Chinese views on nuclear weapons: Evidence from an online survey

By Naomi Egel1,  R. Lincoln Hines2

1Cornell University, USA

2US Air War College, USA

Abstract

What are Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons? Although scholars have studied Chinese elites’ views on nuclear weapons, surprisingly little is known about the views of China’s public. To understand Chinese public views on nuclear weapons, we conduct an online survey (N = 1066) of Chinese respondents. This is, to our knowledge, the first survey of Chinese public attitudes towards nuclear weapons. We find that although Chinese citizens view the possession of nuclear weapons as important for their country’s security, they strongly oppose the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We also provide respondents an opportunity to describe their views on nuclear weapons in their own words. Using computer-assisted text analysis, we assess patterns in these open-ended responses and compare across age groups. We find that younger respondents emphasize non-material factors such as having a greater voice internationally, whereas older respondents emphasize self-defense. Overall, this analysis sheds light on the public attitudes that may shape China’s evolving approach to nuclear weapons.

Introduction

What are Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons? Despite possessing nuclear weapons since 1964, China has a far smaller nuclear arsenal than either the United States or Russia. China, moreover, has long maintained an explicit no-first-use nuclear weapons posture. China’s approach to nuclear weapons is thus distinct among nuclear weapon states (Fravel and Medeiros, 2010; Wu, 2013). However, as Chinese power continues to increase, a vigorous debate is occurring in Chinese strategic communities regarding the future of China’s nuclear arsenal and doctrine (Bin and Zhao, 2016; Nan, 2018).In examining Chinese nuclear attitudes, scholars often focus on the views of political and military elites (e.g. Cunningham and Fravel, 2015, 2019; Fravel and Medeiros, 2010; Pollack, 1972). Yet far less is known about how China’s public views nuclear weapons. Although scholars often dismiss the role of public opinion in autocracies such as China, a growing body of scholarship finds that the Chinese government is highly concerned with and responsive to public opinion (e.g. Distelhorst and Hou, 2017; Meng et al., 2017).To understand Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons, we conducted an online survey (N = 1066) of Chinese respondents in June–July 2020. We find that Chinese respondents strongly favor possessing nuclear weapons and believe that they provide security benefits. However, respondents also largely oppose the use of nuclear weapons in war. When examining responses by age group, we find that although most respondents do not view China’s possession of nuclear weapons as a liability, older respondents more frequently view nuclear weapons as a liability than younger respondents do.We also asked respondents to describe their views on nuclear weapons in their own words. Using computer-assisted text analysis, we investigate patterns in these responses and compare across age groups. We find that younger respondents emphasize factors such as having a greater voice internationally, whereas older respondents emphasize factors related to self-defense. Overall, the results suggest that although China’s public broadly supports their country’s possession of nuclear weapons, younger citizens may have different understandings regarding the purpose of nuclear weapons than older citizens.

China, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons and public opinion

Scholars studying the drivers behind China’s contemporary nuclear weapons program often focus on leaders and other elites. For example, Fravel and Medeiros argue that for China’s senior political and military leaders, nuclear weapons have two primary uses: deterring nuclear attack and countering nuclear coercion, not as a tool for warfighting (Fravel and Medeiros, 2010: 58). Yet it is unclear whether the Chinese public’s views on nuclear weapons are consistent with that of their leadership. This is important because in other areas of international security, scholars have found that China’s leadership is both constrained by and strategically seeks to shape public opinion in support of the regime’s policies (Weiss, 2014; Weiss and Dafoe, 2019).Understanding the role of public opinion in Chinese nuclear policymaking requires first assessing what the Chinese public’s views on nuclear weapons are. For example, does the Chinese public support both the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons? Does China’s public view nuclear weapons as an unalloyed good or as a liability? Moreover, beyond assessing support for nuclear weapons among the Chinese public, this study also provides a first cut at examining the reasoning behind the public’s views on nuclear weapons.If Chinese citizens view nuclear weapons as a liability, public opposition to nuclear weapons could empower political elites who seek to reduce their state’s arsenal. Alternatively, if the public does not view nuclear weapons as a liability but rather only as an asset, elites may feel emboldened to expand their state’s nuclear arsenal. Citizens may also support their country possessing nuclear weapons even if they oppose the use of nuclear weapons. For example, citizens may perceive nuclear weapons to have significant value as a deterrent or as a prestige symbol (O’Neill, 2006). Thus, it is important to understand Chinese citizens’ views on nuclear weapons. However, little is known about Chinese public attitudes on these issues.

Nuclear weapons in the Chinese context

Although China is an autocracy, it is not immune to public pressure, including in its approach to nuclear weapons. Since the reform era, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has faced a growing legitimacy crisis and has become increasingly concerned about domestic public opinion. The CCP exerts considerable resources to influence, censor, and monitor public opinion (King et al., 2013, 2017; Meng et al., 2017). In many cases, the CCP is highly responsive to public opinion (Su and Meng, 2016).The CCP also heavily promotes its nuclear program to domestic audiences, indicating the importance of public opinion on this issue. China’s nuclear program is a key feature of nationalist narratives surrounding China’s “Two Bombs, One Satellite” program, and the CCP promotes its nuclear weapons program in state media and national military parades and museums (e.g. Haynes, 2020: 41; Yang, 2019). The prominence given to nuclear weapons in nationalist narratives indicates that public opinion is an important consideration for China’s nuclear program. Moreover, China’s nuclear weapons posture has been repeatedly discussed in state media in recent years (e.g. Global Times, 2017; Hu, 2020).In assessing Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons, we also examine generational differences in attitudes. Other scholars have referenced the importance of these differences in understanding public attitudes (e.g. Johnston, 2017). In the Chinese context, there are clear generational differences across those who grew up under Maoist China, the reform era (the 八零后 or post-1980s) generation, and those growing up in the Internet age. These different formative experiences may lead Chinese citizens to hold varied conceptions about China’s security and place in the world.

Survey design and methodology

To understand Chinese public perceptions regarding nuclear weapons, we surveyed Chinese online respondents about the importance of China possessing nuclear weapons, whether nuclear weapons are a security benefit and/or liability, and their views on the use of nuclear weapons. We also provided respondents an opportunity to describe, in their own words, why (or why not) they consider it important for China to possess nuclear weapons. We then use a structural topic model to assess patterns in these open-ended responses and compare these themes across age groups.We conducted an online survey (N = 1066) with Chinese respondents in June–July 2020. This survey represents, to our knowledge, the first survey of Chinese public perceptions regarding nuclear weapons. We asked Chinese respondents how important it is for China to have nuclear weapons (on a scale of 1 = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, and 4 = don’t know). We also asked respondents whether they view China’s nuclear weapons as a liability and whether nuclear weapons benefit Chinese security.

Additionally, to assess whether there is a public taboo against nuclear weapons use, we asked respondents whether nuclear weapons should ever be used in warfare.1 These three questions were coded on a five-point Likert scale (in which 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree).2We designed and implemented the survey through Qualtrics, fielding it to respondents aged 18 years and older throughout mainland China. We used stratified sampling so that our respondent pool closely resembles key demographic features of China’s online population. Although we have no reason to expect survey respondents to answer these questions in a systematically different way than the general population, it is important to note differences in the demographic characteristics of China’s online population versus the population writ large: Internet users tend to be younger and more highly educated (Huang, 2015: 292-293).3 

However, as opposed to in-person surveys, online samples have been demonstrated to improve response validity (Chang and Krosnick, 2010; Kreuter et al., 2008)—potential concerns in autocracies such as China. Still, considering the potentially sensitive nature of these questions, our findings may be sensitive to self-censorship. Nonetheless, this self-censorship is likely to also operate in the real-world. As Weiss and Dafoe (2019: 964) argue, even when self-censorship occurs, preferences that Chinese citizens are willing to state publicly are politically consequential for shaping regime policy. At the same time, Shen and Truex (2020) find that levels of self-censorship may not be as high in China as is commonly assumed.It is also necessary to discuss the timing of the survey (June–July 2020). During the summer of 2020, the Trump administration publicly pressured China to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations. These issues were salient in China: during this time, a Global Times editorial discussed increasing the size of China’s nuclear arsenal (Hu, 2020). Yet this was not the first time Chinese state media discussed China’s nuclear arsenal or arms control. For example, in 2017 another Global Times editorial argued that President Trump’s calls for a US nuclear buildup meant that China would need to respond by strengthening its own nuclear capability (Global Times, 2017). Thus, although debates about China’s nuclear arsenal may have been prevalent in the summer of 2020, these public debates had been ongoing for several years.

Survey results

Figure 1 shows that respondents overwhelmingly consider it very important for China to have nuclear weapons. Likewise, Figure 2 indicates that most Chinese citizens perceive nuclear weapons to benefit Chinese security. However, whereas 86% of respondents agree or strongly agree that nuclear weapons benefit Chinese security, only 55% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the view that China’s possession of nuclear weapons is a liability (Figure 3). This indicates that for many Chinese citizens, nuclear weapons are both a security benefit and a liability. Figure 4 shows that 87% of respondents believe countries should never use nuclear weapons in warfare, indicating strong support for a norm of non-use. Overall, respondents support the possession but not the use of nuclear weapons, and have mixed views as to whether nuclear weapons are a liability.

Figure 1. Support for nuclear weapons. 1 = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, 4 = don’t know.

Figure 2. Views on security benefits of nuclear weapons. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

Figure 3. Views on nuclear weapons as liability. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

Figure 4. Views on non-use of nuclear weapons. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

We also assess whether respondents have different views on nuclear weapons based on their age groups. We divide respondents into three age groups—young (18–24), middle (25–40), and older (41–72)—which each include approximately one-third of respondents. This categorization also approximates the distinctions between China’s pre-reform (before 1980) and reform era generations—and divides the reform era between the 1980–1995 cohort that grew up without widespread Internet and the post-1995 cohort of “digital natives” (those who grew up with the Internet).4

Figure 5 indicates that support for China having nuclear weapons is largely shared across generational divides and is roughly even across age groups. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the majority of respondents, across age groups, view nuclear weapons as benefiting Chinese security.

Figure 5. Support for nuclear weapons by age. 1 = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, 4 = don’t know

Figure 6. Views on nuclear weapons as security benefit, by age. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

However, Figure 7 indicates generational differences in whether respondents view nuclear weapons as a liability. Although most respondents do not view nuclear weapons as a liability, this view is most common among those in the young and middle-age categories. In comparison, those in the older category more often view nuclear weapons as a liability. One potential explanation for these differences is that the older generation was more likely to experience the Mao era, when China’s rapid development of nuclear weapons was accompanied by the domestic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and a period when China nearly went to war with the nuclear-armed Soviet Union over Zhenbao Island. Those living through the unrest of this period may be more likely to view nuclear weapons as a liability in periods of domestic instability or heightened international tension. Alternatively, it is possible that the word “liability” (负担) could connote that this older generation views nuclear weapons as economically costly, yet possessing advantages for enhancing Chinese security.5 However, since the preceding survey questions focus on security issues, it is likely that respondents view these weapons as a security liability. Nonetheless, regardless of why these respondents view nuclear weapons as a liability, the fact that they do indicates that support for nuclear weapons is qualified.

Figure 7. Views on nuclear weapons as liability by age. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

Figure 8 demonstrates modest generational differences in attitudes regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons. Although the vast majority of respondents agree that countries should never use nuclear weapons in warfare, the younger generation is stronger in their support for this norm (the “strongly agree” category). In contrast, support for this norm is slightly weaker among older and middle-aged respondents, who respond “agree” more frequently than the younger generation. This suggests that support for the nuclear taboo may be more contingent for these older groups, qualified by factors beyond the scope of this study.

Figure 8. Views on non-use of nuclear weapons by age. 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Completely agree.

Text analysis

We also conduct a quantitative text analysis of the open-ended responses to the question “How important is it for China to have nuclear weapons?” Given that 79% of respondents consider it “very important” that China has nuclear weapons, the open-ended responses largely reflect this view. After removing punctuation, numbers, and standard Mandarin stopwords, the open-ended responses contain a total of 768 unique characters. Table 1 shows the 10 most frequently used characters in the open-ended survey responses. As Table 1 illustrates, Chinese respondents reference security, strength, deterrence, and status in explaining why China should have nuclear weapons. Respondents also frequently cite national defense and protect, suggesting that they view nuclear weapons as a defensive rather than an offensive tool.

Table 1. Most frequently used characters.

We then examine the relationship between respondents’ ages and their views regarding nuclear weapons’ utility (i.e. their open-ended responses) by running a structural topic model. This enables us to both identify the most frequent topics discussed by respondents in explaining their answer, and also estimate the relationship between these topics and respondents’ age cohort. We identify eight coherent topics in respondents’ answers and label them deterring great powers, rights and voice, territorial interference, strength, country and nation, self-defense, ensuring national security, and technology and prestige.6

In the structural topic modeling approach, each respondent’s open-ended answer is not necessarily reflective of only one topic but may contain multiple topics. Additionally, structural topic modeling groups words (or characters) into topics based on how they are used in relation to one another. Consequently, characters like 核武器 (nuclear weapon) and 中国 (China) may be found in several different topics, based on how they are associated with other characters. The data include all respondents, regardless of whether or not they view nuclear weapons as important. For example, some respondents who did not view nuclear weapons as important wrote that China is “too poor.”7

The topics indicate different purposes of nuclear weapons. For example, in Chinese narratives surrounding China’s “century of humiliation,” China is often portrayed as the victim of “bullying” by great powers. Nuclear weapons may thus be a means of deterring great powers from bullying China. In contrast, the topic rights and voice refers to nuclear weapons as a political tool, giving China more rights and a greater voice in the international system. Similarly, the topic technology and prestige indicates a political purpose for nuclear weapons, as advanced technologies are often seen as a source of prestige and an important component of China’s Comprehensive National Power. The territorial interference topic suggests that respondents may view nuclear weapons as a means to prevent interference in China’s sovereignty and territory. This also has historical antecedents: China’s century of humiliation is characterized as a period of constant territorial interference by Western powers.

Figures 9–11 show the relationship between each topic and the three age categories (with confidence intervals). The x-axis reflects the percentage of language devoted to each topic (out of 1.00) in each age group of respondents, out of all written responses in each age group.

Figure 11. Topic Models, Set 3.

Figure 9 indicates that all groups of respondents particularly emphasize the topics strength and ensuring national security. Both topics refer to security benefits provided by nuclear weapons, but are also holistic categories and could stem from multiple sources. Several respondents referencing ensuring national security simply wrote “ensuring national security,”8 whereas a typical response for the strength topic was that nuclear weapons “increase military strength.”9 Respondents also discuss the topic technology and prestige at roughly equal rates; albeit less frequently than the topics strength and ensuring national security.

Figure 10 indicates that younger respondents particularly emphasize the rights and voice topic. In contrast, middle-age respondents discuss this topic less and older respondents mention it even less frequently. The rights and voice topic refers to the non-material implications of nuclear weapons; indicating that younger respondents may value nuclear weapons more as instruments for wielding political influence internationally than older respondents do. For example, one respondent wrote: “Nuclear weapons are a symbol of the status and strength of a country. I think that even if they are not used, [we] should always have nuclear weapons. Otherwise, China’s voice in the world may be discounted, or [we] may suffer injustice.”10 Similarly, another respondent referenced a Mao Zedong quote, stating: “Power comes from the barrel of a gun. Nuclear weapons determine international voice.”11 This suggests that younger Chinese citizens, who have lived through China’s economic rise, may have higher expectations for China’s international influence—and view nuclear weapons as a political tool for attaining this.

Older and middle-aged respondents, in contrast, discuss the self-defense topic more than younger respondents, indicating a heightened perception of nuclear weapons as important for defending China. For example, in referencing self-defense, one respondent wrote that nuclear weapons are “a means of self-protection.”12 Younger respondents discuss this topic less than any other topic, suggesting that they view nuclear weapons as having only limited utility for self-defense. One possible explanation for these perceptions is that the younger cohort grew up in a wealthier and more secure China—one with comparatively more advanced conventional military capabilities—than did older citizens.

As Figure 11 shows, all three groups of respondents emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons for deterring great powers at roughly equal rates. They also emphasize the topic country and nation at roughly equal rates, reflecting the close connections they view between nuclear weapons and their nation’s identity. Yet respondents in the middle-age group (those born in the post-reform era but before the rise of the Internet) are less concerned by territorial interference than either older or younger age groups. In contrast, younger respondents more frequently reference territorial interference in explaining why nuclear weapons are important.

Conclusion

This study provides a necessary first cut at understanding how China’s public views nuclear weapons. We show that China’s public maintains high levels of support for the possession of nuclear weapons and views nuclear weapons as enhancing China’s security. However, we find generational differences in Chinese attitudes regarding nuclear weapons. Our study also shows that in explaining the importance of nuclear weapons, older generations are more likely to reference the benefits of nuclear weapons for self-defense, whereas younger generations are more likely to emphasize non-material factors like providing China greater rights and voice internationally. These results indicate that Chinese public support for nuclear weapons is not based on a common consensus regarding the purpose and utility of these weapons, but stems from a variety of reasons.

Future research should also more thoroughly examine the conditions under which public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons vary and investigate the causal pathways between Chinese public opinion and nuclear weapons policies. This study also suggests that younger generations of Chinese citizens may have different perceptions regarding the utility of nuclear weapons than older generations. Future work might also investigate these differences across age groups. As younger generations represent the future of China, including China’s nuclear strategy, it is crucially important to understand their views.

Notes

1.This question does not distinguish between first and second-use of nuclear weapons and is not intended to assess support for China’s no first-use policy, but rather whether there exists among the Chinese public a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons at all.

2.These questions do not assess the effects of elite cues, probe differences in attitudes regarding first and second-use of nuclear weapons, or examine the conditions under which respondents might support a nuclear strike. Nonetheless, it is important to first establish a baseline of Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons, in the absence of experimental manipulation.

3.See Appendix in the supplementary materials online for additional information.

4.Other studies of Chinese public opinion have found important differences across age groups. Johnston (2017: 25–35), for example, finds that Chinese youth hold more amicable views toward Japan and the United States than older generations, and suggests that these differences may occur because younger generations have been “the most exposed to the economic and cultural effects of globalization.”

5.We thank Reviewer 1 for this suggestion.

6.See Appendix for characters associated with each topic.

7.太穷.

8.保证国家安全

9.增加军事实力

10.核武器是一个国家的地位和实力的象征，我认为即使不使用，也应该要总有核武器。否则中国在世界的话

语权可能会打折扣，也可能会因此遭受不公

11.枪杆子出政权。核武决定国际话语权

12.这是一种自保的手段

Carnegie Corporation of New York Grant

This publication was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

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