for the moment, so they work to take full advantage of them (5). Perhaps the Biden administration’s removal of them from the lists of foreign terrorist organizations is the strongest that can be taken in interpreting the current US position on them, and the position of the Houthis themselves towards the United States, as they maneuver on various local and regional issues, but within the limits of what opportunities offer them, and without prejudice to the essence of American strategic interests. Finally, we find that the outcome of their hostility to the United States, during the period of their attacks on ships in the Red Sea, is equal to (zero) loss for the United States of America, and there is one case above the maritime space of their control, which is the downing of an unmanned aircraft, an MQ-9 Rapier, which was carrying out a reconnaissance mission, and its wreckage fell in the Red Sea (6).
Second: Theaters of escalation operations and the means used
Theaters of escalation
The Houthis’ hotbeds of escalation were concentrated in two areas or directions, the first of which is the maritime and continental areas of the port of Eilat (um al-Rashrash) north of the Gulf of Aqaba, with this extending to the Egyptian Taba area, southwest of the port. In addition to the southeastern territories of Jordan, near the Saudi land border. (7) Second: the southern sector of the shipping line, starting from the northwest of the Gulf of Aden and even off the port of Saleef. The Houthis’ control in this sector is not all direct, but through their missile capability that reaches the place and raises a threat. As for direct control, it extends between the islands of Zagr and Zubair, off the southern coasts of Hodeidah, and then between the island of Zubair and the islands of Baklan, Rafi and Zamhar in the north, knowing that these islands are in the grip of the government naval formation (8).
Thus, the Houthis’ continental and naval control, their ballistic missile capabilities, suicide drones, ancient and modern naval capabilities, and Iranian logistical and intelligence support all imposed the limits of their security threats, north and south of the Red Sea, and determined the nature of the targeted purposes, as the range of their projectiles, of these weapons, is between 1900-2000 km, which is approximately the same distance between Sana’a or the port of Hodeidah, and the port of Eilat (9). The distance between the last coastal point of their concentration south of Hodeidah and any point in the Gulf of Aden located parallel to the port of Aden is estimated between 340-370 km (10). This distance allows air access for rockets and suicide bombers.
In the first direction of escalation, represented by the port of Eilat and its periphery, continental and sea, the Houthis launched their first attacks, with about 15 ballistic missiles and three suicide drones, on October 19, 2023. The USS Carney intercepted some of them over the Red Sea, attributing the source of its launch to Houthi-controlled areas, and that its destination was Israel (the occupied Palestinian territories) (11). Such attacks were repeated during November and December at irregular intervals, with the Houthis admitting to being behind them, linking them to the shifts in Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip. The attacks included about ninety ballistic missiles and a suicide bomber. The last interception in the direction of Eilat was about 15 projectiles, which the US Naval Forces Central Command announced were shot down on December 16, 2023.
The second trend of Houthi escalation is represented in the southern sector of the shipping line, along their coastal control and extending south to the Gulf of Aden, with the escalation centered on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. In this sector, the attacks targeted commercial vessels directly and indirectly linked to the Israeli government and those that went to or departed from its ports through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The attacks varied between targeting with suicide drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, which successive groups of them, during the escalation period, intercepted the US destroyers “USS Carney” and “USS Labon” in the Red Sea, and “USS Mason” in the Gulf of Aden, and the number of attacks in this direction, about 15 attacks, as of December 23, 2023, according to the US Naval Forces Central Command (12).
Several attempts by the Houthis to hijack commercial ships and their crews, or sometimes change their routes
Several attempts by the Houthis to hijack commercial ships and their crews, or sometimes change their routes to the ports of Hodeidah, or to destinations opposite to the direction of their travel, have emerged as other patterns of the threat that have progressed in escalating levels, starting with warnings accompanied by imposing demands to stop the aggression on Gaza, allowing food convoys to enter it, and then moving to implementing the threat on the ground, when the warnings were not heeded. The October 19, 2023 attacks, although the Houthis neglected to acknowledge them, represented the first enforcement of these warnings, followed by a focus on the hijacking of commercial ships related to the Israeli government, whatever this link, in which the ship “Galaxy Leader” occurred, a month after the first Houthi missile attack on Israel, on November 19, 2023, and then attacks with missiles and aircraft, unmanned, suicide bombers, on commercial ships, became the usual behavior of the Houthis, as a result of the lack of any violent Israeli response.
The following table summarizes full details of ship-directed attacks acknowledged by the Houthis and confirmed by US Naval Forces Central Command from October 19, 2023-December 26, 2023.
The Houthis used a range of weapons and technologies within two main categories of official forces they control: the navy and the coastal defense forces, and the air force and air defense forces, represented by the missile force and drones (suicide drones, ballistic missiles, and winged missiles). In addition, the coast guard forces that secure the territorial maritime area in the maritime sector under their control.
During the escalation, a new type of ballistic missile emerged, known as the “flood”, surface-to-surface, which is a copy of the Qadr missiles, which Iran possesses, and has a range of 1,950 km. According to Houthi military parades and nine years of war, the missile is being launched via a mobile ground launcher. It also used Quds cruise missiles, which have a range of more than 1,650 km. (13)
In addition, suicide drones, including: “Samad” aircraft, which have a range between (1200-1500) km, and the “Samad-3” was the type of them whose name is circulating, during the Houthi escalation towards Israel and in the Red Sea. It matches the Iranian version of the suicide drone known as the “witness.” It is not known whether the Houthis used a type of suicide drone, which they had previously declared to possess, known as “Waeed”, and that its range reaches 2500 km, which is identical to the Iranian version of the “Shahed 136” suicide unmanned aircraft (14).
The attacks on the port of Eilat included the largest amount of these projectiles, and varied between ballistic and winged missiles and suicide planes, while naval targets were targeted by individual projectiles, sometimes even or odd, without the six projectiles, and in both directions their explosive warheads were conventional and medium in intensity in the explosion.
In naval attacks and operations, the Houthis have used a range of naval and air weapons and auxiliaries that they have previously displayed in public squares while commemorating their own political and religious events. In any case, they launch their attacks using combat boats with limited armaments, including: navigator, stormer, and harbinger. Its armament includes the AK-47 automatic rifle (7.62-39 mm), the Dushka machine gun (12.7-108 mm), and the RPG-7 rocket launcher. It seems that there are those who provide them with a large ship anchored at sea, which acts as the mother ship from which these boats depart, and here there is a lot of controversy about the role of Iranian ships in the Red Sea, which had logistical contributions in support of the Houthis during the past nine years of the war. This role is in the high seas area which Houthi boats are unable to reach, to intercept ships, and return to their anchors on the coast.
The Houthis have not disclosed the naval missiles used in their attacks on ships, despite the lack of their use, as the projectiles they launch are ballistic missiles and suicide drones stationed on the country’s mainland. One type of missile used to attack ships may be the Quds-4 cruise missile, which has a range of about 800 km, which can deal with both sea and land targets. (15)
Third: The internal and external repercussions of the escalation
Houthi attacks on military targets and public civilian objects in Eilat, and their attacks on commercial vessels directly and indirectly related to Israel, have led to numerous declared and undeclared repercussions, all of which fall into four areas: political, economic, military, and security.
Political Implications
The Houthis’ military escalation towards Israel, its commercial interests, and related international interests in the southern Red Sea has contributed to breaking the political stalemate that surrounded the Yemeni crisis for nearly two years. About two months after their attacks on the port of Eilat and commercial ships in the Red Sea, the UN envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, revealed the commitment of the warring parties to a set of measures that include a ceasefire, improving living conditions, and engaging in preparations for a political process under the auspices of the United Nations. [16] This declaration was accompanied by intense political activity within the various parties to the war and their external supporters, indicating the imminence of a partial political settlement, the most prominent features of which are: humanitarian affairs and confidence-building between these parties, but parties within the Yemeni government are still not enthusiastic about this declaration, although they welcomed it, believing that this leads to complications on the ground in the absence of guarantees that support a real and lasting peace (17).
This was preceded by heavy movements by the UN envoy, throughout the period of Israel’s aggression on Gaza, and the attacks by the Houthis here and there. The movements included the capitals of the countries influential in the parties to the conflict, including: Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, Washington and London. Similarly, the role of the US envoy to Yemen, Timothy Leander King, and the role of Saudi Arabia, represented by the activity of the Minister of Defense, Khalid bin Salman, and the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jaber, who met with the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, and the rest of the members of the Council, during November and December 2023. The Omani role represented a link between all parties, including the Houthis. [18] During the second half of December 2023, representatives of the Houthi group met with US officials in Muscat, which may have been a strong motivation for the announcement of the UN envoy, Hans Grundberg, regarding the resumption of the peace process (18).
In the direction of Israel’s escalation on Gaza, the escalation of the Houthis, along with other factors, prompted Israel and the international powers sympathetic to it to rethink the feasibility of continuing this aggression, by resorting to a political solution based on indirect negotiations with Hamas. At a time when Netanyahu’s government is suffering from a postponed political crisis, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and the response to it, has been an escape from this crisis. So far, the direct impact of the Houthis’ position in this regard is still limited; the perceived tendencies to reduce violence towards Gaza are nothing but evasive, as half of the Israeli prisoners as a result of the Al-Aqsa flood operation remain in the hands of Hamas, and Hamas’ military capabilities, structures and logistical resources continue to pose a serious threat to Israel. [19]
Military Implications
Despite the escalation of Houthi attacks towards the port of Eilat and commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Israel did not take any military action in response to the Houthis, and only issued warnings of the consequences of continuing to do so, and called on its friendly countries to work to stop the threats of the Houthis (20). It seems that this response will be postponed, in the ways, means and time that Israel wants, and whenever necessary, as it is now still mired in the quagmire of Gaza, which it suffers greatly, due to the material, human and psychological losses inflicted on the Israeli army.
In terms of the military impact of the Houthi attacks, they have not achieved a direct military impact that limits Israeli military operations in Gaza, although political efforts are continuing to achieve this. The direct military impact can be estimated is that the attacks on the Eilat region have depleted costly defense efforts and means, for example, the cost of the Arrow-2 and Aro-3 interceptor missile in the Arrow-3 system is about 1.5 to 2 million US dollars. [21] In this regard, we should not forget that the continued exposure of the port of Eilat to Houthi attacks weakens its revenues and imports coming from the east, some of which are used to support the war economy and the logistical operations of the forces involved in the war on Gaza.
In another direction, the southern Red Sea region has not witnessed the international militarization it is witnessing today, along with fixed foreign military bases in some of its countries. The United States has sent advanced warships to operate in the theater of operations of the Fifth Fleet, which includes the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including the destroyer USS Carney
In another direction, the southern Red Sea region has not witnessed the international militarization it is witnessing today, along with fixed foreign military bases in some of its countries. The United States has sent advanced warships to operate in the theater of operations of the Fifth Fleet, which includes the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including the destroyer USS Carney and the USS Mason. This approach is a dangerous entry point to strengthen the previous US military presence in the region, including US bases in Djibouti and Somalia. The ground control and communication station on the island of Seychelles, which connects US bases in the Indian Ocean and beyond, including the command of the US Fifth Fleet in Manama, also monitors satellites specialized in space communications. [22]
Security Implications
Houthi operations against ships led to the resumption of Somali pirates activity off the Somali region of Puntland, northeast of the country, and facts of such activity and armed robbery of ships emerged, as the maritime threat activity of the Houthis, in the southern Red Sea, represented a cover for these activities, and may be closely related to the Houthis, or an undeclared response to the Israeli aggression on Gaza. An armed group attempted to hijack the ship “Central Park” in the Gulf of Aden on November 26, 2023, but a ship belonging to the US Naval Forces Central Command thwarted this and arrested them, and the results of the investigation have not yet been released. On 14 December 2023, Somali pirates hijacked the bulk ship Rween, about 400 nautical miles east of Socotra, and then took it with 17 sailors off the coast of Puntland (23).
In mid-December 2023, the United States announced the establishment of the maritime security alliance described as the “Guardian of Prosperity”, which included 12 countries, including Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Bahrain and the Seychelles. As for the participation of the latter two countries, although small, this can be attributed to the fact that Bahrain is home to the command of the US Fifth Fleet and that the Seychelles has an American station to control international communications and US military bases in the Indian Ocean and surrounding territories.
The crowding of the arsenal of these forces would negatively affect the security of the region, especially since one of its goals is to block Iran’s maritime aspirations, after it became present by proxy, through the Houthis, and insists through a number of its political and military leaders that the Red Sea is an integral part of its maritime space. Mohammad Reza Naghdi, assistant commander of the Revolutionary Guards, warned that sea straits could be closed. [24] This statement indicates their potential to exploit violent armed groups and supply them with suicide drones, which have become the most dangerous weapon of the present time.
Economic Fallout
The economic repercussions for the Red Sea region remain minimal, but may worsen if violence between the Houthis and opposing international and regional powers expands. These repercussions come in light of the challenges facing the global economy as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the remaining bad effects of the Corona pandemic “Covid-19”. So far, the Houthis have been dealing with commercial vessels selectively, focusing on vessels linked to the Israeli government. Therefore, with the exception of Israel and Egypt, the countries of the region, including the ports of Hodeidah belonging to the Houthis themselves, have not been affected much, according to their data presented (25).
In Egypt, the presidency of the Suez Canal Authority revealed that commercial ships have shifted to the Cape of Good Hope route, West Africa, instead of passing through the canal, and that about 55 commercial ships have resorted to this since the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader, on November 19 / November / November (26). This number will double if there is no shift in the decision of more than a dozen international shipping companies to stop the transit of their ships in the Red Sea, the most prominent of which were: the Danish Maersk Company, the French company CMA-CG, the BritishPetroleum Company, the German company Hapag Lloyd, the Taiwanese company Yang Ming, and the Orient Overseas Container Line in Hong Kong (27). Maersk is backing down, but its ships, whose activity is linked to Israel’s ports, will not be included in the decline.
Of course, a shift toward the Cape of Good Hope will compound the bad economic repercussions on the Suez Canal and the ports of the Red Sea countries, even if temporary. The port of Eilat declined by 85% (28). Because the Houthi threat against it will remain if Israel’s aggression on Gaza continues, according to the Houthis, the losses related to the activity of this port will be doubled, not only because the flow of ships to it decreases, but also because it continues to be attacked, and the arrival of ships coming to it from East Asia required taking long routes outside the Red Sea, across the Mediterranean, crossing Gibraltar, then the Suez Canal to the port of Eilat.
Fourth: The Limits of Israeli and American Responses to Escalation
Israeli and U.S. responses to the Houthis’ escalation remain below the level of threats emanating from them, and this situation opens the door to different scenarios for violent responses, but this may be an indication that the crisis will soon fade. The limits of these responses are realistic, and some are expected to happen.
Defense and deterrence measures without confrontation
In the context of the defensive interception response to Houthi attacks, during the last three months of 2023, US Naval Forces Central Command ships intercepted several missiles and unmanned aircraft directed at Israel and commercial ships through their naval vessels deployed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Its justification was self-defence and the protection of the security and safety of maritime navigation. The US Naval Forces Central Command, which is located in its theater of operations, indicated that it was able to contain many Houthi threats, including dropping most of the missiles aimed at ships, thwarting piracy operations against them, arresting a number of pirates, and freeing a detained ship.
Expected confrontation (scenarios)
In light of the circumstances related to the escalation of the Houthis, domestically and abroad, and the policies of the great powers towards the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, options for response can be envisaged within the following scenarios:
Scenario One: Stability on the Low Defensive Course
This approach places a priority on dealing with Houthi attacks, by intercepting them defensively, as they are of a temporary circumstantial nature, and will disappear once the political process in Yemen progresses, and relative stability returns to Gaza, and this is what is being worked for. This behavior is equivalent to the magnitude of the threat impact, compared to the magnitude of the consequences of any violent behavior above this level. It could be followed, in stages, by the imposition of sanctions on leading bodies or elements of the Houthi group, as they are directly linked to the attacks, as the United States has been doing for seven years and in circumstances close to the current threats.
This scenario is the closest scenario in the closest medium term.
Scenario Two: Collective Defense Path
This course depends on the maritime alliance that the United States began to form, to work within the framework of a temporary operation or mission, short or long, on the pattern of Somali anti-piracy operations, during the first decade of this century, such as Operation Ocean Shield carried out by forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Operation Atlantic carried out by forces from the European Union, where ships of this alliance can accompany and defend commercial ships by various means, appropriate and possible, after organizing their march in convoys. In the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. This measure is not only to protect them from the Houthis, but also from any unconventional threat that may arise from the evolution of violence in Sudan, and any violent spillovers in Yemen and Gaza.
This scenario is a temporary option, but it is longer-lasting than the second scenario, and less than it, in the burdens that the United States must bear. This is supported by the carrot-and-stick policy that the United States is pursuing with the Houthis; while forming a coalition to protect maritime navigation, it has opened the door to negotiations with the Houthis in Oman.
Scenario Three: Superviolent Defense Path
This course of action is represented in violent defensive military action, from a distance, that is, without ground incursion. This is done by destructively targeting a group of structures and structures, and elements involved in the escalation, within the Houthi group, and strengthening this by imposing sanctions on other bodies and elements affiliated with it, allied with, or associated with activities related to the escalation. This behavior is achieved by increasing the feeling that the Houthi group has become a source of danger to Western and American interests, and that this danger has exceeded the price of maintaining it, including employing the group to suppress al-Qaeda and ISIS.
This scenario depends on the continuation of the crisis situation in Yemen and Gaza, the continuation of the threatening activity of the Houthis in the direction of Israel, or in the direction of the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the growing Iranian role, or entering with Iran in a violent confrontation over its geography and territorial sea. However, this scenario is out of the question in the near term, as conditions for its availability are scarce.
About the Author
Ali Al , Dahab
Researcher specializing in military and strategic affairs. He holds a PhD in Maritime Transport Technology, Security, Maritime Safety and Security Strategy in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.
REVIEWER
1- Presenting these demands under the dangerous title, which is “humanitarian files”, which is a political drain on the strengths of the Yemeni government, the most important of which are: the payment of employees’ salaries from government oil revenues only, and the total opening of Sana’a airport and the ports of Hodeidah, all of which are under their authority.
2- The reason for this behavior is that the revolution of September 26, 1962, eliminated their ruling poles, political and dynasty, so they are desperate to replace the anniversary of the day of their seizure of power, on September 21, 2014, with the anniversary of the day of this revolution.
3- “The Leader of the Revolution settles the controversy over the internal situation and the state of no war and no peace,” Saba Net (Yemeni News Agency Saba), August 16, 2023, (accessed December 13, 2023), https://bitly.ws/35NAJ
4- “Saudi Vision 2023”, d.t., (accessed December 12, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36in3
5- To understand President Biden’s promises regarding the war in Yemen and the position of the Yemeni parties and US influence forces on them, see: Fernando Garvigal, “Ending the War in Yemen – What War?” , Down for Democracy, April 15, 2023 (accessed December 17, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36jIr
6. See:
“US Reaper drone shot down near Yemen by Iran-backed Houthi rebels, official says”, Edition. CNN, November 8, 2023, accesses 25/12/2023, at: https://bitly.ws/37aqp.
7- The projectile that fell in Taba injured six civilians, and no damage was caused as a result of one of the projectiles falling in the Al-Mudawara area, in the Jordanian governorate of Ma’an.
8- Private field sources.
9. See:
Eric Tegler, “what are the missiles the Houthis have fired at Israel?”, Forbes, 10/11/2023, accesses, 18/12/2023, at: https://bitly.ws/36rVu.
10- Air distance, and this estimate was based on what was stated in: “Paradise of the Red Sea (Hanish Archipelago)”, National Information Center, D.T., (accessed December 14, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36iPR
11. Some of the projectiles landed on one of Yemen’s government-controlled islands, and at that time the Chief of the General Staff, Saghir bin Aziz, was with a group of senior army commanders visiting these islands and the coastal areas of Hajjah governorate.
12. The last interception operation at the time of preparation of this paper was on December 23, 2023, when the destroyer USS Labon intercepted four suicide unmanned aircraft in the southern Red Sea. See:”US says it shot down four drones in southern Red Sea launched from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen”, The Guardian, Dec 24, 2023, accesses 25/12/2023, at: https://bitly.ws/37agR 
;
13- Special follow-ups. And also: “Missiles and drones… Learn about the Houthis’ military arsenal against Israel, Arab TV,” November 19, 2023, (accessed December 18, 2023), in: https://bitly.ws/37avq
14- Same.
15. The Houthis possess winged missiles to confront ships from a distance of 200-400 km, including: Sayyad, Takil, Hatem and Falaq. These missiles, along with the Quds-4, are an Iranian version of the cruise missiles developed by Iran, and are likely supplied by Iran to the Houthis or obtained from other sources. See:
Eric Tegler, “what are the missiles the Houthis have fired at Israel?
16- Grundberg Announces Yemeni-Yemeni Commitments to Peace, Middle East, 23 December 2023 (accessed 25 December 2023), https://bitly.ws/37aBY
17. Among the most prominent of these parties is the Supreme Council of Popular Resistance, headed by Sheikh Hamoud Saeed Al-Mikhlafi. The council has a wide presence in the central regions of the country, such as Taiz, Marib, Al-Jawf, Lahj and Hodeidah.
18- Example: See: “Regional and international movement to make the peace map in Yemen a success,” Asharq Al-Awsat, November 16, 2023, (accessed December 13, 2023), https://bitly.ws/35Pau
19- “News of indirect contact with Washington… Houthis Announce Targeting Two Ships,” Al Jazeera Net, December 18, 2023, (accessed December 19, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36BXM
20- Assaf Orion, Haneen Ghaddar, Matthew Levitt, Robert Satloff, “The Hamas-Israel War: The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning?” , The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 15, 2023, (accessed December 22, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36RYC
21. In this regard, see Ahmed al-Deeb, “Responding to the Houthis: A Raging Debate in Israel,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, December 12, 2023 (accessed December 25, 2023), https://bitly.ws/37aIw
22.
23. For more on these rules, see:
“U.S. Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East”, American Security Project (ASP), June 2018, accesses 23/12/2023, at: https://bitly.ws/36XNW
24- There has been great controversy regarding the involvement of the Houthis behind this, through the emerging relations between them and some of the armed groups in Somalia, where the two sides share hostility to America, in addition to the unified position towards the Israeli aggression on Gaza. It is inconceivable that they can carry out this operation directly, given its location from their areas of control. On piracy incidents in the region, see:
“Bulk Carrier RUEN update Dec 18: off Puntland, Gulf Of Aden”, FleetMon, 18/12/2023, accesses, 18/12/2023, at: https://bitly.ws/36nPZ.
25- US says it shot down four drones in southern Red Sea.
26- This paper monitored the movement of ships in the ports of Hodeidah during the period (1-20 December 2023), and did not find a negative change in their activities. See: “Ship Movement,” Yemen Red Sea Foundation, December 20, 2023, (accessed December 20, 2023), https://bitly.ws/36CjD
27- News of indirect communication with Washington, Al Jazeera Net.
28. “With the escalation of security threats… Giant shipping companies halt their flights across the Red Sea,” CNB Arabia, December 15, 2023, (accessed December 24, 2023), at: https://bitly.ws/37aRe 29- “Calcallist: Ship traffic in Eilat port drops by 80% due to Houthi attacks,” RT Arabic, December 18,
2023, (accessed: 20 December 2023), https://bitly.ws/36CxW
