China Towards Multipolar Competitiveness in the 21st Century: The Belt and Road Initiative as a Model (2013-2021)

The research seeks to stand on China as a rising power and its current position in the international system, as China has sought, since the end of the Cold War, to pursue policies through which it seeks to bring about a transformation in the structure of the international system. In 2013, China introduced the Belt and Road Initiative as one of the most important policies in the twenty-first century. The research first discusses the goals of China – as an emerging country – through its proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative and what it includes of long-term goals that have repercussions for bringing about a shift in the structure of the international system from unipolar to a multipolar system or to reaching a state of non-polarity in the international system. Secondly, the research discusses a number of political, economic, propaganda and strategic mechanisms adopted by China to achieve multipolar competitiveness.

Author
Safaa Saber Khalifa Mohammedin 
Faculty of Economic Studies and Political Science, University of Alexandria
Journal of Politics and Economics Article 5 , Volume 14, Issue 13, January 2022, Page 1-26

an introduction

   The principle of a “multi-polar international arrangement” is a major principle in the movement of Chinese foreign policy, as its features became clear globally after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War between the capitalist and communist camps. Balance with the global influence of American power, China rejected American hegemony in world affairs and called for a multipolar international arrangement that achieves the interests of all parties, which was reflected in China and its endeavor to establish a “multipolar international arrangement”. Therefore, the Chinese vision focused on the need to strengthen the comprehensive Chinese force to reach pluralistic international format. [1]

    Multipolarity – from the Chinese point of view – constitutes an important basis for achieving lasting peace in the world as it will lead to building a just political and economic system and will establish a relatively stable international political framework and promote exchanges and cooperation, as all countries must be equal members of the international community without hegemony with Following a model of common development within the framework of mutual trust, equality and neighborhood, and trying to settle disputes through peaceful means and dialogue, which is the approach that China has adhered to. [2] Thus, Chinese foreign policy rejected the idea of ​​unipolarity, calling for building a new international system that achieves the interests of all countries and does not allow a single country to lead the world, as China believes that multipolarity is an important basis for world peace, and that the democratization of international relations is an essential guarantee for this peace. All nations must benefit equally from the side effects of globalization in its various dimensions, especially the economic one, in the twenty-first century. [3]

   China also believes that a multipolar world must work to create a world of peaceful coexistence that paves the way for all peoples and nations to live a human life. The rise of China in the heart of the East does not mean the decline of the West, which is still the main center of the international system. It is associated with maintaining good relations with both the United States and Europe in all fields, even if that requires concessions to maintain the volume of economic relations between the various parties. [4] And to complement China’s vision, which rejects the singularity of one country with the capabilities of the international system, China does not tend to enter into alliances with other countries or form any fronts in the face of certain forces, and it has been keen to set aside ideological differences between it and the countries of the region, and to develop more cooperative relations based on mutual interest. This is in line with the directions of a number of countries in the world in order to achieve a greater level of stability at the regional and international levels. [5]

Let the dragon sleep because when he wakes up, he will light the world.” These are the words that the French leader “Napoleon Bonaparte” said about China more than two centuries ago in 1815, and this historical saying certainly expresses China’s latent strength, possessing the natural and human elements that may qualify it to play a role Great and influential in international politics, and recently there has been a lot of writings and analyzes that talk about what might be called the  Chinese world order .That concept centered on China’s desire and vision to form a new regional and global system under its leadership, which poses a threat to the United States of America, which wants to continue its leadership in the international system. As the Chinese dragon penetrates into all fields, especially economic and commercial. Now possessing new tools of power, using technology and energy as a driving factor in these areas; making him dominate the world with a new soft power; In addition to putting forward the “One Belt One Road” or “The Belt and Road” or “Silk Road” project, all of which have different names, for the project that China came out to the world as an initiative that entails reformulating the global system, with the rise of China as a leading polar power.[6]

Accordingly, the research discusses the objectives and mechanisms of the Chinese rise globally to influence the structure of the international system. Then it deals with the extent of the possibility of a new cold war between China and the United States based on the global rise of China through the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the reactions of the major international and regional powers, and finally, the opportunities and gains, challenges, and future prospects regarding multiple polar competitiveness. In light of this perception, a course can be drawn for the nature, size and extent of the Chinese role in the twenty-first century .

The first topic

China and the Belt and Road Initiative towards multipolar competitiveness

First, China moved towards achieving the goal of being an influential international actor, by putting forward the Belt and Road Initiative, and in this context, US Deputy Secretary of State “Robert Zoellick” mentioned in 2005 during his speech at the National Committee for US-China Relations that “we now need to encourage China to It becomes a responsible stakeholder in the international system”  ( [7] ) , as Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick coined the term “Chimerica” to describe the economic interdependence relations between America and China, which remained a major driver in The global economy for years, and the most prominent example of Sino-American economic interdependence was China’s purchase of US government securities that finance the US budget deficit [8] ) .

It is worth noting that the Chinese initiative aimed at influencing the structure of the international system, and by emphasizing the multi-polar system, as the global financial crisis in 2008 is considered to be one of the developments that contributed to confirming this character. Because it weakened the position of the United States as the center of the global economic system. [9] ) .

As for the Chinese interior, the language of the “Chinese Dream” has appeared, which began to appear in the speeches of Chinese leaders since 2013, and it is worth noting that the administration of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” Xi Jinping aims to achieve the goal of “the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” This phrase should not be seen merely as a slogan of the administration, but as serving important functions, such as legitimizing the functioning of the political system, and rallying the people together, as the goal of an ambitious national strategy in terms of foreign policy as well; For this purpose, I defined the slogan “The Hundred Years’ Dream”, which coincides with the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, or as it is called New China (2021)  [10] .

The Belt and Road Initiative begins geographically with “ peripheral diplomacy ”  [11] ) , as this diplomacy revolves around the assumption that China is in the center, while other neighboring countries are on the periphery  [12] ) , but it goes beyond that to include most parts of the world, The values ​​of the initiative are very similar to the values ​​of peripheral diplomacy: openness, inclusiveness, and a win-win for all for balanced economic cooperation, and its goals similarly reflect the goals of peripheral diplomacy: policy coordination, utilities connection, unhindered trade, and financial integration  [13] ). In addition, some see the Belt and Road Initiative as a strategy that seeks – in the first place – to rebuild the regional order by placing China as the leader of a Sinocentric Asian Order, and then building a new global order led by China [14] , with new ideas and rules for governance. Between new ideas, such as the “Chinese dream” and “Asia dream,” and new policies such as “comprehensive diplomacy and security” to build what Xi calls a “community of shared future,” Asian cooperation has expanded from the mutual benefit long promoted by Beijing to include shared beliefs and recurrent principles. Commonly, such as mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, equality, and win-win cooperation  [15] ) .

The initiative also includes traditional Chinese ideas of a hierarchical regional structure compatible with this term, and this vision has been confirmed by the official comments of Chinese leaders, for example, when Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Southeast Asian leaders in 2010 that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries.” , and this is just a fact”  [16] , which confirms the concept of hierarchy of the regional system and presenting China itself to its neighbors as a benevolent model for the regional system of the twenty-first century; Thus, it shows how Beijing sees itself at the center of the new regional order, although Chinese leaders often assert that they see small and large countries as equal on the world stage [17] ). Thus, the Belt and Road Initiative seeks to take advantage of China’s economic strength to address a series of economic, political and security challenges in both domestic and foreign policy, and is integrated into China’s 13th Five-Year Plan to support further economic reform and rebalance economic growth inward. It addresses security issues in Xinjiang, while at the same time seeking to use economic cooperation to reduce political and economic tensions with China’s neighbors in Central Asia, and the Maritime Silk Road similarly aims to exploit economic opportunities to deal with security challenges in the South China Sea  [18] ) .

   There is debate in China about whether the Belt and Road Initiative was primarily an economic project (which is the narrative being presented to the West), or whether it also had political and security goals, with some influential Chinese scholars arguing that the goal of the initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Is to challenge the current international pattern, and get rid of Washington’s hegemony [19] ) , and that the initiative is an expression of the new Greater China strategy, and therefore, Beijing aims to impart its preferred vision to build a new world order led by China, but as a response to the rebalancing in the United States Xi also gives the development of China’s relations with “old friends”, that is, countries that have stood by China in the past or to which China is indebted. These tactics have not always been welcome or successful, but they have at least sent a message to Washington about what China thinks about rebalancing Asia. [20] ) .

Since the announcement of the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” OBOR initiative in 2013, most global opinion makers have focused on the relationship between China’s internal development constraints and its search for external spatial solutions. American Marshall in the aftermath of World War II – launched by the United States as the first program or initiative for comprehensive international development aid after it emerged as a global superpower – as the “Chinese Marshall Plan for the Twenty-First Century”  [21] ). In addition, the Chinese state media rejected this analogy, and the Chinese rejection was based mainly on the fact that the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe was part of the geopolitical and geoeconomic attempts led by the United States to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which does not have any resonance with the initiative Belt and Road, on the contrary, the Belt and Road project does not have political purposes, as it does not aim to form any kind of economic, political or security alliances in order to confront any other country [22] . The Chinese Belt and Road, in one way or another, is in a number of aspects with  the “Marshall Plan”,  driven by a geopolitical, geoeconomic and security line of thinking similar to the one upon which the Marshall Plan was launched, as follows.

  • §       The Marshall Plan aimed to boost US exports in order to deal with overcapacity through investments in and exports to Western Europe, while one of the justifications for the Belt and Road Initiative is to deal with similar internal overcapacity problems and absorb overcapacity.
  • §       The Marshall Plan’s explicit goal was to export currencies in order to allow the US dollar to become a tool for global/regional stability and to be used for subsidies, while the Belt and Road Initiative is an ideal channel for China to seek greater use of its currency as an international currency.
  • The Marshall       Plan aimed to counter the Soviet Union as a potential security competitor by helping Western Europe become an effective balancing force for the Soviet Union, while the Belt and Road Initiative was an effective way for China to overtake the United States by expanding regional/global trade networks and relationships investment to secure its commodity exports and energy imports.
  • The Marshall       Plan was designed to reinforce the strategic divide between West and East Germany, while the Belt and Road Initiative refers to Beijing’s response to US “rebalancing to Asia” policy under President Barack Obama, such as the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership agreement launched by the US alliance (Partnership across the Pacific), and the Belt and Road Initiative offers an attractive alternative and project to compete with the United States’ regional and global economic and security alliances in the Eurasia and Asia-Pacific regions. [23] )

    Finally, in this regard, we can say that both the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy-IPS are a reflection of the strategic competition between the United States and China at the regional level, and undoubtedly, the Asia-Pacific region will be greatly affected. With the Belt and Road Initiative if properly implemented, the maritime component of the initiative also highlights China’s desire to deepen relations with Maritime Asia.Despite China’s claim that the BRI endeavor is development-oriented, the United States, among other regional players, is wary that a China-centric regional order may emerge from the project, and there are serious debates in US policy circles about how to formulate competitive strategies in the Middle East. Confronting the Belt and Road Initiative, as US strategists view China’s use of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means to launch a geo-economic attack, as well as to expand its security and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus as a threat to the US-led regional order. [24] ) .

The second topic

Mechanisms of the Chinese rise towards multi-polar competitiveness

  With the aim of establishing a pluralistic international pattern, China has followed a number of mechanisms aimed at peaceful dialogue and the promotion of cooperation and mutual benefit. The gateway to expanding trade relations, technological cooperation, and scientific and cultural exchanges with all countries and regions of the world, and then encouraging what the Chinese describe as common prosperity, is one of The fundamental approaches to which China adheres to the development of its foreign relations. [25]  In this section, we discuss a number of different mechanisms adopted by China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, through which it sought to establish and support a new polar competitiveness in the international arena. These mechanisms range from political, economic, strategic and propaganda tools as follows.

1- Political mechanisms:

China is trying to position itself in international organizations. To localize its influence and international presence, which was revealed during the Covid-19 pandemic, taking advantage of the decline of American leadership in international organizations [26] ) , and China sought during the first decade of the twenty-first century to restructure the structure and rules of international organizations, through a combination of building alliances , and making financial contributions at the strategic time – which you want – and formulating a strategic vision for the future of the international system, and it has achieved success in that in strengthening its involvement in the United Nations organization with the aim of protecting its interests and taking into account the political privacy of states and their political systems, and reformulating the rules of the international system to take into account the disparities between countries At the level of values, cultures and political systems.

 At the same time, China has worked for many years for its citizens to assume senior leadership positions in many international bodies. Since 2019, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Agency has been headed by Qu Dongyu, who held the position of Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in China, while Hulin holds the position. Zhao, who began his career in the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, for the second time the position of Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union since 2018, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Antonio Guterres”, appointed in June 2017 the former Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, “Liu Zhenmin” in the position of Under-Secretary. General for Economic and Social Affairs, a body that advises the Secretary-General on all issues related to development, including climate change, Internet management and financing for development, and Fang Liu for the second time assumes the position of Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [27] ) .

In addition, China chose the African continent as an arena or theater of operations for the post-Cold War environment in its endeavor to weaken Western powers, especially the United States, so as to create an international situation suitable for China’s global interests, so the South-South discourse that China adopts in its dealings with African countries It resonates positively with the countries of the continent, whereby China turns into a spokesman for developing countries by calling for the creation of a pluralistic international environment, and a review of the global economy, which is characterized by two advantages: injustice and neglect of the rights of the poor. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao confirms this endeavor through his belief that China is currently a major participant in the international arrangement, in which the trend towards multipolarity has become irreversible  [28] ) .

And for that; Chinese policies have invested in the Covid-19 crisis and exploited it by increasing the activation and revival of the Belt and Road Initiative by focusing on the health field to enhance China’s position as a global power in the health sector. In this context, China called for an extraordinary African-Chinese summit, via video conference technology, on June 17, 2020. It was a joint initiative between China and South Africa as the current chair of the African Union, and Senegal as the current chair of the FOCAC – Cooperation Africa China on Forum  [29] ) .

2- Economic mechanisms:

     It is worth noting that ideology no longer has a decisive role in shaping China’s vision and shaping the patterns of its external interactions, and it has retreated to a large extent – compared to the Cold War period – in front of the requirements of the national interest, and ideas based on ideology as effective tools and criteria for classifying friends and opponents have become unrealistic, [30]  . China has sought to build economic cooperation more than its inclination for political cooperation, as  “the development and development of the Chinese economy is the way to force the world to listen to you ,” which is the saying that China believes in, especially after what became the experience of China that combines rapid economic growth, clear political stability and a model A development that attracts many. Thus, China has established various relationships in order to achieve economic benefit and benefit based on the realization of Chinese interests on the basis of mutual benefit. [31]

                a)    China’s development and the US dollar system:

    In addition to China’s endeavor to increase its influence in the existing international financial institutions [32] ) , China is working at the same time to establish a new group of international economic and financial institutions under its leadership, as banks that aim to develop infrastructure and work mainly to support the Belt and Road Initiative, just like The United States, which established the World Bank in 1944, which aims to reduce poverty and provide loans for capital projects, and established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945 with the aim of rebuilding international payment systems  [33] )

(Read more)  The influence of the United States of America in the strategic balance in South Asia

Following in the footsteps of the United States, in recent years China has played a leading role in establishing international financial institutions under its leadership, such as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that aims to support infrastructure development in the Asia-Pacific region since It was proposed by President “Xi Jinping” in 2013, then it officially began its work on January 1, 2016, and China also contributed to the establishment of the New Development Bank of the BRICS group, in mid-2014, by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa); To finance infrastructure projects and sustainable development within the BRICS  [34] ), which was proposed by India in 2012, and its establishment was announced at the BRICS summit in Brazil in July 2014 on the 70th anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, which was interpreted as a challenge to the Bretton Woods system, along with the establishment of the BRICS Emergency Reserve Fund and the Development Bank the still-discussed Shanghai Cooperation Organization  [35] , and the Silk Road Fund, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, all of which represent a regional counterweight to Western-led entities such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and more recently the European Central Bank—which have dominated the system The global financial system since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system after World War II, and it can be said that China is only the third country in history, after Britain and the United States, that has the ability to form and lead a global system of money and trade [36] ) .

         b)       The influence of Chinese technology:

  The growing role of Chinese companies in producing and selling digital goods and providing financial services based on technology (fintech) enhances initiative power and gives China greater influence in more places, allows Chinese companies to increase their market power, and forces millions of consumers in initiative countries to use applications developed by Chinese companies to meet their needs. Their banking needs, and although this technical strategy precedes the emergence of the Belt and Road Initiative and is not limited to the countries of the initiative, it enables China to increase its strength and allows it to translate the economic impact of the initiative to achieve political gains, such as punishing countries that take positions that conflict with Chinese interests on issues. China’s contentious domestic and foreign policies, including its persecution of the Uyghur minority, its suppression of freedoms in Hong Kong, and its militarization of the South China Sea, can also use economic incentives to persuade countries to reinforce China’s favorable positions. [37] .

             c)    Ports:

    China could also use its increasing investment in and influence over ports in the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative to project its power in new areas and perhaps to gather intelligence on the US military, if the United States also uses these same ports and other facilities or in places where Chinese companies have built infrastructure. Vital, such as communications networks and power stations, in which Chinese companies maintain operational control over this infrastructure, and China can turn off the electricity or communications network in the country to force the country to take measures that China prefers, and Beijing can use this influence to pressure a country to prevent The arrival of US forces, and Belt and Road projects will also make it more difficult to tackle global climate change, by exporting coal-fired power plants and encouraging the construction of carbon-intensive infrastructure in other countries, as in China itself. [38] ) .

3- Propaganda mechanisms:

       a)             Soft power

    Joseph Nye warned that the rise of China’s soft power – at the expense of its American counterpart – is a matter that requires a serious and dangerous pause, as the elements of Chinese power are not limited to those related to hard power, but rather its soft power is constantly increasing. The basis of the rapid economic growth, the steady integration into the global economy, as well as the political role that China plays in the international system, in addition to the intense cultural presence on the international stage. [39]

China has adopted the soft power theory; In the face of the soft cultural war led by the United States of America and its allies to strike China from the inside, and dismantle its cultural identity and dismantle its national components, as Google International, with the support of the US State Department, established sites in various Chinese national dialects, and the American Walt Disney Company also bought huge spaces in the most prominent cities. Chinese, Shanghai; Therefore, according to the Chinese Communist Party conference held in 2011, China withdrew 88 American and Western television programs that were broadcast on Chinese television screens and networks, adopting a “strategy of cultural and political confrontation” and “a strategy of investing in film, television, cultural, media, educational and communication productions, especially the Internet.” [40] )So, relying on soft power; The Chinese state uses the Belt and Road Initiative as part of its propaganda methods to promote common development, as it claims, as China uses it to promote itself in a big way. Zero-sum game, as one of the pillars of its soft power.

   b)             Chinese culture

The “National Cultural Security” document endorsed by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party stipulated that cultural and ideological challenges must be faced internationally, which have become increasingly complex. This necessitates the strengthening of Chinese cultural strength, and the adoption of the principle of cultural development and the process of cultural reform. And then China took measures to fortify the Chinese Internet from manipulation and penetration, because the enemy’s goal is to weaken, fragment and divide China – according to the statement of Chinese President Hu Jintao -, and vocabulary such as “soft power” and “soft war” and “racing” spread in the Chinese press. Soft armament”, which indicates the Chinese leadership’s awareness of the size of the risks threatening its soft cultural and political front  [41] ) .

    c)             Colonialism in a different way:

The Belt and Road Initiative is consolidating China’s economic and political hegemony in Asia and Africa; And thus expanding its geopolitical influence, which raised many global doubts about the “importance of the hidden geopolitical agenda” of China, especially with regard to the “neo-colonial” discourse about the possible results of the Belt and Road Initiative, by increasing the burden of national debts and making developing countries – the least successful – A market for imports of Chinese goods, which was demonstrated in the overwhelming enthusiasm of developing countries to participate in the first “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation” held in May 2017, is sufficient to invalidate the argument of “neo-colonialism” [42]  .

Although some governments and peoples in the West invoke the arguments of “neo-colonialism” or the “debt trap” to distort the Belt and Road Initiative, they are still increasingly welcome, which is reflected in the success of the convening of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in its second edition, in Beijing in the period from 25 to 27 April 2019, which brought together nearly 5,000 participants from more than 150 countries and 90 international organizations, including heads of state and government and leaders from the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund; To discuss the development of the initiative, the number was much greater than the participation in the first forum of 2017  [43] ) .

China is seen as using the new form of colonialism that does not involve bloodshed, and instead uses economic power to make the colonized dependent on the power of the colonizer, through the Belt and Road Initiative, by exploiting China’s human and natural resources of the colonized developing countries, through high-priced loans; Hence, forcing the investing countries to agree on the main strategic and military issues  [44] ) .

 Beijing considered that the 2008 Beijing Olympics reflects China’s historical position as a great civilization  [45] ) , and foreign investment and Chinese tourism increased Beijing’s global vision, as Chinese leaders seek to maintain peace and stability, while expanding political and economic ties and avoiding war with America, This strategy expanded China’s influence and interests at the global level, and Beijing also wanted to expand the sphere of influence of its soft power by establishing “Confucius Institutes” in American universities to teach Mandarin language using propaganda methods, which some American scholars believe should be closed, as it seeks China to attract outstanding students to it, even at a time when Chinese students abroad in Australia and elsewhere are suspected of espionage for Beijing  [46] ) .

China is using the COVID-19 pandemic to build its Branding of charitable support, while exploiting its position as the world’s largest producer of medicines, active pharmaceutical ingredients and health technology while prioritizing the distribution of medical supplies and medical personal protective equipment to its partners in the Belt and Road Initiative; To deepen its commercial ties with them, and China used the size of the financial power of state-owned banks, and the political support of the Chinese Communist Party to develop high-capacity companies ready to build hard and digital infrastructure around the world under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, and China also benefited from the vacuum created by the United States from Through the inability to find competitive alternatives in the field of vital technologies, such as the fifth generation (5G) cellular networks and high-speed railways, it is expected that China will continue to use ambiguous lending and contracting practices to enhance its presence in the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative; What did not strengthen the United States [47] .

3- Strategic mechanisms

China’s announcement in December 2009 of its intention to establish a naval base in the Gulf of Aden to protect its ships from Somali piracy came to constitute a threat to Western powers, and it had sent several military destroyers to the Gulf in the largest Chinese naval presence in the region, and this declaration came in the context of an effort to develop the naval force China, which enables it for the first time in its history to deploy its fleet in distant oceans in a way that can protect the pipelines of oil imported from Africa and the Arabian Gulf region. [48]

The most prominent question in this regard remains: Does China intend to grow its military power for aggressive purposes such as seizing Taiwan or subjugating its neighbors such as Japan and Vietnam? Without a doubt, China is the most important challenge to US hegemony. In 2016, Stephen K. Bannon, Trump’s populist adviser, predicted “a war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years.” South China militarized some of it, sent warships to Japanese territory near the Senkaku Islands, collided with fishing boats in the territorial waters of other countries, occupied Indian lands in the Himalayas, and sent an aircraft carrier across the Taiwan Strait, in addition to its influence in neighboring countries and its claims in the China Sea South and the Sea of ​​Japan, and the deployment of modern weapons [49] ) .

China accomplished its own military modernization beginning in the 1990s in part by spying on others’ military technologies, which enabled it to avoid costly research and development. Beijing successfully launched a stealth drone in 2013. Moreover, China has large numbers of advanced military aircraft. and intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles with multi-purpose technological capabilities and anti-satellite capabilities, and the Chinese naval capability grew rapidly after Beijing shifted its focus from land threats to sweeping claims of sovereignty over almost all the islands of the South China Sea, coral reefs, atolls and adjacent waters .Beijing sought access to the Pacific Ocean and was pursuing a policy of “anti-access/area-denial”, and its growing naval power aims to bypass what Beijing called the “first island chain” in America, which included the Japanese islands. the mainland, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, Beijing sought to avoid direct military confrontation with America, preferring to use economic capabilities to extend its influence. [50] ) .

China is rapidly pursuing military capabilities to make the Western Pacific a no-go zone for US aircraft carriers and to deter and defeat US military intervention that defends US interests in East Asia, according to the Pentagon; If the US Navy cannot operate safely in the Western Pacific, US allies and friends may lose confidence in the US ability to defend them and their interests against Chinese aggression in areas such as the South China Sea. Such a lack of confidence in the US will make China’s neighbors vulnerable. The inability of the US Navy to operate in Asia would give the Chinese Navy free rein to control maritime security between the Indo-Pacific, coercively regulate trade flows, and impose any desired rule changes  ([51] ) .

“The task of building a strong navy has never been as urgent as it is today,” Xi declared in April 2018, and told Defense Secretary Mattis in June that China would not give up “an inch” of territory it claims in the South China Sea. Or the Sea of ​​Japan, and the Pentagon predicted that the Chinese submarine fleet would grow greatly, although it was widely believed that Chinese submarine technology was far behind America, and in 1947, the Chinese Ministry of Interior published a U-shaped map of the South China Sea, Reflecting a mixture of historical and modern legal claims, President Hu Jintao spoke in 2004 of China’s “Malacca dilemma” because most of the country’s oil passes through the Strait of Malacca and then the South China Sea. In 2009, China sent a diplomatic message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Reaffirming its allegations, which include the South China Sea and Taiwan, in the 2014 edition  [52] ) .

Although there were frequent minor clashes between rival claimants in the South China Sea, tensions escalated in 2014 when China began mobile drilling operations near the Paracel Islands. Vietnam, the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Vietnam; After that, China implemented the island building project in order to claim the territorial waters and its natural resources within the surrounding exclusive economic zones; In response, Washington imposed economic sanctions on companies that helped China build the islands, and the Philippines challenged China’s claims in 2013 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The court ruled that this map itself constituted an “appeal” and decided in favor of the Philippines, although That its decision is not enforceable  [53] ) .

China has also fortified many of these islands with aircraft carriers, anti-ship cruise missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. According to Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of US naval forces in the Pacific, “China is now able to control the South China Sea in all scenarios except war with the United States” and “could easily overwhelm other Asians who have taken over the islands.” However, America and its allies continued to oppose China’s claims, and conducted naval exercises and naval navigation operations to assert their rights. According to China analyst Michael Pillsbury, the Chinese “interpret these freedom of navigation exercises, even when they are innocent passage, as something else as provocations, or hegemonic attempts to maintain their power”  [54] ) .

The third topic

The attitudes of some international and regional powers towards China as a rising power

    a) The    United States of America

After the end of the Cold War, the relationship between Washington and Beijing changed in terms of power relations and strategic interests. The United States’ view of China changed from considering it the enemy of the Soviet camp, to describing it as its competitor at the regional and international levels. [55]However, the collapse of the former Soviet Union coincided with the rise of China, reintroducing the American vision that China represents a challenge and a potential enemy, especially in light of the emergence of the theory of the clash of civilizations, and the United States views China as a rising power that has a regional and global role, which threatens its vital interests and security. Therefore, China’s economic rise remains a source of concern for the United States of America, which has been at the forefront of the international system as a superpower for three decades. In this regard, the Belt and Road initiative is an expression of China’s growing economic power seeking influence in a number of other areas. This calls for talking about the Sino-American relations and the relationship of the initiative and its impact to the point of talking about the possibility of a new cold war between the United States and China. [56]

In this regard, we can say that both the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy – IPS are a reflection of the strategic competition between the United States and China at the regional level. Undoubtedly, the Asia-Pacific region will be greatly affected by the Belt Initiative. And the way if properly implemented, the maritime component of the initiative also highlights China’s desire to deepen relations with maritime Asia.Despite China’s claim that the BRI endeavor is development-oriented, the United States, among other regional players, is wary that a China-centric regional order may emerge from the project, and there are serious debates in US policy circles about how to formulate competitive strategies in the Middle East. Confronting the Belt and Road Initiative, as US strategists view China’s use of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means to launch a geo-economic attack, as well as to expand its security and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus as a threat to the US-led regional order. [57] ) .

And in connection with the above; American think tanks close to American decision-making circles realize the importance of the United States seeking, along with other naval powers, to convince China that its interests as a rapidly growing maritime power with its economic and military interests extending around the world lie in supporting maritime rights and freedoms rather than undermining them. Considering that Freedom of Navigation Operations FONOPS is absolutely necessary; For China to realize that its efforts to establish different rules for the South China Sea will not bear fruit, and the United States should also continue to conduct bilateral and multilateral maneuvers in the region with allies and partners, which is among the important matters as Beijing seeks to exclude the participation of “countries from outside the region” and specifically not to conduct joint military maneuvers with it on the grounds that it has no legitimate interests in the South China Sea  [58] ).

In particular, Washington is working to promote better relations with the Philippines, as an important ally in Southeast Asia. Following Philippine National Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana’s call for a revision of the 1951 United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Washington made it clear that the reference to the “Pacific Ocean” in The treaty includes the South China Sea. The move paved the way for greater progress under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which allows the US military to build facilities, preposition defense assets, and deploy troops to five Philippine military bases; Recognizing the importance of continuing to work on its own and with others (including Australia, Japan, and India) to enhance regional capability, particularly in the maritime domain, where increased capacity to monitor and patrol the EEZ coastal states will highlight illegal and coercive Chinese behavior By strengthening its relations with its regional allies and partners [59] ) .

 We can say that there is a consensus that China represents the greatest challenge to the United States in the twenty-first century, just as there is agreement that the United States and China will be the two largest economic and military powers in the twenty-first century and that the nature of their relations will determine the structure of this system and the nature of interactions within it.

b)    Japan

Tokyo’s reactions to the Belt and Road Initiative are seen in the broader context of the Sino-Japanese competition for influence in the region, a rivalry that has included Tokyo’s use of official development aid since 2008 to bring countries such as India, Vietnam, and the Philippines into closer alignment in order to constrain China, and Tokyo’s efforts to weaken influence The Chinese in Myanmar, and the Belt and Road Initiative exacerbates this competition by threatening Japan’s regional economic influence, especially in Central Asia. Japan can respond to the Belt and Road Initiative in several ways. Diplomatically, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe relied on a “diplomatic offensive” in areas ranging from South Pacific island nations to the Philippines, Mongolia, and Turkmenistan, as part of a campaign to balance the Belt and Road Initiative. Diplomatic opposition also includes meddling in South China Sea conflicts and portraying China as a threat to freedom of navigation. Economically, Tokyo has responded to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with a plan of its own.In the security field, Japan has strengthened maritime security cooperation with the Philippines and other countries in the South China Sea in order to impede Maritime Silk Road [60] .

 c)    India

New Delhi is “cautious” about the Belt and Road initiative. The Chinese-Indian rivalry is another problem, as Hu Jintao admits that part of the problem is that Beijing has not clarified the specific contents of the Maritime Silk Road, which crosses the Indian Ocean, and this ambiguity has led to “ Arouse suspicion.” And the development of Chinese-funded ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, along with negotiations between China and Nepal over the construction of Himalayan highways threatens India’s leading role in the region, and has aroused much suspicion in New Delhi. Another source of tension, and the economic corridor is expected to cross the disputed territories in Kashmir [61] ) .

Notably, there are a range of Indian policies and practices in response to the Belt and Road Initiative, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for an assertive “Go East” policy, alleged interference in the Sri Lankan elections in January 2015 that resulted in the defeat of a pro-Chinese candidate, and efforts to prevent the $1.5 billion Chinese Port Development Project in Colombo (Sri Lanka); encouraging the refusal to fully embrace the China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor; It is expected that New Delhi will continue to interfere with the participation of other South Asian countries in the Belt and Road Initiative, and undermine Chinese economic agreements, as well as the absence of Prime Minister Modi from the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, to increase China’s fears of New Delhi’s motives  [62] ) .

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   d)    Russia:

In Russia, Central Asia is often considered Russia’s “backyard”, which may not seem conducive to such initiatives [63] ) , and the Silk Road project was initially seen as a competitor to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia has officially expressed its support for the project and aims to work with China on concrete proposals  [64] ) . As the Sino-Russian partnership is essential to achieving basic Chinese foreign policy goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and in this regard, the agreement signed between the Silk Road Economic Belt ( SREB) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) established by Russian President “Putin” in 2015 as an indispensable confidence-building measure; Which helps to neutralize Russian fears of strategic displacement by China  [65] ) .

e)    the European Union

 The European Union chose to deal geopolitically by balancing relations with China against the global power of the United States, if we take into account the European Union’s keenness to adhere to Beijing’s vision of emphasizing a “multipolar” international arrangement, as is the case in all official statements between the European Union and China [66] ) .

 f)    Countries  bordering the South China Sea:

Vietnam is   one of the most important countries in Southeast Asia claiming its right to the South China Sea, and it is the most present on the front lines of confrontation in repelling Chinese encroachments, but its responses are far from military solutions, in contrast to the difficult battle waged by the naval forces of South Vietnam against the Chinese naval forces In 1974 to take control of the Paracels Islands  [67] ) .

         Hanoi canceled an oil exploration project with the Spanish company Repsol after a Chinese warning of military action in July 2017, and this was likely motivated by fears that Washington did not support it from Vietnam. It also canceled another project with the same company after a similar warning in March 2018; However, Hanoi has shown shrewdness in awarding licenses for oil blocks to the Russian company Rosneft, and despite Beijing’s opposition in May 2018, the drilling project in these blocks in cooperation with Rosneft is currently moving forward. China “is not in the mood to antagonize Russia in the South China Sea, and doubts remain about the expected fate of the Blue Whale gas-to-power project off central Vietnam with the US company ExxonMobil, which is likely that ExxonMobil will abandon Its share of 63. 75% of the project is under pressure from China, and if ExxonMobil does indeed withdraw, there may be other reasons, including divestment to streamline its portfolio; It will be difficult to determine the extent of Chinese pressure, if any. However, if Beijing is really putting pressure on ExxonMobil, it would not be the first time: in September 2007, China forced three US energy companies: Chevron, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips to suspend production sharing agreements with PetroVietnam in the South China Sea, and in late October 2019 Vietnam sent the Coast Guard to record its objections to the Chinese survey activity in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam, and although there were reports of sending naval vessels, the Vietnamese ruled out that this matter was very escalatory. [68] ) .

   In this context, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued several strong statements protesting the Chinese sweeps, but ultimately, Vietnam’s options are limited in responding to its powerful neighbor, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh raised it at the United Nations General Assembly at the end of September. 2019 concerns about recent complex developments in the South China Sea, including serious incidents that violated Vietnam’s sovereignty, without explicitly mentioning China  [69] ) .

The Philippines        resorted   to the law of the sea to resolve the dispute by legal means; And it took the step of the arbitration process, as it filed a case in January 2013 regarding China’s expansionist activities in the South China Sea, and the case was heard by the arbitral tribunal formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS, which in July 2016 issued a judgment in favor of the Philippines’ eligibility in the islands, which is what It is a great victory for her. Because he ruled against the Chinese allegations  [70] .

    In general, there are not many cards in the hands of the countries of the Southeast Asian region, but their behavior can be expected as follows:

A- Some countries in the region may resort to simulating the Philippine case. In order to obtain similar provisions with the aim of weakening the Chinese position in the conflict.

B- The countries of the region will continue to deepen their military and defense ties and relations with the United States of America to balance the rise of China. However, the continuation of this policy will depend on the extent to which China and the United States succeed in influencing the countries of the region, as the United States will rely on the narrative that China represents a threat to stability and freedom of navigation, and on the other hand; The more China succeeds in persuading the countries of the region that the American intervention in the conflict leads to deepening the state of polarization and increasing the chances of instability; The countries of the region tended to move away from the United States  [71] ) .

The fourth topic

Opportunities, challenges and future prospects for China as a rising power in the twenty-first century

a)           Opportunities for China’s rise in the international arena in the twenty-first century

  • §         Undermining the theory of the Chinese threat:  The Belt and Road Initiative has raised some concerns among the community of states, and Western countries in particular, and Chinese scholars realize that the new role that China can play globally must take into account the presence of development organizations that already exist, such as development agencies that provide Aid and aid to countries or United Nations agencies responsible for implementing the 2030 Development Agenda. Linking the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative to the agenda of these organizations and the United Nations Development Agenda for 2030 can be a way to increase confidence in the initiative and help to dispel doubts and to exercise greater international influence, as the initiative represents The Belt and Road is an attempt by China to explore a new model of international cooperation for development and global governance  [72]and that the Belt and Road Initiative focus on developing global infrastructure and partnerships, which are two priorities also included in the 2030 Development Agenda  [73] ) .

Regardless of the fact that China amends the initiative, it will continue to have important repercussions for the United States, chief among them facilitating the entry of Chinese companies into markets in many countries and reducing the costs of working with those Chinese companies, and with the support of state-owned banks, Chinese companies – and many of them can Also state-owned – to challenge US companies in the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative, and to replace US exports with their exports, especially since most developing countries have great needs for communications infrastructure and data centers, which have become more urgent due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work, and allow The initiative for China to meet these needs to export its technologies at a cheaper cost and in a more coordinated manner than the United States or its allies, by building next-generation digital networks around the world, and China can access huge amounts of data, which can help it build artificial intelligence technologies,Which can be exploited to obtain sensitive data from other countries and re-infiltrated into China, and China can control, a development that could close many markets in developing countries to non-Chinese companies, and the initiative increases the chances of China’s success in setting technical standards that govern communications operations in many countries [74] ) .

  • §         China’s support for ASEAN:  China strongly supports the process of regional integration within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (ASEAN). The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area serves as a major driver of bilateral trade and interdependence between the two sides. to foreign direct investment, and enjoy more stable and stable relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, and China’s increasing assertiveness regarding its regional claims and its initiative for the “new maritime Silk Road” tends to make other countries question Beijing’s intentions in the region  [75] )  .
  • §         China’s support for third world countries

    China has achieved remarkable success in its multilateral foreign policy, not only in developing its relations with the major countries in the international system, but also in its relations with developing countries, and China at present plays a dual role, as it is a force to balance the United States of America and at the same time it has a foothold in Third World countries. [76]

   Accordingly, Beijing focuses in its strategy on the emerging developing world and emerging powers. In an attempt to expand its influence and increase its presence in Central Asia, South Asia, Latin America and Africa, it is also trying to develop its cooperation with other major emerging countries such as India, Mexico, South Africa and Russia. a transportation corridor from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, the “Maritime Silk Road” from China to India, Africa and the Mediterranean, in addition to the establishment of the “Asian Infrastructure Bank” (AIIB), which is seen as the “International Bank for Asia” And the “New Development Bank” (NDB) of the BRICS group, which in turn can be seen as competing with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [77] ) .

b)         The challenges facing China as a rising power in the international system in the twenty-first century:

  • The challenge         of the Taiwanese problem :

 Although Chinese leaders insist that their rise is peaceful, Taiwan remains a contentious issue. Since the 1970s, Washington has agreed that “there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China,” and that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government in China; Taiwan is a province of China; The liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair, and no other country has the right to interfere in it. All US forces and military facilities must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities aimed at establishing “one China, one Taiwan”. Beijing also promised not to seek regional hegemony. However, America guaranteed the de facto independence of Taiwan and promised to defend Taiwan if China used force  [78] ) .

The Taiwan  Relations Act  states:

  • Maintaining comprehensive and close commercial, cultural, and other friendly relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, as well as the people of China and all other peoples of the Western Pacific region
  • That the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China depends on determining Taiwan’s future by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine Taiwan’s future by means other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, would threaten peace and security in the Western Pacific region and cause concern United States strongly.
  • the United States supplying Taiwan with weapons of a defensive nature; and preserving the ability of the United States to resist any recourse to force or other forms of coercion that would endanger the security or social or economic order of the people in Taiwan. [79]

In early 2019, Chinese President Xi spoke of his desire for reunification, offering a framework of one country, two systems, such as the one that defined Hong Kong’s relationship with Beijing; Taiwan’s leaders quickly rejected this, pointing out that Beijing had violated Hong Kong’s framework and imposed strict security laws, reducing democracy and autonomy there. Under Xi, China also pursued the genetic and psychological genocide of Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps. China has also repeatedly threatened war if Taiwan declares its formal independence and sent several military aircraft across the Taiwan Strait in September 2020 after it appeared that America would sell Taiwan advanced weapons, including drones and missiles that could reach targets in most parts of China. After that, China increased missile tests and sent aircraft near Taiwan, and increased its propaganda to a possible war with China and America [80] ).

  • §         Ideological challenges

  The main challenge that the Chinese political leadership faces in front of its desire to become a superpower in the twenty-first century is not related to the economy or military power, but lies in the lack of an ideology that is exported to the world or at least to its economic and strategic partners, although Confucianism is located in The heart of Chinese culture, however, it does not have specific political criteria that can be adopted to develop a political system.Huntington has noted that the Confucian heritage, with its focus on power, order, hierarchy, and the supremacy of the group concept over the individual, creates obstacles to democratic transition. However, there are some basic principles firmly established in political theory, one of which is that authoritarianism, in its direct or indirect forms, It cannot be treated as a legitimate political ideology. In the case of China, there is an absence of conceptual alternatives such as ideas of consensus according to John Locke’s consent, popular sovereignty according to Rousseau’s Popular Sovereignty, and individual liberty according to John Stuart Mill’s individual liberty. [81]

  • §         Political challenges:

     The United States sought to legitimize its economic model by introducing a coherent political system based on the principles of liberal democracy. On the other hand, China uses its economic power to obtain legitimacy for its political model, but this can backfire in the long run because of three reasons: the tendency of people in general to demand rights and freedoms after achieving some material growth, and the lack of political adaptation of the Chinese system to diversity cultural/ideological. In addition to the lack of transparency and information, in theory, China’s constitution guarantees freedom for its citizens. However, the Cybersecurity Law prohibits the use of the Internet to endanger sovereignty, overthrow the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate racial hatred and racial discrimination, create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social system; Under this law, dissenting voices are targeted and often turned into political prisoners due to disagreements with officials in power.

 Moreover, China has a unique approach, which contrasts with the approach of the United States, which is that it promotes economic cooperation between countries, and that the growth of one party automatically pays dividends for the other party, in other words, China has introduced a unique case of state capitalism that achieves beneficial economic gains for both parties together. However, the Chinese model is unlikely to remain aloof from international pressure, criticism of global civil society, and regional civil rights movements, nor appeal to investors or multinational corporations operating within the opaque Chinese system. [82]

  • §         Cultural challenges:

Culture is a complex entity, and this complexity is due to the fact that culture is not static and changes to varying degrees and ranges; As the difference of national culture in remote areas from urban ones; Therefore, there cannot be a unified Chinese culture that can be dealt with as a single entity, but there is a broad social context in which different sub-cultures function and develop mostly influenced by the philosophy of Confucius. On the other hand, globalization led by the United States has affected various cultures. However, closed societies such as Russia and China are in a position to resist change and oppose any attempt to change their social systems. In the same context, China is working to improve its soft power resources; Therefore, universities, international laboratories, and some exchange programs were established to allow foreigners to enter and interact with the Chinese to export their local culture. However, soft power in the public sphere overtly controlled by the state is not the same as limited freedoms. For example, Facebook and Twitter do not exist in China for the general public, and this makes them a society from another world; As a result, Chinese culture has lost the basic principles that every pluralistic society carries, such as the ability to accept, assimilate, and absorb; Hence, there is a strong perception that as China grows economically, it is more likely that it will oppose democracy, liberal values, and freedoms around the world.[83]

  • The human         rights file in the economic context:

         On June 24, 2021, the White House issued a ban on some imports of solar energy products from Xinjiang Province; For the purpose of pressuring China about Chinese state-sponsored forced labor and systematic and gross human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party against the Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities living in Xinjiang Province, following the issuance of an official communiqué from the leaders of the G-7 countries, led by the United States In the United States, he criticizes China after discovering that employment in the Xinjiang region of China is home to many Muslim citizens of that country (  [84] .

         As part of an intensified effort to crack down on the use of forced labor by China against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the administration of US President Joe Biden has taken a range of punitive measures against five companies that make polysilicon — a raw material intended for the production of solar panels — involuntarily placed on the Entity List of the Ministry of Commerce; Which requires US companies to obtain a license to export to them  [85] ) .

          On July 14, 2021, the US Senate passed legislation banning the import of products from China’s Xinjiang region; To punish Beijing for what US officials describe as an ongoing genocide against the Uyghurs and other Islamic groups, the Xinjiang authorities have facilitated forced labor by detaining about a million Uyghurs and other mainly Muslim minorities since 2016, and the next step is to pass the bill to the House of Representatives before Sending it to the White House for President “Biden” to sign it into law, amid great expectations that the bill will gain strong support in the House of Representatives, winning the praise and support of human rights groups, researchers, lawmakers, and Western officials (  [86] .

C)         Perceptions and future prospects for the rise of China in the international arena in the 21st century

It is possible to formulate three possibilities regarding the future structure of the international system :

  • The first possibility:

Supporters of this scenario assume that the centralization of American power will remain, without fundamental changes in the existing system at the present time, while allowing for an international partnership system. In the sense of the continuation of the centrality of the system and unipolarity, with the hegemony of the United States with its economic and military supremacy, and until now, for example, the United States is still able to challenge and prevent China from establishing its empire in the South China Sea.

  • The second        possibility:

Supporters of this scenario assume the establishment of a multipolar international system, and some manifestations of this possibility have already begun to take shape. There are the United States, the European Union, and the BRICS countries, and there are other powers that may arise in the future to form other poles. Perhaps one of the indicators of future significance for China is that it is striving With Russia in building what could be a future pole, represented by the “Shanghai” alliance and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Central Asia,

  • The third        possibility:

Supporters of this scenario assume an international system without poles, so that the phenomenon of polarity ends, and the international system is built on foundations that are not based on any poles. The basic idea of ​​this possibility indicates that the global powers that form the international system in the near future cannot play major roles as major international poles. Given the incompleteness of its strengths in a comprehensive manner with regard to the rising powers, or the decline in its capabilities in the case of the United States, in addition to other variables, and this will lead to the formation of an international arrangement on the basis of strategic alliances and opposing flexible and continuous change that does not give a fixed form to it  [87] )It is the possibility that “Richard Haass” spoke about in 2008, pointing out that the non-polarity pattern is far from the usual traditional sense of polarity with the control of states or State actors in leading the international format. Multinational corporations, which we are currently seeing with the presence of companies such as Facebook in the United States or the Chinese company Huawei, which had a very significant impact on the outbreak of the trade war between the two countries.

  Finally, it remains to reshape the structure of the international system and the actual success in creating a multipolar international system depends on the state of the US-Chinese competition, and the extent to which the Chinese economy can survive with the level of Chinese military capabilities that must keep pace with the US military capabilities, and at the same time work to strengthen its relations with Russia is the balancing and revisionist ally that seeks to create a policy of balances that undermines US hegemony, allowing for the creation of balances in the international system, just as the transformations of the international system and the transition to a multipolar system will be accompanied by the return of spheres of influence and the logic of the vital sphere as basic pillars that govern relations between the major powers  [88] ] ) .

Conclusion

    From this research, we concluded that the Belt and Road Initiative might pose far-reaching effects on the international system. Because of its complex nature, as the success of this initiative will give China greater regional status and power, and its influence in the East may exceed the traditional influence of the United States and Europe, and China’s strength will stem from its economic power, which will be transformed into political influence, which strengthens Beijing’s position.

  However, the “Belt and Road” initiative must adhere to its policy of peaceful development without arousing unnecessary anxiety among partners, and China should make efforts to eliminate all bad practices that undermine its positive image abroad and the trust of partner countries, and the project must be a win-win for all partner countries. , not just China; Hence, China’s influence and economic hegemony will spread in Asia, and may reach Europe, giving Beijing unlimited capabilities that can be increased. Cooperation with China will lead to achieving development in the partner countries, making them dependent on Chinese success, and Beijing will be able to build “communities of a shared destiny with some of its main neighbors,” and a new Asian heart of the global economy will be formed, with Beijing in the middle and western countries on Margin, unless you participate in the Chinese initiative.

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As for the soft power approach and the winner-take-all strategy, it is likely to grow stronger in the future in the post-Coronavirus-Covid-19 pandemic world. It can be said that despite the element of surprise of the pandemic, the post-Coronavirus world represents a great opportunity for China, which has made good use of the pandemic in its favor. Towards its ultimate goal, after China was able to promote itself well towards developing countries, by avoiding allegations that the initiative represents a debt trap, and Chinese propaganda works to promote the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, given that China proposed an initiative for common development for the world, which revolves around facing the challenges and risks facing mankind jointly and achieve win-win results.

The Belt and Road Initiative is one of the manifestations of the US-Chinese competition, and the US reaction is represented in the Pacific Ocean strategy, just as the United States has explicitly declared that it will not allow the establishment of a Chinese empire in the South China Sea, which is a form of competition now, and this competition may extend into Independent close to the leadership of the international system.

 Meanwhile, the Belt and Road Initiative restructures global value chains as transportation and new energy corridors lead to China, which are funded through international financial instruments led by China. The United States may look at alternative connectivity models, which could compete with the Belt and Road. Other challenges arise if China participates more in international development initiatives such as labor issues and environmental concerns, and the initiative faces many international accusations that it is a form of colonial power in a new way, amid an analogy that it is tantamount to the Chinese Marshall Plan.

Finally, the proposed Chinese initiative proved that China has the political will to influence the structure of the international system, by emphasizing the multipolar character of the multi-polar system, just as the global financial crisis in 2008 contributed to confirming the character of the multipolar international system. Because it has weakened the status of the United States as the center of the global economic system, the Covid-19 pandemic will support the Chinese rise to lead the international system, and in the event that non-polarity emerges in the international system, Chinese multi-national corporations will serve as the spearhead for a Chinese century. New is the twenty-first century.

List of references:

First: Arabic references:

                           a)    Books

1)     Soft War: Theoretical and Practical Foundations,  Soft War Center for Studies, Beirut – Lebanon, first edition, 2014

                        b)    Scientific theses

1)     Hassan Ibrahim Saad,  Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa since the End of the Cold War,  PhD thesis, (Cairo University, Institute for African Research and Studies, Department of Politics and Economics, 2007).

2)     Al-Shaima Hisham Abu Al-Wafa,  Chinese Politics in the International System from 1990 to 2005,  Master Thesis, (Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2008).

3)     Ali Sayed Fouad,  The Impact of Changes in the International System on Chinese Foreign Policy towards the United States of America , PhD thesis, (Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2004).

4)     Yassin Amer Abdul-Jabbar Al-Rubaie,  The Reality of China’s Position and its Future in the Structural Structure of the International System  –  Constraints and Opportunities , Master’s Thesis in Political Science, Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, Middle East University, Jordan, 2018.

                         c)    Periodicals and articles:

1)     Ibtisam Muhammad Al-Amiri, The Chinese Role in Africa: A Study in Soft Power Diplomacy , The Arab Future Magazine,  Vol. 40, p. 46, Lebanon, December 2017.

2)     Sharifa Kalaa, Towards Reforming a New World Order and Creating a Multipolar World: Features, Indicators, and What Role for China in That?,  Journal of Global Politics,  Volume 5, Issue 2, Year 2021.

3)     Abdel Qader Mohamed Fahmy , China’s Role in the Structural Structure of the International System , (Abu Dhabi, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2000).

4)     Ali Salah, Shadi Abdel-Wahhab Mansour, The Belt and Road Project, How does China link its economy to the outside world?,  Appendix to Event Trends,  Future Center for Research and Advanced Studies, Issue 26-2018.

5)     Mohamed El-Sayed Selim, The Reality and Future of Alliances in Asia,  International Politics , (Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Issue (183), January 2011).

6)     Muhammad Saad Abu Amoud, Towards a Multipolar International Order: US-Chinese Relations,  International Politics , (Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, No. (145), July 2001).

7)     Muhammad Fayez Farhat, Conflict in the South China Sea and Egyptian interests,  Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies , 8-1-2017, available at:  https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/5638.aspx

Second: English references:

  1. Books

1)    China’s foreign policy and external relations, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, July 2015, European Union, 2015.

2)    Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, Chairs, Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, China’s Belt and Road Implications for the United States, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Independent Task Force Report No. 79, March 2021.

3)    Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, The Return of Geopolitics and Declining U.S. Hegemony, In: Populism and Globalization: The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

4)    Rumi ,Aoyama, China’s Foreign Policy as a Rising Power, In: Tse-Kang Leng & Rumi Aoyama (editors), Decoding the Rise of China: Taiwanese and Japanese Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan; 1st edition, 2018.

  1. Periodicals

1)    Alterman, Jon B., China’s Soft Power in the Middle East (Chapter 5), Mar 10, Centre for strategic and international studies (CSIS), Strategic insights and bipartisan policy Solutions, 2009, available at: http://csis.org/publication/chinas-soft-power-middle-east

2)    Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, Will Trump make China great again? The belt and road initiative and international order, International Affairs, 94: 2, 2018.

3)    Bobo Lo, The Sino‑Russian partnership and global order, China International Strategy Review, 2, 2020.

4)    Farah Adeed & Saleha Anwar, Beyond the End of History and the Chinese Century: An Analysis of the post-COVID-19 World Order, International Review of Social Sciences, Vol. 8, Issue.12, December 2020.

5)     Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 12, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., October 2017.

6)    Kerry Brown, “The Belt and Road: Security Dimensions”, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 16, issue 3, September 2018.

7)    Kurt W. Radtke, China and the Greater Middle East: Globalization: No Longer Equals Westernization, K.W. Radtke /PGDT, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 6 (2007).

8)    Lynn Kuok, How China’s Actions in the South China Sea undermine the rule of law, Brookings Institution, November 2019, available at: https://brook.gs/3yc2UGY

9)    Li Xing, China’s Pursuit of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative: A New World Order with Chinese Characteristics, In: Li Xing (editor), Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative, Springer International Publishing.

10)           Marie-Hélène Schwoob, Chinese views on the global agenda for development, In: The United Nations of China: A vision of the world order – April 2018 – The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)/252, available at:  https://ecfr.eu/wpcontent/uploads/the_united_nations_of_china_a_vision_of_the_world_order.pdf

11)           Mikael Weissmann, Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer “Striving for Achievement”, JCIR: VOL. 3, No. 1 (2015).

12)           Minghao Zhao, Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2019.

13)           Napang, M., Nurhasanah, S., & Rohman, S., One Belt One Road (OBOR) and the Increase of China’s Global Influence. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, 5(2), 2019.

14)           Nye, Jr, Joseph S, Soft Power, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990).

15)           Nye, Jr, Joseph SSoft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), P.P 3-19. Available at: https://webfiles.uci.edu/schofer/classes/2010soc2/readings/8%20Nye%20Soft%20Power%20Ch%201.pdf

16)           Nye, Jr, Joseph S, The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, (May – Jun, 2004).

17)           Nye, Jr, Joseph S, The future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, The World Ahead (November/December 2010).

18)           Pham, J. Peter, China’s Surge in the Middle East and Its Implications for U.S. Interests, American Foreign Policy Interests, 31, 2009

19)           Simon Shen, How China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Compares to the Marshall Plan?, The Diplomat, 6 February 2016, Available at http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/how-chinas-belt-and-road-compares-to-the-marshall-plan/ 

20)           Tsui SIT, Erebus WONG, Kin Chi LAU & Tiejun WEN, One belt, one road: China’s strategy for a new global financial order, Monthly Review, January  Volume 68, Issue 8, 2017.

21)           William A Callahan, China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 2016, Vol. 1(3).

22)           William A. Callahan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), 2016, available at: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep07951

23)           Yu Lintao, A new stage: The Belt and Road Initiative advances after years of hard work and development, in: Working together to deliver a brighter future for Belt and Road cooperation, NPC National People’s Congress of China, ISSUE 2, 2019.

24)           Zhang Zhexin, The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Geopolitical Strategy, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 2018.

  1. Internet Resources:

1)    New U.S. Government Actions on Forced Labor in Xinjiang, Formal statement released by U.S. Secretary of state, JUNE 24, 2021, available at: https://bit.ly/3ifS7WN  

2)    Michael Martina, U.S. Senate passes bill to ban all products from China’s Xinjiang, Reuters, July 15, 2021, available at: https://reut.rs/3i9GwZ5


[1]  Hassan Ibrahim Saad,  Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa ,  reference previously mentioned, p. 120.

[2] Muhammad Saad Abu Amoud, Towards a Multipolar International Order: US-Chinese Relations,  International Politics , (Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, No. (145), July 2001).

[3]Nye, Jr, Joseph S, The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, (May – Jun, 2004), P.P. 16-20.

[4]Nye, Jr, Joseph S, The future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, The World Ahead (November/December 2010), P.P. 2-12.

[5] Abdel Qader Mohamed Fahmy , China’s Role in the Structural Structure of the International System,  reference previously mentioned, p. 20.

[6]Pham, J. Peter, China’s Surge in the Middle East and Its Implications for U.S. Interests, American Foreign Policy Interests, 31, 2009, P. 184.

([7])Kerry Brown, “The Belt and Road: Security Dimensions”, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 16, issue 3, September 2018, P.214

([8]) Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, The Return of Geopolitics and Declining U.S. Hegemony, In: Populism and Globalization: The Return of Nationalism and the Global Liberal Order, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, P. 103.

[9] Ali Salah, Shadi Abdel Wahhab Mansour, The Belt and Road Project, How does China link its economy to the outside world?,  Appendix to Events Trends , Future Center for Research and Advanced Studies, Issue 26-2018, p. 11.

([10]( Kerry Brown, Op.cit., P. 214

([11]) William A Callahan, China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 2016, Vol. 1(3), P. 237

([12]Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, Will Trump make China great again? The belt and road initiative and international order, International Affairs, 94: 2, 2018, P. 236

([13]) William A Callahan, China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order, Op.cit., P.237.

([14]) Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, Op.cit., P. 235.

([15]William A Callahan, China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order, Op.cit., P. 231.

([16]) Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, Op.cit., P. 236

([17]) William A Callahan, China’s ‘‘Asia Dream’’: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order, Op.cit., P.231.

([18])  Ibid, P. 237

([19]) William A. Callahan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), 2016, p 1, available at http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep07951

([20])  Ibid, P. 2

([21]) Li Xing, China’s Pursuit of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative: A New World Order with Chinese Characteristics? In: Li Xing (editor), Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative, Springer International Publishing, P.12

([22]) Ibid

([23])Simon Shen, How China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Compares to the Marshall Plan?, The Diplomat, 6 February 2016, Available at http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/how-chinas-belt-and-road-compares-to-the-marshall-plan/

([24])Minghao Zhao, Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, Vol. 12, No. 3, P.P. 371–394.

[25]  Al-Shaima Hisham Abu Al-Wafa,  Chinese Policy in the International System from 1990 to 2005,  reference previously mentioned, p. 33.

[26] ) Sharifa Kalaa, Towards Reforming a New World Order and Creating a Multipolar World: Features, Indicators, and What Role for China in That?,  Journal of World Politics,  Volume 5, Issue 2, Year 2021, p. 81

[27] ( Ibid., p. 82

[28] Ibtisam Muhammad al-Amiri, The Chinese Role in Africa: A Study in Soft Power Diplomacy,  The Arab Future Magazine,  Volume 40, Issue 46, December 2017, Lebanon, p. 134.

[29]  ( Sherifa Kalaa, reference previously mentioned, p. 82

[30] Ali Sayed Fouad,  The Impact of Changes in the International System on Chinese Foreign Policy towards the United States of America , PhD thesis, (Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2004), pp. 123, 124.  

[31]Kurt W. Radtke, China and the Greater Middle East: Globalization: No Longer Equals Westernization, K.W. Radtke /PGDT, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 6 (2007), P.410.

([32](Tsui SIT, Erebus wong, Kin Chi LAU & Tiejun WEN, One belt, one road: China’s strategy for a new global financial order, Monthly Review, January 2017, Volume 68, Issue 8, P.38

( [33] ( Napang , M. , Nurhasanah , S. , & Rohman , S. , One Belt One Road (OBOR) and the Increase of China’s Global Influence. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, 5(2), , P

([34]) Ibid

([35])Rumi Aoyama, China’s Foreign Policy as a Rising Power, in: Tse-Kang Leng & Rumi Aoyama (editors), Decoding the Rise of China: Taiwanese and Japanese Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan; 1st edition, 2018, P. 33

([36]) Tsui SIT, Erebus Wong, Kin Chi LAU, Tiejun WEN, Op.cit., P.38

([37]) Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, Chairs, Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, China’s Belt and Road Implications for the United States, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Independent Task Force Report No. 79, March 2021, P. 18

([38]) Ibid

[39]Nye, Jr, Joseph SSoft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), P.P 3-19. Available at:https://webfiles.uci.edu/schofer/classes/2010soc2/readings/8%20Nye%20Soft%20Power%20Ch%201.pdf

Also: Alterman, Jon B., China’s Soft Power in the Middle East (Chapter 5), Mar 10, Centre for strategic and international studies (CSIS), Strategic insights and bipartisan policy Solutions, 2009, available at:

http://csis.org/publication/chinas-soft-power-middle-east

 Also:  Noam Chomsky; Arabization: Osama Asber,  Rogue States: The Use of Force in Global Affairs,  (Riyadh, Obeikan Library, 2004).

[40] ) Soft War: Theoretical and Practical Foundations, Soft War Center for Studies, Beirut – Lebanon, first edition, 2014, p. 22

[41] ) Ibid., p. 23

([42]) Zhang Zhexin, The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Geopolitical Strategy, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 2018, p 336

([43]) Yu Lintao, A new stage: The Belt and Road Initiative advances after years of hard work and development, in: Working together to deliver a brighter future for Belt and Road cooperation, NPC National People’s Congress of China, ISSUE 2, 2019, p 12

([44])  Napang, M., Nurhasanah, S., & Rohman, S., Op.cit, P 64

([45])  Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, Op.cit., P95

([46])  Ibid, p. 98

([47])Jacob J. Lew &Gary Roughead, Chairs, Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, China’s Belt and Road Implications for United States, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Independent Task Force Report No. 79, March 2021, P. 19.

[48] ​​Mohamed El-Sayed Selim, The Reality and Future of Alliances in Asia,  International Politics , (Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Issue (183), January 2011), p. 52.

, Brown, Kerry, Mixed signals: China in the Middle East, Policy Brief, No (190), December 2014.

[49] (  Ibid, p. 95

([50]) Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, Op.cit., pp. 107–108

([51]) Ibid, p 108

([52] ( Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, Op.cit., pp. 108–109).

([53])  Ibid, p 109

([54])  Ibid, p 109

 [55]Nye, Jr, Joseph S, Soft Power, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), P.P. 153-171.

[56] Hassan Ibrahim Saad,  Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa,  reference previously mentioned, p. 130, 131.

, Pham, J. Peter, China’s Surge in the Middle East and Its Implications for U.S. Interests, American Foreign Policy Interests, 31, 2009, P.P. 188-189.

([57]) Minghao Zhao, Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2019, Vol. 12, No. 3, P. 384.

([58])Lynn Kuok, How China’s Actions in the South China Sea undermine the rule of law, Brookings

Institution, November 2019, available at: https://brook.gs/3yc2UGY, P. 8

([59]) Ibid

([60])Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies China Strategic Perspectives, No. 12, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., October 2017, P.P. 19- 20.

([61] ( Ibid, P.20.

([62]) Ibid, P. 20

([63])Marie-Hélène Schwoob, Chinese views on the global agenda for development, In: The United Nations of China: A vision of the world order – April 2018 – The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)/252, P. 19, available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/the_united_nations_of_china_a_vision_of_the_world_order.pdf

([64])China’s foreign policy and external relations, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, July 2015, European Union, 2015, P. 44

([65]( Bobo Lo, The Sino‑Russian partnership and global order, China International Strategy Review, 2, 2020, P. 310

([66])William A. Callahan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order, Op. cit, P 4

([67]) Lynn Kuok, Op.Cit, P. 6

([68]) Ibid

([69]) Ibid, p. 7

([70]) Ibid, p 2

([71]) Muhammad Fayez Farhat, Conflict in the South China Sea and Egyptian interests,  Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies , 8-1-2017, available at:  https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/5638.aspx

([72])  Marie-Hélène Schwoob, Op.cit., P. 18

([73])  Ibid, p. 19

([74]) Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughead, Chairs, Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, Op.cit., P. 17

([75]) Ibid

[76]  Hassan Ibrahim Saad,  Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa since the End of the Cold War,  PhD thesis, (Cairo University, Institute for African Research and Studies, Department of Politics and Economics, 2007), p. 114.

([77]) Mikael Weissmann, Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer “Striving For Achievement”, JCIR: VOL. 3, No. 1 (2015), P.P 162 – 163

([78] ( Richard W. Mansbach & Yale H. Ferguson, Op.cit., p. 106).

[79] Ibid, p 106 – 107

([80])  Ibid, p 107

[81] Farah Adeed & Saleha Anwar, Beyond the End of History and the Chinese Century: An Analysis of the post-COVID-19 World Order, International Review of Social Sciences, Vol. 8, Issue.12, December 2020, P.P. 34 – 36

[82] Ibid

[83] Ibid

([84]( New U.S. Government Actions on Forced Labor in Xinjiang, Formal statement released by U.S. Secretary of state, JUNE 24, 2021, available athttps://bit.ly/3ifS7WN

([85]) Ibid

([86]) Michael Martina, U.S. Senate passes bill to ban all products from China’s Xinjiang, Reuters, July 15, 2021, available at: https://reut.rs/3i9GwZ5

[87] ) Yassin Amer Abdul-Jabbar Al-Rubaie,  The Reality of China’s Status and Future in the Structural Structure of the International System: Constraints and Opportunities , Master’s Thesis in Political Science, Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, Middle East University, Jordan, 2018, p. 104.

[88] ( Sherifa Kalaa, reference previously mentioned, pp. 93-94

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

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